Autauga Banking & Trust Co. v. Chambliss

• Citation: 200 Ala. 87,75 So. 463
• Decision Date: 26 April 1917
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 264
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: AUTAUGA BANKING & TRUST CO. v. CHAMBLISS et al.

75 So. 463

200 Ala. 87

AUTAUGA BANKING & TRUST CO. v. CHAMBLISS et al.

3 Div. 264

Supreme Court of Alabama

April 26, 1917

Rehearing Denied May 24, 1917

Appeal from Chancery Court, Autauga County; Leon McCord, Chancellor.

Bill by the Autauga Banking & Trust Company against Joe A. Chambliss and Carrie Chambliss. Decree for respondents, and complainant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The bill alleges a large indebtedness by Joe A. Chambliss to the bank which was reduced to judgment, and a certificate of said judgment duly filed for record in the office of the judge of probate of Autauga county, on November 10, 1913; execution duly issued upon said judgment with the return of no property found, and that complainant has been unable to locate property of defendant out of which to satisfy said judgment. It is alleged that on January 21, 1910, one L.A. Chambliss and wife executed and delivered to Joe A. Chambliss, for a valuable consideration, a warranty deed, conveying to him a certain interest in certain valuable lands in Autauga county a copy of the deed being attached to the exhibit. It is alleged that said deed was filed in the office of the judge of probate, and recorded in deed book 40, p. 196, and that notwithstanding the deed was made and executed to Joe A Chambliss, and was so recorded, said Chambliss did, after the deed had been so recorded, erase from the record his name wherever it occurred therein, and write in lieu of Joe A the name, Carrie E., and in several places the initials C.E., which makes the record appear as if the deed was made to Carrie E. Chambliss, the wife of Joe A. Chambliss, rather than to Joe A. Chambliss. This is alleged to be a fraudulent attempt to show a conveyance to Carrie Chambliss, the wife, with the intent of defeating complainant in the collection of its said indebtedness.

Eugene Ballard and P.E. Alexander, both of Prattville, and W.P. McGaugh, of Montgomery, for appellant.

W.A. Gunter, of Montgomery, for appellees.

SAYRE J.

It is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the appellee J.A. Chambliss was named as grantee in the deed executed by L.A. Chambliss on the 21st day of January, 1910. Thereby the legal title to an undivided half interest, the half interest in controversy, vested in the grantee named, and in him it still is. If the appellant Banking & Trust Company, at the time its certificate of judgment was filed for record, had no notice of the equity now asserted by the appellee C.E. Chambliss, wife of J.A. Chambliss, then appellant became and is now entitled to protection as an innocent purchaser for value without notice. Silvey v. Cook, 191 Ala. 228, 68 So. 37.

It is also entirely clear that, after the deed from L.A. to J.A. Chambliss had been recorded in the office of the judge of probate, some person interested in the property and in the question propounded by this litigation and with a deliberate purpose to create a false record, mutilated and changed, or caused to be mutilated and changed, the recorded copy so as to make C.E. Chambliss appear therein as grantee instead of J.A. Chambliss. It is not necessary to state a definite finding as to the identity of the person who did or procured this wrong. It cannot be said that appellee C.E. Chambliss was the author of the wrong, nor can it be affirmed on the evidence that she was privy to this spoliation of the record, though it was done to put an apparent legal title in her. At this point we state our opinion, contrary to a suggestion advanced in the brief for appellees, that this criminally fabricated record could have no effect whatever as constructive notice to appellant of the alleged equity now claimed by C.E. Chambliss.

The further proposition of appellees, and more worthy of consideration, is that appellant should be charged with notice of the equity claimed by C.E. Chambliss, viz. that she bought and in part paid for the interest in question before judgment rendered for appellant, and that by mistake the deed was made to J.A. Chambliss instead of to her--that appellant should be charged with notice by reason of the fact that at the time its judgment was filed for a lien under the statute appellee C.E. Chambliss was in possession, claiming to own the entire fee. It is...