Audirsch v. Audirsch, 012221 TNCIV, M2020-00279-COA-R3-CV

Docket Nº:M2020-00279-COA-R3-CV
Opinion Judge:ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE
Party Name:DARLA JO ADAMS AUDIRSCH v. GRIFFIN LYNN AUDIRSCH
Attorney:L. Samuel Patterson, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Griffin Lynn Audirsch. Darla Jo Adams Audirsch , Lynchburg Tennessee, Pro se.
Judge Panel:Arnold B. Goldin, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Andy D. Bennett, and John W. McClarty, J., joined.
Case Date:January 22, 2021
Court:Court of Appeals of Tennessee

DARLA JO ADAMS AUDIRSCH

v.

GRIFFIN LYNN AUDIRSCH

No. M2020-00279-COA-R3-CV

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Nashville

January 22, 2021

Assigned on Briefs January 4, 2021

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Moore County No. 2907 J. B. Cox, Chancellor

The Appellant, who is the former spouse of the Appellee, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for "Rule 60" relief seeking residential time with the Appellee's child. There is no dispute that the Appellant has been excluded as the father of the child based upon DNA testing he requested. Discerning no error on the part of the trial court, we affirm its judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed and Remanded.

L. Samuel Patterson, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Griffin Lynn Audirsch.

Darla Jo Adams Audirsch [1] , Lynchburg Tennessee, Pro se.

Arnold B. Goldin, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Andy D. Bennett, and John W. McClarty, J., joined.

OPINION

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE

The present appeal stems from a divorce proceeding between Griffin Lynn Audirsch ("the Appellant") and Darla Jo Adams Audirsch ("the Appellee"). In her complaint commencing divorce proceedings against the Appellant, the Appellee averred that one child had been born during the marriage, but she asserted that the Appellant was not the biological father. According to the Appellee, both she and the Appellant were aware that he was not the father of the child. The complaint alleged the Appellee's child had been born in December 2014 and that the parties had separated the following summer in August 2015. According to the Appellee, the Appellant was incarcerated at the time of the complaint's filing. Following the filing of the Appellee's divorce complaint, the Appellant requested DNA testing to determine parentage. Subsequent testing, conducted pursuant to court order, confirmed the Appellee's assertion, placing the Appellant's probability of paternity at "0%." The ensuing divorce judgment accordingly noted there was clear and convincing evidence that the Appellant was not the biological father of the Appellee's child and held that he had no rights or claims to the child.

The Appellant's present grievance specifically relates to his unsuccessful effort to set aside the trial court's judgment relative to claimed rights to the child. In a "Rule 60" motion filed subsequent to the entry of the divorce decree, 2 the Appellant acknowledged he was not the biological father of the child but requested that he be awarded "residential...

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