Autobahn Imports, L.P. v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC
| Decision Date | 20 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4:16-CV-1172-A,4:16-CV-1172-A |
| Parties | AUTOBAHN IMPORTS, L.P. D/B/A LAND ROVER OF FORT WORTH, Plaintiff, v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
severed into: 4:17-cv-499-A
Before the court for consideration and decision is the motion of plaintiff, Autobahn Imports, L.P., d/b/a Land Rover of Fort Worth ("Autobahn"), for summary judgment. After having considered the motion, the response thereto of defendant, Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC ("Jaguar"), Autobahn's reply, the record of this action, and applicable legal authorities, the court has concluded that plaintiff's motion should be granted in part, and that the unresolved part should be severed into a separate action.
This action was filed by Autobahn in state court to recover damages and attorney's fees based on Jaguar's alleged violations of sections 2301.467(a)(1) and 2301.468 of the Texas Occupations Code ("Code") and Jaguar's alleged violation of section 1750.50(b)(1) of the Texas Business & Commerce Code. Doc. 1-4, ¶¶ 26, 29, & 30.1 Jaguar removed the action to this court. Doc. 1.
Autobahn is a retailer/dealer of vehicles of which Jaguar is a distributor/manufacturer. Doc. 22 at 5. Jaguar had an incentive-based program, which it referred to as the "Business Builder," contingent, among other things, on a dealer's sales. Id. Under the program, Jaguar paid its dealers a percentage of the manufacturer's suggested retail price ("MSRP") on each Land Rover vehicle sold if certain requirements were met. Id.
A dispute arose between Autobahn and Jaguar as to whether Autobahn's sales of vehicles to leasing companies qualified Autobahn to receive the incentive benefits contemplated by the Business Builder program. Following an audit of Autobahn's sales from February 1, 2013, through January 31, 2014, Jaguar charged-back against Autobahn $317,204.80, representing incentive benefits that Autobahn had received during that time period from sales to leasing companies. Id. at 6.
In May 2014, Autobahn initiated an administrative claim against Jaguar for violations of certain provisions of chapter2301 of Subtitle A of chapter 14 of the Code. Doc. 21 at 6, ¶ 24. On September 7, 2016, the Board of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles ("Board"), acting through its Chairman, issued a final order resolving in favor of Autobahn its dispute with Jaguar over the incentive payments. Doc. 22 at 28. Jaguar filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied by the Board by decision and order issued October 17, 2016. Id. at 30.
As authorized by section 2301.751(a)(2) of the Code, Jaguar sought judicial review of the Board's final order by a document filed in the Court of Appeals for the Third Judicial District of Texas on November 16, 2016. Doc. 36 at App. 005. The appeal remains unresolved. Id. at App. 050-App. 052.
Autobahn's live pleading in this action is its first amended complaint. Doc. 21. Its allegations clarify the causes of action Autobahn is asserting against Jaguar, by stating them as follows:
Grounds of Autobahn's Motion,
and Responsive Positions Taken by Jaguar
Autobahn seeks by its motion for summary judgment a summary adjudication in its favor of the first, second, and fourth causes of action described above, which Autobahn refers to in the motion as "its three causes of action against [Jaguar]." Doc. 27 at 4,¶ 2. It describes in a general way the summary adjudications it seeks as follows:
Autobahn is entitled to summary judgment on each of its three causes of action against [Jaguar], which it asserted in this matter following an administrative proceeding before the Texas Motor Vehicle Board (the "Board"). First, [Jaguar]'s violations of Chapter 2301 of the Texas Occupations Code (the "Code"), as found by the Board, establish Autobahn's claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") as a matter of law, by virtue of a DTPA tie-in statute contained in the Code. Second, the Board expressly found that the underlying agreements in this matter collectively constitute valid and enforceable contracts that [Jaguar] breached by virtue of wrongful chargebacks. Finally, although Chapter 3 8 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code may not allow an award of attorneys' fees against a limited liability company, Autobahn is still entitled to recover its attorneys' fees by prevailing on its claims for violation of the DTPA.
Id. at 4-5, ¶ 2 (footnotes omitted).
Jaguar starts its response with its contention that Autobahn is not entitled to pursue this action because it has not exhausted its administrative remedies. Doc. 35 at 1-3 & 5-9. It maintains that Autobahn's administrative remedies have not been exhausted until Jaguar's appeal from the Board's final order has been concluded. Id. at 7. Alternatively, Jaguar argues that even if Autobahn had the authority to pursue this action, there would be no basis for an award of treble damages because Autobahn has not established that the conduct of Jaguar about whichAutobahn complains was committed knowingly, as contemplated by the pertinent section of the DTPA (section 1750.50(b)(1) of the Texas Business & Commerce Code). Id. at 9-11. Jaguar notes that it has credited Autobahn's customer account with the amount of $317,204.80 (subject to a full reservation of rights), with the consequence, Jaguar argues, that it cannot be considered to have knowingly continued to withhold Autobahn's money. Id. at 10-11.
Jaguar adds that even if Autobahn were entitled to recover attorney's fees, its recovery should be limited to attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution of this action, and should not include fees incurred in the Board proceeding or in Jaguar's state court appeal from the Board's final order. Id. at 11-12.
Finally, Jaguar takes the position that Autobahn's motion for summary judgment would be inconsistent with a ruling the court earlier made that Jaguar could not assert a counterclaim against Autobahn in this action because Jaguar had not exhausted its administrative remedies as to the relief it sought by way of the counterclaim. Id. at 12-13.2
84 S.W.3d 212, 224 (Tex. 2002).
Jaguar reasons that so long as its appeal from the Board decision is pending, Autobahn, according to the language used by the Texas Supreme Court, has not exhausted its administrative remedies for the purpose of pursuing damages in the trial court for Code-based claims, with the consequence that this court has no jurisdiction to resolve those claims.
Autobahn disagrees, contending that the Subaru language upon which Jaguar relies is pure dicta, and that Jaguar's argument isdirectly addressed by section 2301.755 of the Code, which provides that an appeal such as Jaguar has taken from the final Board order, does not affect the enforcement of such an order by an action such as this action Autobahn has brought against Jaguar, and also addressed by the more general provision of section 2001.176(a)(3) of the Texas Government Code that the filing of a petition to vacate a state agency decision for which other than trial de novo is the manner of review authorized by law does not affect the enforcement of an agency decision.
The court has concluded that Autobahn has the better of the exhaustion of administrative remedies argument.
Autobahn is correct in saying that the language of Subaru upon which Jaguar relies is nothing more than dicta. The automobile dealer which initiated Subaru in the trial court had not sought any administrative relief before it initiated the action. Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at 217. Consequently, the dealer was faced with the barrier to judicial relief existing by reason of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Board to resolve the kinds of disputes the dealer sought to resolve judicially. There was no need for the Court to discuss what would have happened if the dealer had successfully pursued his administrative remediesand the losing party in the administrative process had then sought judicial review of the Board ruling.3
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