Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. System, Docket No. 04-0561-CV.

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
Citation426 F.3d 635
Docket NumberDocket No. 04-0561-CV.
PartiesCarol AURECCHIONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCHOOLMAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., Classic Coach and Bill Schoolman, Defendants-Appellees.
Decision Date23 September 2005
426 F.3d 635
Carol AURECCHIONE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SCHOOLMAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., Classic Coach and Bill Schoolman, Defendants-Appellees.
Docket No. 04-0561-CV.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued October 14, 2004.
Decided September 23, 2005.
Corrected October 17, 2005.

Page 636

Edward Cherney, Port Jefferson, N.Y. (John J. Andrews, Kenneth Lauri, Law Office of John J. Andrews, of counsel), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Barry Leibowicz, Great Neck, N.Y. (Law Offices of Barry Leibowicz, of counsel), for Defendants-Appellees.

Before OAKES, KEARSE and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.

Judge KEARSE concurs, dubitante, in a separate opinion.

OAKES, Senior Circuit Judge.


Appellant Carol Aurecchione ("Aurecchione") appeals the district court's dismissal of her complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the complaint was essentially an application for attorney's fees pursuant to § 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Adopting Magistrate Judge Boyle's Report and Recommendation, the district court (Seybert, J.) granted the Defendants-Appellees' motion to dismiss on the grounds that federal courts do not permit claims solely for attorney's fees.

For the reasons stated below, the district court's judgment is vacated and Aurecchione's

Page 637

claim is remanded with instructions to allow amendment of Aurecchione's complaint.

I. Background

Aurecchione was originally hired in April 1986 as a charter reservationist for Defendant Classic Coach, and was promoted to office manager by the end of that year. By February 1987, Aurecchione became Defendant-Appellee Classic Coach's de facto general manager, although she did not receive either the corresponding title or salary. Aurecchione was discharged from Defendants-Appellees' employment in October 1987. Thereafter, she filed a gender discrimination complaint against the Defendants-Appellees with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("SDHR"), a state agency. As required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, SDHR filed a copy of Aurecchione's complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").

More than eleven years later, in April 1999, SDHR recommended, and the state agency Commissioner rendered a decision in Aurecchione's favor, to wit, a finding that the Defendants-Appellees had discriminated against Aurecchione on the basis of her gender, thereby violating New York Executive Law § 296. Thus, Aurecchione was awarded back pay and compensatory damages with interest.1

Also in April 1999, the EEOC issued Aurecchione a Notice of Right to Sue. The subject complaint was filed thereafter on June 29, 1999, but during the pendency of her state court appeal of the state agency's decision,2 Aurecchione's federal suit was administratively closed October 1, 1999. It was later reinstated to active status on May 8, 2002, when the state appeal was resolved.

In her federal court complaint seeking a $100,000 judgment for attorney's fees, Aurecchione claimed the district court had jurisdiction over her action "pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. sections 2000e et seq.)." Compl. ¶ 1. She further claimed that she was "entitled to an award of counsel fees from the defendants, for the services rendered by her attorneys in the SDHR administrative proceeding and in the New York State Court proceeding, under the authority of New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 100 S.Ct. 2024, 64 L.Ed.2d 723 (1980)." Id. ¶ 24.

Magistrate Judge Boyle disagreed, as did District Judge Seybert. Over Aurecchione's objections, Judge Seybert adopted Magistrate Judge Boyle's Report and Recommendation in toto, finding: (1) Aurecchione was not a "prevailing party" under Title VII; (2) the Carey case was not controlling; (3) based on North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, 479 U.S. 6, 107 S.Ct. 336, 93 L.Ed.2d 188 (1986), and Paz v. Long Island R.R. Co., 954 F.Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y.1997), federal courts do not allow suits solely for attorney's fees; and (4) Aurecchione's remedy is confined by her choice of the state administrative forum which, in this instance, does not allow for attorney's fees. Thus, Judge Seybert dismissed Aurecchione's complaint.

On appeal, Aurecchione first argues that under Carey (which she claims is applicable in this case), Title VII does, indeed,

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entitle a party who successfully litigates an employment discrimination case in a state administrative agency in a deferral state — such as New York State — to recover attorney's fees. Second, Aurecchione argues that she is a prevailing party in this instance. Finally, Aurecchione makes the policy argument that one of Congress's intents in enacting Title VII — namely, providing a discriminated employee with complete relief from discriminatory employment practices, including the relief of awarding attorney's fees — compels reversal of the district court's judgment. Notably, Aurecchione claims that her jurisdictional predicate is Title VII and the body of the complaint can be liberally construed to allege substantive Title VII violations. Aurecchione further argues that if a liberal construction of her complaint is not enough to bring it within the strict...

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