Aurbach v. Gallina

• Decision Date: 03 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. SC94597.,SC94597.
• Citation: 753 So.2d 60
• Parties: Michael AURBACH, et ux., Petitioners, v. Angelina GALLINA, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

753 So.2d 60

Michael AURBACH, et ux., Petitioners, v. Angelina GALLINA, et al., Respondents.

No. SC94597.

Supreme Court of Florida.

February 3, 2000.

Dan W. Moses, Boca Raton, Florida; and Nancy Little Hoffmann, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Petitioners.

Angela C. Flowers and Caryn Bellus-Lewis of Kubicki Draper, Miami, Florida, for Respondents.

PARIENTE, J.

We have for review Aurbach v. Gallina, 721 So.2d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), on the basis of express and direct conflict with Frankel v. Fleming, 69 So.2d 887 (Fla. 1954). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

FACTS

Michael Aurbach, petitioner, was injured in an automobile accident by a motor vehicle operated by Angelina Gallina, age eighteen. Aurbach and his wife sued Angelina as the operator of the motor vehicle and her parents, Louis and Carolina Gallina (the Gallinas). Although the motor vehicle was titled in the name of Carolina Gallina, the Aurbachs also sought to hold Louis Gallina vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, alleging that he owned or had the right to control the motor vehicle driven by his daughter. Although the Gallinas admitted Angelina's liability and did not contest Carolina's vicarious liability, Louis Gallina contended that he could not be held liable for the negligent operation of an automobile owned by his wife and driven by his daughter with his wife's permission. Louis Gallina claimed he was not the owner of the vehicle, as required by the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.

The sole evidence presented by the Aurbachs at trial on the issue of Louis Gallina's liability was that

[t]he car was purchased with Louis and Carolina's joint funds. Before buying the car, the Gallinas test drove it together. The car was purchased with the intent that the Gallinas' other daughter, Caroline, be the primary user, but that both of their daughters would be allowed to drive it. The expenses to maintain the car were paid out of the Gallinas' joint account. The Gallinas kept the automobile at the home where both of them resided.

Id. at 759. It was undisputed that Angelina had her mother's permission to use the vehicle on the day of the accident.

By special interrogatory on the verdict form, the jury found that "Louis Gallina owned or had the right to control the vehicle driven by his daughter, Angelina, at the time of the accident and that Angelina had her father's express or implied consent to drive it."¹ Aurbach, 721 So.2d at 758. After trial, Louis Gallina moved for judgment in accordance with his motion for directed verdict, which the trial court granted. See id.

On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court after concluding that liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is imposed only where there has been an "identifiable property relationship between a defendant and a motor vehicle." Id. at 759. In doing so the Fourth District concluded:

In the context of family relationships, the better rule is to have legal responsibility follow title ownership, a bright line standard which makes liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine both foreseeable and predictable. To analyze family dynamics to determine all the "beneficial" owners of a car is to impose a fuzzy legal standard that will encourage litigation and potentially expand liability beyond that which is justified by the rationale for the rule.

In this case, Louis Gallina was not an owner, bailee, or lessee of the automobile sufficient to impose liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. He did not put the car in the possession of a non-family member. Angelina Gallina's operation of the car on the date of the accident was with the permission of the title owner, her mother Carolina. Under the facts of this case, the trial court did not err in granting Louis Gallina's motion in accordance with his motion for directed verdict.

Id.

The issue before this Court is whether the dangerous instrumentality doctrine extends to hold a parent vicariously liable for an accident caused by a child's negligent operation of a motor vehicle where the parent purchased the vehicle for his or her child, paid for the motor vehicle's maintenance, and had a general right to control the operation or use of the vehicle as the child's parent, even though the parent did not hold legal title to the vehicle. We conclude as a matter of law that these circumstances, without more, do not give rise to vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.

ORIGIN OF DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY

DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA

Adopted in 1920, Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another. See Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 468, 86 So. 629, 637 (1920). As expressed in Southern Cotton Oil:

[O]ne who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is peculiarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the public highway is liable in damages for injuries to third persons caused by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the highway by one so authorized by the owner.

Id. at 638. Under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, an owner who gives authority to another to operate the owner's vehicle, by either express or implied consent, has a nondelegable obligation to ensure that the vehicle is operated safely. See Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla.1993).

Seventy years after this Court issued its opinion in Southern Cotton Oil, Justice Grimes, writing for the Court, reaffirmed the viability of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine and the important policies that led to its adoption in Florida:

The dangerous instrumentality doctrine seeks to provide greater financial responsibility to pay for the carnage on our roads. It is premised upon the theory that the one who originates the danger by entrusting the automobile to another is in the best position to make certain that there will be adequate resources with which to pay the damages caused by its negligent operation. If Florida's traffic problems were sufficient to prompt its adoption in 1920, there is all the more reason for its application to today's high-speed travel upon crowded highways. The dangerous instrumentality doctrine is unique to Florida and has been applied with very few exceptions.

Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Fla.1990) (footnote omitted).

IDENTIFIABLE PROPERTY INTEREST

In determining who is vicariously liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, this Court repeatedly has required that the person held vicariously liable have an identifiable property interest in the vehicle, such as ownership, bailment, rental, or lease of a vehicle. See, e.g., Kraemer, 572 So.2d at 1364-67. The most common application of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is where the legal title holder is held vicariously liable for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See Kraemer, 572 So.2d at 1363-67; Metzel v. Robinson, 102 So.2d 385 (Fla.1958). In Southern Cotton Oil, the motor vehicle owned by the Southern Cotton Oil Corporation was being operated by an employee with the express or implied permission of the owner. 86 So. at 636. Thus, when that employee operated the motor vehicle negligently, we found Southern Cotton Oil vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. See id.

Thereafter, the Court extended vicarious liability to the owner of a vehicle acting as a lessor or bailor for the negligent operation of the vehicle by the lessee or bailee. See Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832, 835-36 (Fla.1959); Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d 268, 271 (1947), overruled in part on other grounds by Meister v. Fisher, 462 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1984). In Lynch, the Court held that when owners authorize other individuals to use their vehicles, they are liable for the damages that the other authorized drivers negligently cause to third parties. 31 So.2d at 271. Likewise, in Susco Car Rental, the Court extended the ownerlessor's vicarious liability further to situations where the vehicle was operated by one other than the authorized lessee in violation of the terms of the lease. 112 So.2d at 835-36; see also Kraemer, 572 So.2d at 1364-67 (owner of vehicle under long-term lease liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for the negligence of driver of vehicle).²

In addition to holding owners vicariously liable, the Court has also recognized the vicarious liability of lessees and bailees of motor vehicles who authorize other individuals to operate the motor vehicles. See Frankel, 69 So.2d at 888. However, whether an entity or individual is vicariously responsible as a bailee for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle may be a fact-based inquiry. See Brown v. Goldberg, Rubenstein & Buckley, P.A., 455 So.2d 487, 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Thus, this Court's prior cases have recognized a variety of identifiable property interests that might give rise to vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.

"BARE" LEGAL TITLE VERSUS BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP

Legal title remains the most common basis for imposing vicarious liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. However, a narrow exception for the legal title owner to escape vicarious liability has been recognized where the holder of "mere naked title" is able to demonstrate the absence of beneficial ownership of the vehicle. In Palmer v. R.S. Evans, Jacksonville, Inc., 81 So.2d 635, 637 (Fla.1955), this Court first explained that "mere naked title" could repose in one entity but "beneficial ownership" in another.

In Palmer, a man agreed to buy a motor vehicle from a used-car dealer, made a down payment, signed a conditional sales contract and a power of attorney, then drove the car out of the...