Aurich v. Rapelje

• Decision Date: 26 December 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 09-cv-10717
• Parties: STUART AURICH, Petitioner, v. LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

STUART AURICH, Petitioner, v. LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent.

Case No. 09-cv-10717

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: December 26, 2013

HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING LEAVE TO

PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

This matter is before the Court on petitioner's application for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner pled guilty in the Oscoda Circuit Court to one count of armed robbery. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529. The state circuit court sentenced him to a term of 14-to-30 years in prison. The petition raises six claims: (1) petitioner's guilty plea was involuntary; (2) the circuit court erred in sentencing petitioner; (3) petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel prior to his plea; (4) petitioner involuntarily waived his right to challenge his extradition from Florida; (5) the arrest warrant used to extradite petitioner was fraudulent; and (6) petitioner has demonstrated cause for not raising his third, fourth, and fifth claims during his direct appeal in the state courts. The Court will deny the petition because none of these claims are meritorious. The Court also declines to issue a certificate of appelability and will deny leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.

I. Background

Petitioner was originally charged as a second time felony offender with two counts of armed robbery and commission of a felony with a firearm after his participation in the armedrobbery of a grocery store. Rather than stand trial, petitioner agreed to a plea bargain.

At the plea hearing, the prosecutor put the terms of the agreement on the record. Petitioner would plead guilty to one count of armed robbery and, in exchange, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss the second armed robbery count as well as the habitual offender and firearm charges. Petitioner and defense counsel acknowledged the terms of the agreement.

The circuit court then placed petitioner under oath. He denied that there were any other terms of the agreement. The circuit court informed petitioner that he faced up to life in prison, and petitioner acknowledged his understanding of the terms of the plea. Petitioner denied that anyone had promised him anything or coerced him in anyway to obtain his guilty plea. The circuit court also informed petitioner of the trial rights he was waiving by entering his plea, whereupon petitioner indicated his assent to the plea agreement.

Petitioner then gave a detailed factual basis for the crime. He described how he and his accomplice went into a grocery store to rob it. His accomplice was armed with a handgun, and he pointed it at the two people present in the store. Petitioner then used duct tape to tie the hands of the victims. The two men then stole money and lottery tickets and left the store. The circuit court accepted the plea.

After the hearing, defense counsel requested that petitioner be freed on bond so that he could receive surgery on his shoulder. The circuit court denied the motion because petitioner had fled to Florida after photographs of him committing the robbery were publicized.

At the sentencing hearing, petitioner never expressed his desire to withdraw from the plea. He informed the circuit court that he had cooperated with the sheriff's department with the hope of receiving a lighter sentence. The state circuit court adjourned the sentencing hearing toobtain information from the sheriff's department, but it was later revealed that no promises of leniency were made. After resolving any objections to the sentencing guideline scoring, the circuit court sentenced petitioner to 14-to-30 years incarceration.

Following his guilty plea and sentence, petitioner requested and was appointed appellate counsel who filed a motion for withdrawal of the plea and resentencing. The circuit court held a hearing on the motion and denied the requested relief.

Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals raising the following claims:

I. Petitioner should be allowed to withdraw his involuntary guilty plea where: 1) he could not have been guilty of felony firearm in the first instance where he did not possess the gun; 2) trial counsel calculated his guidelines range incorrectly and petitioner relied on the misrepresentation when he pled; 3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and where 4) promises of leniency, surgery and medications were made to him by the police for his cooperation and plea which he also relied upon and never materialized.

II. Petitioner should be resentenced where: 1) he was incorrectly scored for a charge which was deferred or dismissed pursuant to MCL 769.51 and MCL 750.81; 2) the trial court sentenced him based on an incorrect guidelines range and incorrect information; 3) he was promised leniency by the police if he cooperated and he relied on that promise; 4) his co-defendant possessed the firearm and provided the firearm and received a lower sentence; and where 5) mitigating circumstances exist to sentence petitioner to the lower end of his guidelines range.

The Michigan Court of Appeals denied the application for leave to appeal "for lack of merit in the grounds presented." People v. Aurich, No. 277964 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug 8, 2007). Petitioner subsequently filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same claims. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the application by form order. People v. Aurich, 480 Mich. 959 (2007) (table).

Petitioner then filed the instant habeas petition, raising identical grounds for relief. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion to stay the proceedings in this Court and return to the state courts to raise additional claims. The Court granted the motion, and the case was held in abeyance while Petitioner pursued post-conviction review in the state courts.

Petitioner returned to the circuit court and filed a motion for relief from judgment, raising the following claims:

I. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel where trial counsel: (1) failed to request a Franks hearing to challenge the validity of warrant's affidavit; and (2) failed to request a psychiatric evaluation on defendant to see if he was competent to stand trial.

II. Petitioner's due process rights were violated when he was forced to waive his right to an extradition hearing to receive medical treatment without counsel present due to severe mental and physical duress petitioner's waiver was involuntary. Petitioner was unaware of the rights he was forfeiting by waiver of extradition hearing.

III. Petitioner's due process rights were violated when a fraudulent arrest warrant used to gain an extradition order was obtained under false pretense; arrest warrant contained perjuries by Sgt. J. Allie of the Oscoda County Sheriff's Department.

IV. Petitioner has established an entitlement to relief from judgment of his conviction and sentence by demonstrating good cause for failure to raise his present claim on direct appeal or in a prior motion and actual prejudice from the alleged irregularities in this criminal process.

The circuit court denied the motion for relief from judgment, stating that petitioner failed "to establish any of the three basic provisions" of Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(3). People v. Aurich, Oscoda County No. 06-945-FH (September 24, 2009). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which was denied "for failure to establish entitlement to relief under MICH. CT. R. 6.508(D)." People v. Aurich, No. 300374 (Mich. Ct. App. January 5, 2011). Petitioner applied for leave to appeal this decision in theMichigan Supreme Court, where his application was also denied under Rule 6.508(D). People v. Aurich, 489 Mich. 991 (2011) (table).

Petitioner then reopened the instant proceeding raising the same issues that he argued before the state courts on direct and post-conviction review.

II. Standard of Review

Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Pursuant to the AEDPA, petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claims on the merits-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v.Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537...