Austin v. House of Vision, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 June 1968 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 52164 |
| Citation | 243 N.E.2d 297,101 Ill.App.2d 251 |
| Parties | Richard D. AUSTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The HOUSE OF VISION, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Leonard Rose, Mason, Albright, Stansbury & Rose, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.
Lawrence J. West, Leo Spira, Chicago, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal has been prosecuted in this case by plaintiff, Richard D. Austin, from a judgment order of the circuit court of Cook County which dismissed an amended complaint against defendants, The House of Vision, Inc., and the trustees of its Employees' Benefit Trust, wherein plaintiff sought to recover treble damages under the provisions of the Illinois Antitrust Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, pars. 60--1 thru 60--11,) for injuries allegedly suffered as the result of a conspiracy to restrain competition in interstate commerce.
Facts gathered from the pleadings reveal that The House of Vision, Inc., hereinafter referred to as defendant, engages in the optical business directly with the public from offices located in eight different States. Eighteen separate offices are situated in the Chicago metropolitan area. In March, 1956, plaintiff, then an optical technician with fifteen years experience, was employed by defendant and thereafter worked in offices in and around Chicago. At no time was there a written contract of employment. On the date plaintiff's employment began there was in existence The House of Vision Employees' Benefit Trust, a benefit program for employees funded by their contributions and those of the employer. Whether participation was compulsory or voluntary does not appear, but plaintiff did become a participant. On July 9, 1958, with the express written consent of the participating employees, including plaintiff, the trust instrument was amended retroactively to provide as follows:
'Upon the written concurrence of a majority of the TRUSTEES, any employee whose compensation is $6,500.00 per annum or more, and any former employee whose compensation immediately before termination of his employment was $6,500.00 per annum or more, who divulges any of the EMPLOYER'S trade secrets to any competitor of the EMPLOYER, or who as owner, co-partner, director, officer, servant, shareholder or otherwise becomes interested in or connected with any person, firm or corporation in direct competition with the EMPLOYER shall, regardless of the number of years he was a participant, be paid by the TRUSTEES only the aggregate of his own contributions to the Trust, plus interest thereon at the rate of 3% Per annum less the amount of any charges against his account for hospitalization benefits or term life insurance, and less distributions previously made to such employee, if any.'
Plaintiff voluntarily terminated his employment with defendant on June 15, 1966, and five days later started to work as an optical technician for a competitor of defendant. As of the termination date, plaintiff's trust account in the benefit program came to $16,288.27, such sum being the aggregate of plaintiff's contributions of $1,189.43, employer contributions of $6,854.73, and trust income of $8,244.11; however, under a formula evidently contained in the trust instrument, defendant calculated plaintiff's vested interest as being $6,794.48. It further appears that plaintiff was, at the time his employment ended, indebted to the trust fund for a loan which, with interest to August 31, 1966, amounted to $4,281.53. On August 17, 1966, the trustees passed a resolution that plaintiff should be paid only the aggregate of his own contributions plus 3% Interest ($1,348.03); that such amount should be applied to his loan indebtedness to the trust; and that a demand should be made for the immediate payment of the balance ($2,933.50) due on such loan. Plaintiff was duly advised of the trustees' action and his amended complaint, praying for treble damages in the amount of $48,642.12 (less the amount due on his loan), was filed the following day.
We see no beneficial purpose to be served by a detailed recital of the amended complaint. Suffice it to say it purports to be based on Section 60--3(c)(2) of the Illinois Act which makes it a violation of the law for any person to unreasonably restrain trade or commerce by contract, combination or conspiracy with one or more other persons. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 60--3(c) (2).) Generally speaking, its theory is that the defendant company and the trustees of the benefit fund have conspired 'to retrain competition in Illinois commerce by preventing former employees of the defendant corporation from competing with the corporation'; that the conspiracy has been carried out by the use of restrictive employment contracts, the trust provisions and 'various forms of coercive activity'; and that such conspiracy 'has resulted in an actual restraint of competition in Illinois commerce by reason of defendant's monopolization and control of the availability of optical industry employees in Illinois commerce.' To obviate the circumstance that the trust instrument had been amended with plaintiff's consent, the complaint alleged there had been an implied threat to discharge employees who did not consent. Section 60--7(2) of our act provides that a person must 'have been injured in his person or property' by a violation in order to maintain a private antitrust action, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 60--7(2) and, while inartfully pleaded, it is apparently plaintiff's theory that the loss of the full amount which had been credited to him in the benefit trust fund is the injury which gives him standing to sue, and which proximately resulted from the alleged conspiracy. Indeed, plaintiff has suffered no other injury since the alleged 'conspiracy' and 'monopoly' have not prevented him from working for a competitor. The amended complaint was stricken and the cause dismissed on motion of defendants, and this appeal has followed.
Among other things, defendants' motion pleaded the four-year statute of limitations provided in Section 60--7 (2) as follows: 'Any action for damages under this subsection shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of...
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