Automated Personnel International, Inc. v. Stamper

• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: EAGER
• Citation: Automated Personnel International, Inc. v. Stamper, 307 N.Y.S.2d 193, 33 A.D.2d 748 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)
• Decision Date: 04 December 1969
• Docket Number: Nos. 1,2 and 3,s. 1
• Parties: AUTOMATED PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner-Respondent-Appellant. v. Alfred K. STAMPER and Automated Personnel International of Rochester, Inc., Respondents-Appellants-Respondents. AUTOMATED PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL OF EAST ORANGE, INC., Petitioner-Appellant-Respondent, v. AUTOMATED PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent-Respondent-Appellant. R. K. MARSAN, Individually, and Automated Personnel International of Washington, D.C., Inc., Petitioners-Appellants-Respondents, v. AUTOMATED PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent-Respondent-Appellant.

Page 193

307 N.Y.S.2d 193

33 A.D.2d 748

AUTOMATED PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner-Respondent-Appellant. v. Alfred K. STAMPER and Automated Personnel International of

Rochester, Inc., Respondents-Appellants-Respondents.

AUTOMATED PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL OF EAST ORANGE, INC., Petitioner-Appellant-Respondent, v. AUTOMATED PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Respondent-Respondent-Appellant.

R. K. MARSAN, Individually, and Automated Personnel

International of Washington, D.C., Inc., Petitioners-Appellants-Respondents, v. AUTOMATED PERSONNEL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Respondent-Respondent-Appellant.

Proceeding Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division,

First Department.

Dec. 4, 1969.

S. G. Brundage, Rochester, for appellant.

Jared Specthrie, New York City, for respondents.

Order entered September 26, 1969, consolidating Proceedings 2 and 3 and denying the application to consolidate those proceedings with Proceeding No. 1 modified on the law and the facts and in the exercise of discretion to the extent of denying consolidation of Proceedings 2 and 3, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs or disbursements, without prejudice to an application at Special Term for a joint arbitration of all three proceedings after answers have been interposed in Proceedings 2 and 3 and all preliminary proceedings have been had. It may well be that common questions of law and fact may exist and that the interests of justice and avoidance of multiplicity of hearings would best be served by a joint arbitration. At this stage of the proceedings, however, no such determination can be made. For the difference between joint trials and consolidations, see Padilla v. Greyhound, 29 A.D.2d 495, 497, 288 N.Y.S.2d 641; Dasheff v. Tennis Club of Westhampton, 25 Misc.2d 13, 206 N.Y.S.2d 733; Vidal v. Sheffield, 208 Misc. 438, 141 N.Y.S.2d 82. Finally, when all preliminary proceedings in...