Auerbacher v. Wood.

Decision Date30 April 1947
Docket Number147/13.
Citation53 A.2d 800
PartiesAUERBACHER et al. v. WOOD.
CourtNew Jersey Court of Chancery

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Suit by Louis Auerbacher, Jr., and others, constituting the Essex County Bar Association, against Charles A. Wood to enjoin the alleged unlawful practice of law by the defendant.

Bill dismissed.

Louis Auerbacher, Jr., and George W. C. McCarter, both of Newark, Milton T. Lasher, of Hackensack, and Samuel J. Kaufman, of Newark, for complainants.

Pitney, Hardin, Ward & Brennan, of Newark (William J. Brennan, Jr., of Newark,) for defendant.

BIGELOW, Vice Chancellor.

This is a suit to enjoin what complainants charge to be the unlawful practice of the law by the defendant, Charles A. Wood. Mr. Wood is not licensed to practice in New Jersey. The complainants are the Essex County Bar Association, a committee of the State Bar Association, and Louis Auerbacher, Jr., an attorney and counsellor-at-law.

The defendant at the outset challenges the title of complainants to maintain the suit and the jurisdiction of Chancery to grant relief. Discussion in this court, however, is foreclosed by Unger v. Landlords' Management Corp., 114 N.J.Eq. 68, 168 A. 229, which settles the question in favor of complainants. In our sister states also, during the past 15 years, courts of equity have frequently enjoined the unlawful practice of the law at the suit of a bar association. Chicago Bar Association v. United Taxpayers Association, 312 Ill.App. 243, 38 N.E.2d 349; Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27; Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910, 94 A.L.R. 356; Dworken v. Apartment House Owners Association, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577; Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883; Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.2d 401; Merrick v. American Security & Trust Co., 71 App.D.C. 72, 107 F.2d 271. This jurisdiction perhaps grows from a realization that an injunction is an effective means for protecting the public, and is less harsh than an indictment, and from the fact that bar associations are well fitted to perform the public function of prosecuting the cause. Recognition in New Jersey of the public aspect of bar associations is found in R. S. 2:17-2; 2:23-1, et seq., N.J.S.A.,; Supreme Court Rule 14; In re New Jersey State Bar Association, 111 N.J.Eq. 234, 162 A. 99; Id., 112 N.J.Eq. 236, 164 A. 1; Id., 112 N.J.Eq., 606, 166 A. 316; Id., 114 N.J.Eq. 261, 168 A. 794. We proceed then to inquire whether the defendant is unlawfully practicing law, or rather was he about to do so when the suit was started. He had just opened an office in Montclair and begun to hunt a clientele, but when confronted with litigation, he deferred activities pending the outcome of the suit. In this opinion, however, I will use the present tense as if he were actually doing what he plans to do if the court permits.

The defendant is a consultant to employers in labor or industrial relations. The subject of industrial relations as commonly understood and as defined by defendant, begins with the processes by which employees are obtained, then deals with their training, provisions for their safety, health and welfare, morale building, pension systems, employee records, the settlement of grievances, wage administration, negotiations with unions and appearances before arbitrators and administrative agencies. In such matters, defendant purposes to assist the employer in the determination of policies, in the development of an organization fitted to carry out the policies and in the formulation of effective routine practices. He is ready, if called upon, personally to handle or aid in the handling of specific problems. For example let us say, the avoidance of friction upon the promotion of a negro to a position theretofore held by a white employee. Or the negotiation of a contract with a labor union.

The relation between employer and his employee group and the duties of the former toward the latter, have become the subject of many statutes and governmental regulations. Of necessity, no one handling industrial relations, or acting as a consultant, can render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems to me clear that defendant's knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law; although I am aware of a suggested definition of the practice of law that includes the rendition of any sort of service which requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901. It is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the law: That certain acts are punishable as crimes; that trespass is actionable; that there must be a consideration for a contract; that land titles pass by deed; that a last will and testament must be witnessed. Our knowledge of the law-accurate or inaccurate-moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. It may well be recalled that Blackstone's Commentaries were originally read as lectures at Oxford, not to young men who expected to become law-yers, but to the generality of the students that they might acquire ‘a competent knowledge of the laws of that society in which we live.’ Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it...

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13 cases
  • Sperry v. State of Florida the Florida Bar
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • May 27, 1963
    ...N.Y.S.2d 209, 218 (1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949) (Treasury and Tex Court) (by implication); Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J.Eq. 599, 604, 53 A.2d 800, 803 (1947), aff'd, 142 N.J.Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (1948) (N.L.R.B.); De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S.W.2d 14......
  • Petition of Soto
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • October 23, 1989
    ...Ass'n. v. N.J. Ass'n of Realty Bds., 93 N.J. 470, 473, 461 A.2d 1112 supplemented 94 N.J. 449, 467 A.2d 577 (1983); Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J.Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (Ch.1947), aff'd 142 N.J.Eq. 484, 485, 59 A.2d 863 (E. & A.1948) (what constitutes the practice of law does not always lend it......
  • New Jersey Optometric Ass'n v. Hillman-Kohan Eyeglasses, Inc.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • September 28, 1976
    ...39 L.Ed. 1092, 1103 (1895), or where the plaintiff is capable and competent to protect the public interest, Cf. Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J.Eq. 599, 600, 53 A.2d 800 (Ch.1947). Nor will it be granted to those who proceed under the outward pretense of a public service, motivated in fact by s......
  • New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern New Jersey Mortg. Associates
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • May 23, 1960
    ...line between such activities and permissible business and professional activities by non-lawyers is indistinct. See Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J.Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (Ch.1947), affirmed 142 N.J.Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 864 (E. & A.1948). In the Auerbacher case Justice Heher noted that what constitut......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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