Augustine Band of Cahuilla Indians v. California
| Decision Date | 06 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1:21-CV-1509 AWI SKO |
| Parties | AUGUSTINE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS, a federally-recognized Indian tribe, Plaintiff v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and GAVIN NEWSOM, as Governor of the State of California, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO TRANSFER VENUE
Plaintiff Augustin Band of Cahuilla Indians (the “Tribe”) has filed suit against the State of California and Gov. Gavin Newsom (collectively “California”) alleging violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). Specifically, the Tribe alleges that California failed to engage in good faith negotiations on a new Tribal-State Gaming Compact. Currently before the Court is California's 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) motion to transfer venue from the Eastern District of California (“EDCA”) to the Central District of California (“CDCA”). For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.
California argues that the existing Tribal Gaming Compact between the Tribe and California contains a forum selection clause. Under this clause, venue for disputes involving good faith negotiations is set in the CDCA. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Atlantic Marine, the clause should be enforced and this matter transferred to the CDCA.
Alternatively the relevant § 1404 factors favor a transfer. Because IGRA good faith cases are resolved by evaluating the record of negotiation between the Tribe and California, live witnesses are not used. This means that many of the typical transfer factors do not apply. Further, the CDCA has more judges and a less congested docket, which means that the case will likely be resolved quicker in the CDCA. Further, any common interests that this case may share with other IGRA good faith cases pending in the EDCA will be resolved before the Ninth Circuit in the Chicken Ranch litigation. Thus, this case will be resolved based on its own record of negotiation and the Ninth Circuit's decision. Finally because the Tribe's casino is located in the CDCA, the case could have been brought in that district and there is no impediment to transfer.
The Tribe argues that venue is appropriate in the EDCA and should not be transferred to the CDCA. The forum selection clause is permissive, which means that the analysis of Atlantic Marine does not apply. In terms of the traditional § 1404(a) factors, the convenience of the parties and witnesses is not a significant factor because this case will be decided on the record of negotiations and likely cross-motions for summary judgment. However, the “interests of justice” related factors weigh against a transfer. Judge Ishii has already ruled on lawsuits against California by at least six other tribes and is currently presiding over eight other cases, most of which involve cross-motions for summary judgment. No other judge is as familiar with IGRA tribal-state compact negotiations occurring in the last five years (like the negotiations in this case). Although the record of negotiation is not identical to other pending cases, this case and the other cases pending before Judge Ishii involve either substantially similar or identical legal issues, applicable law, and demands by California. Those demands are largely also at issue before the Ninth Circuit in the Chicken Ranch case. If this case is transferred to the CDCA, the parties will need to familiarize a new judge with a detailed factual background and a legal framework with witch the judge will be unfamiliar. This would be a considerable burden to the CDCA. Further, while most of the issues in this case are the same as Chicken Ranch, there are demands made by California that were not made in Chicken Ranch, which means that Chicken Ranch will not per se be dispositive of all issues in this case. Additionally, this motion is an attempt at forum shopping because this Court has issued rulings in the Chicken Ranch case that would be against California and would be dispositive in this case. Finally, this motion has resulted in an unnecessary delay.
The 2000 Tribal-Gaming Compact between the Tribe and California contains a forum selection clause. That clause reads:
Disagreements that are not otherwise resolved by arbitration or other mutually agreeable means as provided in Section 9.3 may be resolved in the United States District Court where the Tribe's Gaming Facility is located, or is to be located, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (or, if those federal courts lack jurisdiction, in any state court of competent jurisdiction and its related courts of appeal). The disputes to be submitted to court action include, but are not limited to, claims of breach or violation of this Compact, or failure to negotiate in good faith as required by the terms of this Compact.
Doc. 13-3 at Ex. A, p. 27 (“2000 Tribal-Gaming Compact”) at ¶ 9.1(d).[1]
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides in relevant part: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This statute partially displaces the common law doctrine offorum non conveniens. See Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). The purpose of § 1404(a) is “to prevent the waste of time, energy, and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 616 (1964). “Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Stewart Organization, Inc. v. RICOH Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). The analysis of a § 1404(a) motion depends on whether a forum selection clause is at issue, see Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 62-63 (2013); Depuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 28 F.4th 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2022), and whether the forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive. See Lakeside Surfaces, Inc. v. Cambria Co., 16 F.4th 209, 216 (6th Cir. 2021); D&S Consulting, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 961 F.3d 1209, 1213 (2020); BAE Sys. Tech. Sol. & Servs. v. Republic of Korea's Def. Acquisition Program Admin., 884 F.3d 463, 471-72 (4th Cir. 2018); Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 766-67 (5th Cir. 2016); Found. Fitness Prods., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. FreeMotion Fitness, 121 F.Supp.3d 1038, 1043 (D. Or. 2015). “To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one.” Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 794 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2015); Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1995). A permissive clause often authorizes jurisdiction in a designated forum and does not prohibit litigation elsewhere. See Rivera v. Kress Stores of P.R., Inc., 30 F.4th 98, 103 (1st Cir. 2022); Slater v. Energy Servs. Grp. Int'l, Inc., 634 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2011); Hunt Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1987).
If a permissive forum selection clause is at issue, courts will examine the traditional public and private factors in determining whether to transfer venue. See Lakeside Surfaces, 16 F.4th at 216; D&S Consulting, 961 F.3d at 1213; BAE Sys., 884 F.3d at 471-72; Weber, 811 F.3d at 76667. Those factors include: (1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed; (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law; (3) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (4) the respective parties' contacts with the forum; (5) the forum's contacts with the plaintiffs cause of action; (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums; (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses; (8) the ease of access to sources of proof; (9) the presence of a forum selection clause; (10) the relevant public policy of the forum state, if any; (11) convenience of the parties; (12) convenience of the witnesses; (13) local interest in the controversy; (14) court congestion of the two forums; and (15) feasibility of consolidating other claims. See Jones, 211 F.3d at 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000); Hawkins v. Gerber Prods. Co., 924 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1213 (S.D. Cal. 2013); Barnes & Noble, Inc. v. LSI Corp., 823 F.Supp.2d 980, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Metz v. United States Life Ins. Co., 674 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1145-46 (C.D. Cal. 2009). To transfer a case under § 1404(a), the “defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiffs choice of forum.” Decker, 805 F.2d at 843; see BAE Sys., 884 F.3d at 472; see also Jones, 211 F.3d at 497.
If a mandatory forum selection clause is at issue, the calculus changes significantly. See Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S at 62-65; Weber, 811 F.3d at 767. The plaintiff's choice of forum is afforded no weight, and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the case should not be transferred. See Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 63-64; Sun v. Advanced China Healthcare, Inc., 901 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2018). Further, the court will not weigh the private interest factors, but will instead deem them to weigh in favor of the forum identified in the forum selection clause. See Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 64; Sun, 901 F.3d at 1087-88. The public interest factors include: (1) court congestion; (2) local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; and (3) having the trial of a diversity case in a forum...
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