Austin v. Lange
| Decision Date | 02 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No: C 10-4551 SBA |
| Parties | RONALD AUSTIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MATTHEW LANGE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiffs have brought the instant civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants. The parties are presently before the Court on the motion to dismiss of the United States of America ("United States"), brought on behalf of named Defendant U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Dkt. 7, as well as the motion to dismiss of Defendants Cornell Companies dba Cornell Corrections Center and Matthew Lange (collectively "Cornell Corrections"), Dkt. 21. Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with this matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND the United States' motion and ORDERS the parties to submit further briefing with regard to the motion of Cornell Corrections as directed below. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).
Plaintiff Ronald Austin ("Ronald" or "Plaintiff") was sentenced to serve 37 months of imprisonment in a federal corrections facility for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(b), possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Dkt. 1 ¶9, 10. His sentence commenced on August 1, 2006. Id. On March 26, 2008, Plaintiff was released on parole to the Cornell Corrections Center in Oakland, California. Id. § 11. Defendant Matthew Lange("Lange") was the facility director. Id. § 14. As a condition of parole, Plaintiff was required to seek employment. Id. § 12. Plaintiff began seeking employment in Solano County, California. Id. § 13. Lange informed Plaintiff that he could not seek employment in Solano County. Id. § 14. Plaintiff spoke with his pre-trial officer who told him that he was permitted to seek employment in Solano County, but Lange would be required to complete certain paperwork. Id. § 16. When Plaintiff informed Lange that he could seek employment in Solano County, but Lange had to submit the required paperwork, Lange allegedly became angry and verbally abusive, stating that the "paperwork was a hassle and too much work." Id. § 19.
A week later, Lange told Plaintiff that he had tested positive for methadone. Id. § 21. A week after that, Plaintiff was awakened from his sleep and advised that Lange wanted to speak with him, but, instead, he was taken to a hearing pertaining to his alleged use of methadone. Id. §§ 22, 23. Plaintiff denied using drugs, but he was transported to the federal corrections institute in Dublin. Id. § 25. Plaintiff remained at the Dublin facility until June 11, 2008, at which time he was transferred to the Victorville facility. Id. § 25. At the Victorville facility, Plaintiff was placed in isolation until he was transferred to Lompoc on June 16, 2008. Id. § 26. At Lompoc, Plaintiff was placed in isolation. Id. § 27.
On July 2, 2008, for the first time, Plaintiff received the paperwork forming the basis of the allegations that he had used methadone. Id. § 28. The paperwork indicated Plaintiff had admitted to use of "unprescribed medication," when he had not. Id. § 29. Further, the sample that tested positive for methadone was not Plaintiff's sample, as it did not have Plaintiff's specimen number, but someone else's number. Id. §§ 30, 31. Plaintiff informed staff at Lompoc of the mistake, but he was held for two more weeks. Id. §§ 32, 33.
On December 9, 2008, Plaintiff filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2401, for damages with the United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons; United States Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons—Cornell Companies; and United States Department of Probation/Supervised Release. Dkt. 1, Ex. A. In the claim, Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the negligence ofLange and other individuals, Plaintiff was falsely arrested and imprisoned in deprivation of his due process rights when the wrong positive test for methadone was attributed to him. Id.
On April 2, 2009, Harlan W. Penn ("Penn"), Regional Counsel for the Bureau of Prisons, wrote a letter to Plaintiff's counsel stating that the FTCA claim was being sent back because it did not contain the original signature of Plaintiff and because it did not contain proof of counsel's ability to act on Plaintiff's behalf. Dkt. 18, Ex. A. On April 14, 2009, Plaintiff's counsel resubmitted the FTCA claim. Dkt. 18 at 3. On April 30, 2009, Plaintiff's counsel received a letter from Cornell Corrections' insurer stating that it was in receipt of Plaintiff's FTCA claim. Id., Ex. B. On May 5, 2009, Penn wrote acknowledging receipt of Plaintiff's second FTCA claim. Id., Ex. C. In August 2009, Plaintiff's counsel suffered a debilitating heart attack requiring him to close his office and establish a conservatorship. Id., Ex. D. Plaintiff was left without counsel while his counsel's family went through counsel's files and made efforts to cover his cases. Dkt. 18 at 4. On April 8, 2010, Penn wrote a letter rejecting Plaintiff's FTCA claim, stating that Plaintiff had six months to file suit. Dkt. 18, Ex. E. On September 15, 2010, Plaintiff contacted his new and current counsel. Dkt. 18.
On October 7, 2010, Plaintiff filed his complaint within six months of the April 8, 2010 letter rejecting his FTCA claim. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff brings the complaint against Defendants Lange, Cornell Corrections Center, and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff alleges causes of action for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; false arrest; false imprisonment; negligence; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. Plaintiff Deborah Austin, Plaintiff's wife, asserts a claim for loss of consortium. Id.
On November 29, 2010, Defendants Lange and Cornell Companies dba Cornell Corrections Center filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiff's claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations, except for the claims for false arrest and imprisonment, which are barred by a one-year statute of limitations. Dkt. 3. On December 22, 2010, Plaintiff opposed the motion, and, on May 6, 2011, filed an amended opposition. Dkt. 10, 18. In his initial opposition, Plaintiff conceded his claims were time-barred as pleaded, but requested leave to amend to plead facts showing that, except for the false arrest and imprisonment claims, the claims were not time-barred because the time to file the claims was tolled by the filing of his FTCA claim. Dkt. 10 at 2, 4. In his subsequent opposition, Plaintiff argues that Cornell Corrections is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because the letter from Penn stated that he had six months to file suit. Cornell Corrections responded to both oppositions. Dkt. 14, 19. In both replies, Cornell Corrections and Lange assert that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred and that Plaintiff cannot state a Bivens civil rights claim against them. Id. Moreover, Cornell Corrections and Lange also maintain that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Plaintiff's filing of a FTCA claim. Id. Recognizing that an FTCA claim is only needed in connection with a suit against the United States for the torts of federal agencies and individuals, Cornell Corrections and Lange assert they are not federal agencies or individuals, but private entities, and therefore it was not proper to file a FTCA claim as to them. Id. Consequently, Cornell Corrections and Lange contend the filing of the FTCA claim could not have tolled the statute of limitations on any claims against them. Id. In their reply addressing Plaintiff's second opposition, Defendants request that the Court strike Plaintiff's second opposition and argue that Plaintiff cannot establish equitable estoppel. Dkt. 19.
On December 17, 2010, the United States filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on behalf of Defendant U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, arguing that it should be substituted as the Defendant. Dkt. 7. The United States also asserted that the complaint should be dismissed because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction (1) over Plaintiff's constitutional claims for damages against the United States; (2) over Plaintiff's tort claims because Plaintiff failed to meet the statutory prerequisites to suit pursuant to the FTCA; and (3) over Plaintiff's tort claims because the independent contractor and false imprisonmentexceptions to the FTCA apply in the instant action. Id. The United States further argued that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because no due process rights exist for an inmate to be housed in any particular penal facility or to be housed in any particular kind of cell. Id. On June 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition wherein he stated that he does not oppose the granting of the United States' motion to dismiss. In light of Plaintiff's non-opposition, the Court GRANTS WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND the United States' motion to dismiss.
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts generally "consider only allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice." Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). The court is to "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of...
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