Austin v. Carwyle

Decision Date19 April 2016
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-177-SA-SAA
PartiesARON J. AUSTIN PLAINTIFF v. JILL CARWYLE, et al. DEFENDANTS
CourtUnited States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Northern District of Mississippi
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1] in this Court on October 14, 2015 against the Lafayette County Justice Court Clerk Jill Carwyle, Deputy Clerks May Ann Pettis, Carolyn Bell, and Sheritta Harris, in their individual and official capacities, Lafayette County, Mississippi, (collectively: County Defendants) and the City of Oxford, Mississippi. The City of Oxford was dismissed by another order of this Court, leaving only the County Defendants remaining. Now before the Court is the County Defendants' Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and for qualified immunity [14]. The Plaintiff responded [17], and the Defendants did not reply within the time allotted, making this motion ripe for review. See L.U.CIV.R. 7(b)(4).

On July 24, 2015, Plaintiff received a speeding ticket in Lafayette County. In an attempt to pay the fine associated with his speeding ticket, the Plaintiff mailed a personal check to the Lafayette County Justice Court. The Justice Court responded, informing the Plaintiff that it does not accept personal checks from out of state defendants. Plaintiff is a resident of Tennessee. Plaintiff then directed his bank to issue a check to the Justice Court for $100.00. The Justice Court again refused Plaintiff's payment and informed him that it does not accept partial payments. The Justice Court then mailed Plaintiff a notice dated September 16, 2015 stating that his driving license and privileges would be suspended if he did not pay the full amount due ($196.00), within ten days.

In his complaint, the Plaintiff alleges constitutional and civil rights violations and demands injunctive and monetary relief. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants discriminated against him because he is from Tennessee, he is African-American, and because he is disabled. According to the Plaintiff, he suffers from Darlin disease, and cannot be exposed to sunlight or florescent lights. The Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants subjected him to deprivation of rights and privileges secured by the constitution under color of state law by refusing his personal check and partial payment, and engaged in extortion against him.

The Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in the form of an apology from the Justice Court, various reformations of Justice Court policies, and the termination of the named Justice Court Clerks. Plaintiff also seeks $2,404,800,000.00 in damages.

The questions before the Court at this time are whether the Plaintiff has articulated a plausible claim for relief against the County Defendants, and if so, whether the individual defendants may invoke the protection of qualified immunity.

Standard of Review

Bearing in mind the pro se status of the Plaintiff, and that the complaint should be construed liberally in his favor, the Court will apply the following standard in assessing the plausibility of the Plaintiff's stated claims against the City. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007). "The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid claim when all well-pleaded facts are assumed to be true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Shandong Yinguang Chem. Indus. Joint Stock Co. v. Potter, 607 F.3d 1029, 1032 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). "The court's task is to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff'slikelihood of success." Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Sullivan v. Leor Energy LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010). "Federal pleading rules call for 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); they do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S. Ct. 346, 346, 190 L. Ed. 2d 309 (2014).

While a plaintiff's complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). Whether a plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief is "context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 129 S. Ct. 1937.

Discussion and Analysis

With the above standard in mind, the Court must catalog the particular claims brought by the pro se Plaintiff as a preliminary matter. Based on a review of the pleadings, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has brought three constitutional claims under Section 1983, and one state law claim. Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plaintiff brings two claims under the Equal Protection Clause, one for discrimination based on race, one for discrimination based ondisability, and a claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause for discrimination based on his state citizenship. Finally, the Plaintiff brings a state law claim for extortion.

Equal Protection Claims
Race Discrimination

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. "Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm . . . [and] may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility." Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 109 S. Ct. 706, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1989)). "[A]ll race-conscious measures receive strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause." Id.

On the most fundamental level, Plaintiff must allege some treatment that is unequal to provide a basis for his claim of race discrimination. "To state a claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause and section 1983, the plaintiff 'must allege and prove that [he] received treatment different from that received by similarly situated individuals and that the unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.'" Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, Miss., 681 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2001)); see also Village of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1977) (holding that "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").

In this case, the Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts to support his bare allegation that the County Defendants discriminated against him based on his race. While a plaintiff's complaint"does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 346, 190 L. Ed. 2d 309 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955) (emphasis added). In light of this complete lack of factual support, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against the County Defendants for discrimination based on race.

Disability Discrimination

Unlike race, disability is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause, and discriminatory disability policies are subject only to a rational-basis review. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985). In order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff must meet a similar burden of alleging a specific factual basis for unequal treatment.1 It is well established that in order to state an equal protection claim a plaintiff must "allege, inter alia, that similarly situated individuals were treated differently" and "purposeful or intentional discrimination." Stoneburner v. Sec'y of the Army, 152 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 1992); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1987)).

In the instant case, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that could demonstrate that the County Defendants treated him differently than any other person or group because of his disability. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 346, 190 L. Ed. 2d 309; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. Because of this complete lack of relevant factual allegations, the Plaintiff has notalleged a plausible claim for relief against the County Defendants for discrimination based on his disability.

Privileges and Immunities Claim

Plaintiff also alleges that the County Defendants discriminated against him because he is not a Mississippi resident by refusing to accept his personal check and for refusing to accept partial payment of his fine.

Mississippi law grants justice court clerks the discretion to accept personal checks as payment for fines or costs. See MISS. CODE. ANN. § 9-11-27(1). A separate state law requires justice court clerks to accept personal checks from Mississippi residents. See MISS. CODE. ANN. § 63-9-12. As such, there is no state law expressly prohibiting clerks from...

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