Augustus v. Locke, Civil Action No. 09-1003 (EGS).
| Decision Date | 29 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 09-1003 (EGS). |
| Parties | Debra AUGUSTUS, Plaintiff, v. Gary LOCKE, Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alan Lescht, Rani V. Rolston, Alan Lescht & Associates, PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Diane M. Sullivan, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Debra Augustus brings this action against Defendant United States Department of Commerce (the “DOC”) alleging race and sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Pending before the Court is defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the motion, the response and reply thereto, the applicable law, the entire record, the arguments of counsel made during the motions hearing held on March 24, 2010, and for the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's race and sex discrimination claims and GRANTS without prejudice defendant's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's retaliation claim.
Plaintiff is an African-American female employed as an Equipment Facilities Services Assistant in the Office of Facilities Management at the DOC. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6. She has been employed in that position since approximately June 2004. Compl. ¶ 6. Her rank is roughly equivalent to a GS-8 rank, and plaintiff's annual salary is approximately $52,000. Compl. ¶ 6.
On or about December 18, 2007, defendant assigned plaintiff the duties of the Contracting Officer Technical Representative (“COTR”) in the cafeteria at the Herbert C. Hoover Building in addition to her duties as an administrative assistant. Compl. ¶ 6. Her duties as a COTR include, among other things, performing twice daily inspections of the cafeteria, monitoring the employees for health code compliance, and inventory maintenance. Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff spends approximately 45-50% of her work time performing COTR duties. Compl. ¶ 10.
When plaintiff was assigned the COTR duties, she was informed by her first-line supervisor, Ms. Pat McNutt (white, female), that she would receive a pay increase. Compl. ¶ 11. 1 Plaintiff's second-line supervisor (white, male) and fourth-line supervisor (white, male), however, allegedly stalled efforts to increase plaintiff's salary. See Compl. ¶¶ 12-17.
Accordingly, on June 23, 2008, plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination (Agency Complaint No. 08-51-00148) alleging that she was not properly compensated for her additional COTR duties because of her race and sex. See Def.'s Statement of Material Facts (“SMF”) ¶ 2; Pl.'s Ex. 1, Declaration of Debra Augustus (“Augustus Decl.”) ¶ 6; see also Def.'s Ex. C. The agency accepted these claims for investigation on July 9, 2008. See Pl.'s Ex. 3. The agency completed its investigation on September 23, 2008, and advised plaintiff that she had 30 days to either request a hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) administrative judge or a Final Agency Decision based on the record. See Def.'s Ex. E. On September 29, 2008, Ms. Augustus elected to proceed with a hearing before an administrative judge. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 3; Def.'s Ex. F.
On December 10, 2008-170 days after plaintiff filed her agency complaint-the Washington field office of the EEOC sent the parties an “Acknowledgment and Order.”
See Def.'s Ex. H. This order acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's request for a hearing, and provided an overview of the hearing process, including the parties' discovery obligations. See Def.'s Ex. H. Specifically, the order advised that “[a]bsent prior approval from the Administrative Judge, a party must initiate discovery within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of this Order.” Def.'s Ex. H. Plaintiff's counsel received the Acknowledgment and Order on December 19, 2008, see Augustus Decl. ¶ 8, and served discovery requests on the DOC on January 7, 2009. On January 8, 2009, however, the DOC advised plaintiff that it would not respond to her discovery requests, explaining that the requests were due by January 5, 2009 and were therefore untimely. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 4; Augustus Decl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff's counsel immediately filed a motion to extend the deadline to initiate discovery nunc pro tunc and to compel discovery responses, stating her intent to file suit in federal court if the request was denied. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 4; Augustus Decl. ¶ 10. 2
On or about February 11, 2009, the administrative judge advised counsel that he would not grant plaintiff's motion and ruled that plaintiff would be precluded from conducting discovery. See Def.'s SMF ¶ 5; Augustus Decl. ¶ 11. Accordingly, on February 16, 2009, plaintiff's counsel advised the EEOC that plaintiff had decided to file a complaint in federal district court. See Pl.'s Ex. 6.
Plaintiff also alleges that after she filed her administrative complaint asserting race and sex discrimination claims (Agency Complaint No. 08-51-00148), her first-line supervisor, Ms. McNutt, began retaliating against her by, inter alia, scrutinizing her work performance, threatening to give plaintiff's COTR duties to other employees, prohibiting plaintiff from leaving her desk during certain hours, and withholding pertinent information from plaintiff. See Compl. ¶¶ 20-27. Accordingly, on June 15, 2009, plaintiff filed another formal complaint of discrimination (Agency Complaint No. 09-51-00510), alleging that Ms. McNutt subjected her to a hostile work environment in retaliation for filing her initial EEO complaint (Agency Complaint No. 08-51-00148). See Def.'s SMF ¶ 6; Augustus Decl. ¶ 15. This complaint was accepted for investigation on July 1, 2009. See Pl.'s Ex. 7. On September 1, 2009, plaintiff amended her complaint to include additional events in support of her claims for hostile work environment and retaliation. See Augustus Decl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff's amended complaint was accepted for investigation on September 8, 2009, and was completed on December 3, 2009. See Docket No. 14, Pl.'s Status Report dated March 23, 2010 (“Pl.'s Status Report”) ¶ 3. On December 10, 2009, plaintiff elected to proceed with a hearing before an administrative judge. See Pl.'s Status Report ¶ 4. The parties are currently engaged in discovery, which is set to close on April 2, 2010. Pl.'s Status Report ¶ 6.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court on May 29, 2009, alleging sex discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation. On August 24, 2009, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment based on plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust her administrative remedies as to these claims. This motion is now ripe for determination by the Court.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party has shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Waterhouse v. Dist. of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991 (D.C.Cir.2002). A material fact is one that is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue is one where the “evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A court considering a motion for summary judgment must draw all “justifiable inferences” from the evidence in favor of the nonmovant. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To survive a motion for summary judgment, however, the requester “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”; instead, the nonmoving party must come forward with “ ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
Defendant argues that plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed, or, alternatively, summary judgment must be granted, because plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. First, with regards to plaintiff's claims of race and sex discrimination, defendant argues that plaintiff is precluded from pursuing those claims because she purportedly “abandoned” them by withdrawing from the administrative hearing process on February 16, 2009. Second, with regards to plaintiff's retaliation claim, defendant argues that Ms. Augustus has not yet exhausted this claim as she is actively litigating the issue before an administrative judge. The Court will explore these arguments in turn.
It is well settled that prior to commencing a Title VII suit in federal district court, a plaintiff must exhaust his or her remedies at the administrative level by asserting all claims in an administrative complaint and allowing the agency time to act on the complaint. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). The exhaustion requirement “serves the important purposes of giving the charged party notice of the claim and narrowing the issues for prompt adjudication and decision.” Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Court may dismiss a claim when a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a discrimination action.” Jones v. Wash. Times, 668 F.Supp.2d 53, 57 (D.D.C.2009)(citing Rann v. Chao, 346 F.3d 192, 194-95 (D.C.Cir.2003)).
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