Austin v. Hamilton
| Decision Date | 13 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-cv-00285-GZS |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER AUSTIN, Plaintiff v. RICKER HAMILTON, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
In this action, Plaintiff Christopher Austin alleges Defendants,1 evidently in connection with child support-related proceedings in state court, have unlawfully garnished his wages and "frozen" his driver's license and bank account, without due process. (Complaint, ECF No. 1.) He also asserts the governing law is biased against non-custodial parents. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 5), which application the Court granted (ECF No. 6). In accordance with the in forma pauperis statute, a preliminary review of Plaintiff's complaint is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Following a review of the complaint and the attachments to the complaint, I recommend the Court dismiss Plaintiff's complaint.
The federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is designed to ensure meaningful access to the federal courts for those persons unable to pay the costs of bringing an action. When a party is proceeding in forma pauperis, however, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines," inter alia, that the action is "frivolous or malicious" or "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). "Dismissals [under § 1915] are often made sua sponte prior to the issuance of process, so as to spare prospective defendants the inconvenience and expense of answering such complaints." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
When considering whether a complaint states a claim for which relief may be granted, courts must assume the truth of all well-plead facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Although a pro se plaintiff's complaint is subject to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), this is "not to say that pro se plaintiffs are not required to plead basic facts sufficient to state a claim, Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890 (1st Cir. 1980). To allege a civil action in federal court, it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to allege that a defendant acted unlawfully; a plaintiff must affirmatively allege facts that identify the manner by which thedefendant subjected the plaintiff to a harm for which the law affords a remedy. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Plaintiff challenges income withholding, license suspension, credit bureau reporting and other child support enforcement actions undertaken by the Maine Division of Support Enforcement and Recovery, a subdivision of the Department of Health and Human Services. (See ECF No. 2-9, p.6.) Plaintiff asserts, in conclusory fashion, that Defendants have violated his rights to due process and equal protection. Plaintiff attached to his complaint numerous documents, many of which are copies of statutes, regulations, and court decisions.3 In one of the attachments, Plaintiff includes a "statement of claim," in which he challenges the process by which he was assessed a child support debt, and appears to assert the administrative agency is racially biased. (ECF No. 3-7.) In another statement, Plaintiff details some of his interaction with certain representatives of the Maine Department of Health and Human Services who were involved in the efforts to collect child support from Plaintiff. (ECF No. 3-10.)
Plaintiff cites 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a basis for this Court's jurisdiction. Pursuant to the federal civil rights statute:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ....
Section 1983 "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To maintain a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish: "1) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and 2) that this conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1999).
As alleged, Defendants' conduct was under color of state law. The issue is whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to assert an actionable claim based on the denial of rights secured to him under the Constitution or federal law.
The United States Supreme Court has described the child support provisions of Title IV-D as part of "an interlocking set of cooperative federal-state welfare programs." Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 333 (1997). The programs include the Aid to Familieswith Dependent Children (AFDC), found in Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 - 617, and related provisions in Title IV-D that require States to "establish a comprehensive system to establish paternity, locate absent parents, and help families obtain support orders," in consideration for federal grants that support the AFDC program. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 333 - 34 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 651, 654).
In Blessing, the Supreme Court held that a group of plaintiff mothers could not pursue relief against the State of Arizona under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to the extent they claimed that Title IV-D conferred upon them "an enforceable individual right to have the State's program achieve 'substantial compliance' with the requirements of Title IV-D." Id. at 333. The Court remanded the case for the District Court to consider whether the plaintiffs' claims constitute the assertion of a violation of a federal right rather than the violation of federal law, which assessment would require consideration of multiple factors.4 Id. at 340, 342 - 46 (emphasis in original).
In this case, Plaintiff does not allege Defendants deprived him of a right conferred on him by Congress through its enactment of Title IV-D. Instead, Plaintiff contends that Defendants' use of the enforcement provisions developed under the Title IV-D program resulted in the deprivation of his rights under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a claim is not actionable under section 1983.
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a due process claim. Plaintiff merely asserts in conclusory fashion that his due process rights have been violated.5 Conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff's equal protection allegations are also insufficient to state an actionable claim. Plaintiff suggests that Title IV-D is unfair to noncustodial parents, but noncustodialparents are not a suspect category, and the pursuit of child support from noncustodial parents is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.6
Plaintiff also asserts a belief that "the agency target[s] black men most." To state a claim of discrimination, Plaintiff must assert (1) facts that could support a plausible inference that he experienced differential treatment when compared to another person "similarly situated in all relevant respects," Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), and (2) facts that suggest that the difference in treatment "was based on an impermissible consideration, such as race," Ayala-Sepulveda v. Municipality of San German, 671 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2012). See also Knowlton v. Shaw, 704 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013) () (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Plaintiff's conclusory allegations lack any facts that would satisfy his burden.7
Plaintiff appears to assert that Defendants have deprived him of a right to have his child support obligation and any enforcement proceedings determined by a jury. The Seventh Amendment governs proceedings that take place in federal courts. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 418 (1996). Accordingly, if the state proceedings did not afford a jury trial in an underlying paternity or child support proceeding, that ruling did not implicate a federal right and, by extension, would not support a federal claim.8
Plaintiff, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2007, maintains that the suspension of his driver's license violated federal law. (ECF No. 3-7.) The statute provides that a person cannot be imprisoned, based on process issued by a federal court, in a state that has abolished imprisonment for debt. Plaintiff does not allege he was imprisoned, either as the result of state or federal process. Plaintiff thus has not alleged a violation of section 2007, even if section 2007 is construed to authorize a private cause of action.
The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) authorizes a civil action for a person harmed by certain debt collection practices undertaken by a debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The term "debt collector," however,...
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