Austin v. Plumley, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-0892
Decision Date | 29 March 2013 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:11-0892 |
Parties | TIMOTHY J. AUSTIN, Plaintiff, v. MARVIN PLUMLEY, Warden, Huttonsville Correctional Center, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
Pending before the court is plaintiff's Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody. By Standing Order, the action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge R. Clarke VanDervort for submission of findings of fact and recommendations regarding disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Magistrate Judge VanDervort submitted his Findings and Recommendation to the court on December 4, 2012, in which he recommended that this court grant plaintiff's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and remove the matter from the court's docket.
In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the parties were allotted fourteen days plus three mailing days in which to file any objections to Magistrate Judge VanDervort's Findings and Recommendations. On December 18, 2012, defendantfiled objections to the Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation.
In April 2007, Austin was convicted of Breaking and Entering in the Circuit Court of Wood County, West Virginia. As a result of that conviction, he was sentenced to serve no less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years in the penitentiary. While serving his sentence for Breaking and Entering, Austin walked away from a road crew and was gone for two and a half days. By indictment dated June 16, 2009, in the Circuit Court of McDowell County, he was charged with Jail or Prison Escape, in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-5-10. Defendant's Exhibit No. 1. On September 24, 2009, Austin pled guilty to Attempted Jail or Prison Escape, a lesser included offense. Defendant's Exhibits No. 2 and 3.
At sentencing on the Attempted Escape conviction, Austin was sentenced to Defendant's Exhibit No. 4. The record reflects that the sentencing judge deferred Austin's sentence in order todelay the parole eligibility date for his first conviction. See id.
On August 31, 2010, Austin filed an expedited motion to correct an illegal sentence under West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a). Defendant's Exhibit No. 5. Austin argued that, by delaying his effective sentencing date on the second conviction from November 2009 to March 2010, the trial court was illegally extending his parole eligibility date. Austin further argued that the sentencing judge intended to run his sentence on the Attempted Escape concurrent with his term of imprisonment on the Breaking and Entering conviction. See id. On October 19, 2010, while the motion to correct remained pending, Austin filed a petition for writ of mandamus and for production of documents with the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Defendant's Exhibit No. 6. The mandamus petition sought to have the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals direct the lower court to rule on the pending Rule 35 motion. See id.
Thereafter, on October 22, 2010, the trial court issued an Amended Sentencing Order which it stated was intended to clarify its original sentencing order. That order read:
On December 30, 2010, Austin appealed the court's order of October 22, 2010 to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The West Virginia Supreme Court denied Austin's appeal on October 25, 2011. In so doing, that court stated:
It is clear from the amended sentencing order that some confusion arose from the language of the original sentencing order. In clarifying its intention, the circuit court stated in the amended sentencing order that "[i]t was the intent of the sentencing court that the sentence imposed on November 12, 2009 be servedconsecutively with the unrelated sentence that the [petitioner] was already serving on November 12, 2009. The circuit court went on to add that it intended to give petitioner credit for the time he served on the attempted escape charge from his arraignment to the date of sentencing, and that the balance would then be served consecutively to this other unrelated sentence. It is from the resulting confusion that petitioner finds the basis for his argument that his sentence was impermissibly increased by thirty-three months upon entry of the amended sentencing order. However, this Court finds no merit in petitioner's argument. Had the circuit court originally intended for these two sentences to run concurrently, it is hard to imagine how the subsequent sentence would have punished the petitioner or served to deter him from future escapes. It is clear from the record that the circuit court intended for the sentences to run consecutively, and that the sentence was not impermissibly increased. As such, the petitioner's due process rights were not violated by entry of the amended sentence order.
A federal court will grant habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings only where such adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). A state court decision is contrary toclearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. See id. at 407-08. State court factual findings are accorded a presumption of correctness that can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Our appeals court recently explained the great deference a federal court must give a state court's findings when confronted with a habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254:
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") § 104, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006), provides two "independent requirements" for federal court review of state court factual findings in habeas petitions. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may not grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim already adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." And, under §2254(e)(1), "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," unless the petitioner satisfies his "burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." The two provisions, operating in tandem, require that "[t]o secure habeas relief, petitioner must demonstrate that a state court's finding . . . was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence, and that the corresponding factual determination was 'objectively unreasonable' in light of the record before the court." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 348, 123 S. Ct. 1029.
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As the Supreme Court has explained, although "[t]he term 'unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to define . . . [i]t suffices to say . . . that a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, "even if reasonable minds reviewing the...
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