Autio v. Afscme, Local 3139

• Decision Date: 09 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-3145.,97-3145.
• Citation: 140 F.3d 802
• Parties: Jock Orville AUTIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee, v. AFSCME, LOCAL 3139, Defendant, State of Minnesota, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

140 F.3d 802

Jock Orville AUTIO, Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee, v. AFSCME, LOCAL 3139, Defendant State of Minnesota, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 97-3145.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 9, 1998.

Decided April 9, 1998.

Order Granting Rehearing En Banc and Vacating Opinion July 7, 1998.

Melissa L. Wright, St. Paul, MN, argued, for Defendant-Appellant.

Steven E. Rau, Minneapolis, MN, argued, for Autio.

Seth M. Glanter, Washington, DC, argued, for United States.

Before BEAM and HEANEY, Circuit Judges, and WATERS¹, District Judge.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

The State of Minnesota appeals the district court's denial of its motion to dismiss Jock Orville Autio's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and other supplemental state law claims. Minnesota contends that Autio's claims should have been dismissed because the district court lacked jurisdiction. Specifically, Minnesota argues that the Eleventh Amendment acts as a bar to an ADA claim against a state in federal court. We conclude that the state was properly sued in federal court and affirm the district court.

I.

Plaintiff/appellee, Autio, worked as a store clerk in the Minnesota State Department of Administration's Central Store for Materials Management. On several occasions, Autio requested accommodations for various physical disabilities. According to Autio, Minnesota denied his requests. Autio also claims that his union, AFSCME, Local 3139, did not provide him any assistance in pursuing his claim. Autio argues that without accommodations his employment responsibilities aggravated his physical condition and caused him injury. Autio filed a claim alleging unlawful employment practices in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 363.01-363.20; and the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 176.001-176.861.

Minnesota moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment barred Autio's ADA claims from being heard in federal court. Minnesota argued that once the ADA claims were dismissed, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the remaining state law claims. The district court held that Minnesota's Eleventh Amendment immunity was lawfully abrogated by Congress and it could properly be sued in federal court. Minnesota appeals.

II.

Whether a complaint sufficiently states a cause of action is a legal question subject to de novo review. Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir.1986)). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we assume all facts alleged by a plaintiff are true. Id. Dismissal is only proper if it appears that a plaintiff is unable to prove any set of facts entitling the plaintiff to relief. Id. (citing Morton, 793 F.2d at 187).

Minnesota argues that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars Autio's claims.² Specifically, Minnesota contends that the ADA does not represent an appropriate congressional exercise of its enforcement power so as to override its Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state is not subject to suit in federal court by its own citizens. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355-56, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). A state can, however, expressly waive its immunity to suit or Congress can abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-41, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3146, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (citations omitted). In this case, both parties agree that Minnesota has not waived its immunity to suit. Therefore, we must determine whether Congress properly abrogated Minnesota's Eleventh Amendment immunity.³

In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-56, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1123, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine whether Congress has properly abrogated a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The first question is whether Congress unequivocally expressed an intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 425-26, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)). The second question is whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Id.

With regard to the first question, it is clear that in enacting the ADA, Congress unequivocally abrogated a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (under the ADA, "[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment"). Second, in determining whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of power, we look to the Fourteenth Amendment because the ADA was explicitly enacted to provide equal protection to those with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. 12101(b)(4). Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not "deny ... any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. § 5.

We now turn to whether Congress properly enacted the ADA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-24, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Supreme Court set forth a three-part test to determine whether Congress properly enacted legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) whether the statute may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause; (2) whether it is plainly adapted in furthering that end; and (3) whether it is consistent, and not prohibited by, the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.

First, the ADA was clearly enacted to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (one purpose of the ADA was "to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment ... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day to day by people with disabilities"). Second, we believe that the ADA was plainly adapted to enforcing the Equal Protection Clause. Relying heavily on City of Boerne v. Flores, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), Minnesota contends that the ADA is not "plainly adapted" to enforcing the Equal Protection Clause because it prohibits more than what a court might find unconstitutional. In Flores, the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because, in part, the "legislative record lack[ed] examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. The history of persecution in this country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years." Id. at, 117 S.Ct. at 2169 (citations omitted). In this respect, the Court found that, in passing the RFRA, Congress was attempting to a make a substantive constitutional change, rather than enforcing a recognized Fourteenth Amendment right. Id. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2170.

"While preventative rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented." Id. (citation omitted). Unlike the RFRA, the ADA clearly chronicles and directly addresses the discrimination people with disabilities have experienced and the "evils" those with disabilities continue to experience in modern day America. For example, the ADA and its legislative record illuminate the fact that approximately 43 million Americans have disabilities, that disability discrimination is still a pervasive problem in our society, that people with disabilities face isolation and segregation in all aspects of life, including employment, and that such discrimination costs the United States billions of dollars in lost productivity and dependency each year. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)-(9).⁴

In passing the ADA, Congress was not attempting to a make a substantive constitutional change. Rather, it was attempting to enforce a recognized Fourteenth Amendment right: equal protection. In Flores, the Court restated its long-held view that "[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into `legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the states.'" Flores, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2163 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976)). Congress is prohibited from determining "what constitutes a constitutional violation," id. at, 117 S.Ct. at 2164, but it may enact legislation prohibiting conduct which a court itself may not deem unconstitutional. We must afford congressional findings significant deference. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 1189, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) (citation omitted).

Unlike the RFRA struck down in Flores, the ADA is "plainly adapted" as a remedial measure even though each individual violation of the ADA may not in and of itself be unconstitutional. The remedies provided in the ADA are not so sweeping that they exceed the harms they are sought to redress. Because of the clear "evil" present in disability discrimination and the well-documented need for equal protection in this respect, the ADA is plainly adapted to the end of providing those with disabilities equal protection under the law.

Third, the ADA is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. In Seminole Tribe, although striking down a statute abrogating sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court recognized that "Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment [has] allowed Congress to abrogate ... immunity from...