Austin v. Clark, No. S13G1590.

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Writing for the Court: MELTON
• Citation: 755 S.E.2d 796,294 Ga. 773
• Parties: AUSTIN v. CLARK et al.
• Decision Date: 10 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. S13G1590.

294 Ga. 773
755 S.E.2d 796

AUSTIN
v.
CLARK et al.

No. S13G1590.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 10, 2014.

[755 S.E.2d 797]

Jerry A. Lumley, Macon, Frank H. Childs, Jr., Childs & Noland, for appellant.

Lindsay Marie Hodgson, Atlanta, John Byrd Garland, Jackson, A.J. Welch, Jr., Smith, Welch, Webb, & White, LLC,

[755 S.E.2d 798]

David A. Siegel, Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., Columbus, for appellees.

MELTON, Justice.

Donna Austin filed a complaint seeking recovery for personal injuries allegedly sustained when she fell on a sidewalk as she was leaving a graduation ceremony at Peach County High School. As is relevant here, she filed the suit against Susan Clark, the Superintendent of Peach County Schools; C.B. Mathis, the Assistant Superintendent of Facilities of Peach County Schools; Bruce Mackey, the Principal of Peach County High School; and Chad Sanders, the Director of Maintenance of Peach County Schools. Austin alleges in her complaint that she was on school district property when she stepped from a sidewalk into a roadway and her leg became lodged in an opening on the curb where water drains from the roadway. Austin alleges that the individual defendants negligently performed the ministerial duties of inspecting, maintaining and repairing the sidewalk and road where she fell.

Pursuant to OCGA § 9–11–12(b)(6), the individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the claims against them were barred by the doctrine of official immunity. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. See Austin v. Clark, 322 Ga.App. 368, 745 S.E.2d 293 (2013).¹ Thereafter, we granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order granting the individual defendants' motion to dismiss based upon official immunity. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

As the parties and the Court of Appeals have pointed out, the pivotal determination in this case is whether the school officials' actions or inactions constitute the violation of a ministerial or discretionary duty.

The doctrine of official immunity, developed primarily in Georgia through case law, provides that while a public officer or employee may be personally liable for his negligent ministerial acts, he may not be held liable for his discretionary acts unless such acts are wilful, wanton, or outside the scope of his authority. See Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. [329,] 331, 264 S.E.2d 878 (1980)]; OCGA § 36–33–4; Sentell, Individual Liability in Georgia Local Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of Hennessy, 40 Mercer L.Rev. 27 (1988).

(Punctuation omitted.) Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 752(6), 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).² Furthermore,

[a] ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and requiring merely the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act, however, calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned conclusions, and acting on them in a way not specifically directed.
(Citation omitted.) Common Cause/Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 482(2), 614 S.E.2d 761 (2005).

The answer to this pivotal distinction between a discretionary and a ministerial duty is highly fact-specific, and, due to the current procedural posture of this case, cannot be definitively answered.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief

[755 S.E.2d 799]

sought.... In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's favor.

Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997). In other words,

[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will...