Augustus and Edward Bonnafee, Partners Under the Name and Style of Bonnaffe Co Plaintiffs In Error v. Ira Williams, Charles Spann and Cook, Defendants In Error
Decision Date | 01 January 1845 |
Parties | AUGUSTUS AND EDWARD BONNAFEE, PARTNERS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF BONNAFFE & CO., PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. IRA E. WILLIAMS, CHARLES S. SPANN AND B. H. COOK, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of Mississippi.
The plaintiffs in error were citizens of the state of New York; the defendants in error, of Mississippi.
The defendants in error executed four joint and several promissory notes, promising to pay to Cowles Mead or bearer, for the use of the Real Estate Banking Company of Hinds county, the sums of money therein mentioned.
In 1841, the plaintiffs brought suit upon these notes, alleging themselves to be the lawful bearers thereof.
The defendants demurred upon the two following grounds:
'1. The plaintiffs cannot maintain the action, because, by their own showing, the defendants who are sued are also a part of the persons for whose use the suit is commenced.
&c.
The Circuit Court sustained the demurrer, from which decision a writ of error brought the case to this court.
The cause was argued for the plaintiffs in error, by Mr. Walker, as follows:
The first cause of demurrer was as follows: 'The defendants who are sued are also a part of the persons for whose use the suit is brought.'
Now, the suit is brought in the name of Bonnafee & Co. alone, and not for the use of any one, and therefore the demurrer cannot be sustained on this ground. The note was payable to 'Cowles Meade, or bearer, for the use of the Real Estate Banking Company of Hinds county,' and it was assigned by delivery, by Cowles Meade, to the plaintiffs, who, throughout every count of the declaration, are described as the lawful bearers of the note, and in whose name alone the suit is brought. It is true, the note was payable to Cowles Meade, for the use of the Real Estate Banking Company, and that Cowles Meade was one of that Company; but this could constitute no objection to the jurisdiction, because, before a court of common law, this company had no rights whatever. They were unincorporated, and, therefore, could not sue at law in the name assumed by them; and even if they could, no right of action would accrue to them, where the note, as in this case, was not payable to them, but to Cowles Meade, or bearer, in whom alone, or the bearer, the sole legal title was vested. The question, therefore, intended to be raised by the demurrer, does not apply to this case. The legal title is vested in any bearer, and the fact that the bearer derived title by delivery, from Cowles Meade, can have no injurious effect upon the title of the plaintiffs.
But it is said that Cowles Meade, to whom, or bearer, the note is payable, appears to be one of the same unincorporated banking company for whose use the note is given. But if Cowles Meade delivered the note to the plaintiffs, and they, as is the fact, are not members of the same banking company, still the question does not arise, that one partner cannot sue another partner at law; for the plaintiffs and defendants were not partners, and the use for which the note was given does not affect the legal rights of the parties. The legal intendment is, and such is the fact, that the plaintiffs, with the consent of the banking company, were the purchasers of the note in question, and brought the suit for their own use alone. But were it otherwise, could not Cowles Meade maintain a suit at law on such a note as this of the defendants, even if Meade and the defendants were members of the same banking company? Now, the law is clearly settled that a partnership can sue upon a note given by one of the partners to another, even although it be for the use of the firm. Van Ness v. Forrest, 8 Cranch, 30.
In that case, the person to whom the note was given was a mere trustee for the firm; yet the court maintained the action against one of the partners. The cases in which partners cannot sue each other, on account of transactions growing out of the partnership, or where the firm cannot sue a partner, are cases of unascertained balances, or where the partnership transaction has not been separated by a note or express promise. In such cases a court of law cannot sever the joint contract or liabilities, but this may be done by the parties themselves. Neale v. Tuston, 4 Bing., 149; Coffee v. Brian, 3 Id., 54; Gibson v. Moore, 3 N. H., 527; Nevins v. Townsend, 6 Conn., 5; Story Part., 241, 527, 320; Colly. Part., 392, 504, 91, 148, 152, 147, 165; Wright v. Hunter, 1 East, 30; Brierly v. Cripps, 7 Carr. & P., 709; Smith v. Barrow, 2 T. R., 476; Simpson v. Rochman, 7 Bing., 617; Venning v. Leckie, 13 East, 7; Gale v. Leckie, 2 Stark., 96.
Where a note is payable to A, for the use of B, the legal title is in A, and he is the party to transfer it, to receive payment, and to sue upon it. 3 Kent Com., 89; 1 Selw. N. P., 292; Chit. Bills, 180, 226, 428, 566; Baily Bills, 76, 115; Chaplin v. Canada, 8 Conn., 286; Binney v. Phumpley, 5 Vt., 500.
At law, the trustee has the whole title and interest. Bank of the United States v. Devaux, 5 Cranch, 91; Irving v. Lowry, 14 Pet., 300; Bauerman v. Rodenus, 7 T. R., 663; Wake v. Tinkler, 16 East, 36; Tucker v. Tucker, 4 Barn. & Ad., 745; Willis' Trustees, 72, and N. E., 73, 83, 86, 87; Lewin Trust., 267, 247, 481.
The express purpose of the trust was, to give Meade the legal title, and enable him to sue at law.
But even if Meade could not sue, the bearer could; and Meade could receive payment, or transfer by delivery. And having done so, he is presumed to have received full value from the plaintiffs. 1 Selw. N. P., 292, citing Carth., 5; 2 Vent., 307; Skin., 264.
The banking company are not parties plaintiffs or defendants, on the record, nor is the suit brought for...
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