Austin v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers

Decision Date02 March 2012
Docket NumberNo. 4:11-CV-1029 CEJ,4:11-CV-1029 CEJ
PartiesPATRICIA AUSTIN, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is the plaintiff's motion to remand this case to the Twenty- Second Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri (City of St. Louis). Defendants have filed responses opposing plaintiff's motion, and the issues are fully briefed.

I. Background

Plaintiff brings this action for damages and injunctive relief, asserting claims of employment discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 et seq., assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants are the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1455, and Michael Datillo. Plaintiff alleges that Datillo, who was her supervisor and the business manager of Local 1455, discriminated against her based on her age and sex and threatened her with bodily harm while she was employed by Local 1455. Plaintiff alleges that IBEW and Local 1455 were aware of Datillo's illegal conduct, but they failed to take appropriate action.

After plaintiff initiated this action in state court, the defendants removed it, asserting federal question jurisdiction based on § 301 of the Labor ManagementRelations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Defendants claim that they were first notified of their basis for removal when plaintiff cited to several provisions of IBEW's constitution in her interrogatory answers as supporting a claim against IBEW based upon agency. The IBEW constitution is the governing document that sets forth the rights and responsibilities between IBEW and its local unions. In her motion to remand, plaintiff argues that mere reference to the IBEW constitution does not give rise to complete preemption under § 301 of the LMRA.

II. Applicable Law

Any civil action brought in a state court over which the district courts have original jurisdiction may be removed to the proper district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). In the event that the federal court determines it does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over a removed action, it must remand the action to state court where it originated. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c). Removal statutes are strictly construed, and any doubts about the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand. In re Business Men's Assurance Co. of America, 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993). As the party invoking jurisdiction, defendants have the burden of establishing that prerequisites to jurisdiction have been satisfied. Id.; Hatridge v. Aetna Cas & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1969). Generally, in determining whether removal was proper, the court must look to the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537-38 (1939). The basis for federal jurisdiction must be apparent from the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). However, where a complaint raises issues to which federal law applies with complete preemptive force, the Court must look beyond the face of the complaint in determining whether remand is proper. Williams v.National Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009).

Section 301 of the LMRA states that federal law governs "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a). Section 301 completely preempts state law claims that are "substantially dependent upon analysis" of a CBA, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985), because "the application of state law...might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state law principles as there are States." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406 (1988); see also Williams, 582 F.3d at 874.

In applying the § 301 complete preemption doctrine, the Court begins with the "claim itself," Trustees of the Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 331 (8th Cir. 2006), and applies a two-step approach in order to determine if the claim is sufficiently "independent" to survive complete preemption. Williams, 582 F.3d at 874. First, a state law claim is preempted if it is "based on" a provision of the CBA, meaning that "the CBA provision is at issue" and "it actually sets forth the right upon which the claim is based." Id. Second, § 301 complete preemption applies where a state law claim "is dependent upon an analysis of the relevant CBA," meaning that the resolution of plaintiff's state law claim requires interpretation of a provision of the CBA. Id. The Eighth Circuit in Williams reiterated that § 301 preemption only applies to claims that "require interpretation or construction of the CBA" as opposed to "those which only require reference to it" or where "the CBA need only be consulted during its adjudication." Id. at 876 (quoting Trustees of the Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 331 (8th Cir. 2006); citing also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124-25 (1994)).

"Union constitutions are an important form of contract between labor organizations" and fall within the scope of § 301. Woodell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 502 U.S. 93, 101 (1991). However, "[n]either United Ass'n of Journeymen nor Wooddell are removal cases, nor does either raise an issue of preemption nor state that § 301 gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over suits to enforce union constitutions." Tisdale v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of the U.S. & Canada, Local 704, 25 F.3d 1308, 1310 (6th Cir.1994) (referring to United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615 (1981); Woodell, 502 U.S. 93). "[P]reemption and removal are related but distinct concepts. Even '[t]he fact that a defendant might ultimately prove that a plaintiff's claims are pre-empted ... does not establish that they are removable to federal courts.' " Id. at 1311 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987). The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether removal and complete preemption applies to claims that depend on the content of an international union's constitution. Hahn v. Rauch, 602 F.Supp.2d 895 (N.D. Ohio 2008); Sowell v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Slip Copy, 2009 WL 4255556 *3, n.13 (S.D. Tex. 2009).

III. Discussion

Defendants argue that the plaintiff's claims against IBEW rely on seven sections of IBEW's constitution to establish agency liability for the acts of Datillo or Local 1455.1 (Doc. #23). They also refer to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) to which defendants Local 1455 and IBEW are parties as supporting complete preemption. (Doc. #24 at 2). Defendants have not, however, provided a copy of the referenced CBA, nor pointed to any specific language that would require interpretation. Meyer v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 163 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 1998) (complete federal LRMA preemption "require[s] interpretation of a specific provision of a CBA."). Thus, the Court finds defendants to have failed to satisfy their burden of establishing complete preemption jurisdiction based upon any provision of a CBA. Id.

1. Claims against Datillo and Local 1455

Initially, the Court finds that plaintiff's claims against Datillo and Local 1455 are not completely preempted. Plaintiff was an administrative employee hired by a local union. She was not a member of the union or a beneficiary of a CBA. Nor was defendants' conduct toward plaintiff governed by any "contracts between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a). As such, plaintiff's claims for the violation of non-waivable rights created under Missouri law could not be completely preempted by § 301 because there are no federal claims plaintiff could assert in lieu of her state-law claims. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994) (§ 301 "cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law."); Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 220 (state-law claims that are completely preempted must "be treated as a § 301 claim, . . . or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law." (internal citation omitted)).

2. Claims against IBEW

The Court need not determine whether complete preemption as described in Allis-Chalmers Corp. extends to claims that are dependant upon a union constitutionunless plaintiff's reliance on the IBEW constitution would be sufficient to trigger complete preemption here. See In re Prempro Products Liability Litigation, 591 F.3d 613, 624 (8th Cir. 2010). Assuming that complete preemption is available under these circumstances, the Court concludes that defendants have failed to show that plaintiff's claims against IBEW are completely preempted.

Plaintiff's theory of liability as to IBEW is based upon an agency relationship between IBEW and Datillo or Local 1455. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that common law principles of agency govern whether an international union is liable for the actions of a local union chapter or its officers § 301. See Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 444 U.S. 212, 216-217 (1979). The applicability of the agency test under Carbon Fuel, however, only implicates ordinary preemption (choice of law), not complete preemption (jurisdiction). See Sowell v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Slip Copy, 2009 WL 4255556 *3 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (discussing ordinary versus complete preemption). Thus, IBEW may attempt to raise federal preemption as a defense to plaintiff's theory of liability if there is a conflict between federal and Missouri agency law.2 But a federal defense based uponpreemption is, by itself, insufficient to support federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Caterpillar, 482...

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