Automobile Club of Mo. v. City of St. Louis, 47603

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Citation: 83 A.L.R.2d 612,334 S.W.2d 355
• Docket Number: No. 2,No. 47603,47603,2
• Parties: AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF MISSOURI, a Corporation, and George C. Mackey, and Mr. and Mrs. Oscar Cotta, Respondents, v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, John J. Dwyer, Treasurer of the City of St. Louis, and John H. Poelker, Comptroller of The City of St. Louis, Appellants
• Decision Date: 11 April 1960

Page 355

334 S.W.2d 355 83 A.L.R.2d 612 AUTOMOBILE CLUB OF MISSOURI, a Corporation, and George C.
Mackey, and Mr. and Mrs. Oscar Cotta, Respondents,
v.
CITY OF ST. LOUIS, John J. Dwyer, Treasurer of the City of
St. Louis, and John H. Poelker, Comptroller of The
City of St. Louis, Appellants. No. 47603. Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2. April 11, 1960.

Page 356

Thomas J. Neenan, City Counselor, John J. Shanahan, Associate City Counselor,

Page 357

Eugene P. Freeman, Associate City Counselor, St. Louis, Mo., for appellants.

Green, Hennings, Henry & Evans, Robert D. Evans, John R. Green, II, Lewis C. Green, St. Louis, Mo., for respondents.

ELMO B. HUNTER, Special Judge.

This is an action for declaratory judgment and injunction involving the interpretation and validity of certain ordinances of the City of St. Louis relating to the installation of parking meters and the collection and disposition of fees and fines thereunder.

Plaintiffs-respondents are the Automobile Club of Missouri, a corporation, George C. Mackay and Mr. and Mrs. Oscar Cotta, individuals, all residents and taxpayers of the City of St. Louis, and all of whom are conceded to be proper parties. Defendants-appellants are the City of St. Louis, John J. Dwyer, Treasurer, and John H. Poelker, Comptroller of the city.

Plaintiffs filed their petition for declaratory judgment and injunction on July 19, 1958, for the purpose of determining the validity of Ordinances 45307, 45771, 48437, 48438, 48484, 48897, 48898 and 49071 of the City of St. Louis.

Of these eight ordinances the first four mentioned either had been repealed or had expired prior to the time the petition was filed. The question of their validity is moot, and we do not undertake to pass on it.

Ordinance 48484, with amendments to be noted shortly, is the current Parking Meter Ordinance of St. Louis. It provides for a Parking Meter Commission, establishes its powers and duties; provides for the installation of parking meters and zones; for parking meter fees and for the enforcement of the ordinance and fines for violation thereof. Ordinances 48897 and 48898 amend Sections Six and Twelve of the Parking Meter Ordinance, relating respectively to meter fees and fines. Ordinance 49071 amends Section Ten of the Parking Meter Ordinance by authorizing the transfer in fiscal year 1958-59 from parking meter funds to general revenue a sum not to exceed $350,000 of which sum $200,000 had been transferred prior to the filing of this suit.

The trial court declared Section Six of Ordinance 48484 invalid as vesting in the commission arbitrary power to set parking fees at less than the designated maximum without requisite standards; Section Ten invalid for making fines for violation of the Parking Meter Ordinance a part of the parking meter fund, declaring 'such fines belong to the general revenue of the City'; Section Ten also invalid for the reason it conflicts with Section 304.120, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.; Ordinance 48897, passed June 19, 1958, invalid in that it attempts to vest in the Parking Meter Commission power to fix parking meter fees within minimum and maximum limits, and eliminates the Zones provided in Section Six of Ordinance 48484; and Ordinance 49071, approved July 14, 1958, invalid 'because it purports to transfer parking meter funds to the general revenue of the City, for general revenue purposes, and to authorize the use of parking meter funds for furthering the regulation of traffic including off-street parking for cities.'

Additionally, the trial court enjoined defendants: (1) from mingling any fines collected for parking meter violations with the parking meter funds; (2) from transferring any parking meter funds to the general revenue fund of the City of St. Louis; and (3) from using or transferring any parking meter funds for off-street parking facilities.

After an unavailing motion for new trial defendants have appealed.

Defendants present their contentions on this appeal under four points and authorities. We will consider all of them but not in their numerical order.

Page 358

Defendants contend the trial court erred in determining that Section Six of Ordinance 48484, the current Parking Meter Ordinance, is unconstitutional, claiming that such section does provide adequate standards for the Parking Meter Commission in the establishment of parking meter fees, and is not an unlawful attempt to delegate legislative power to an administrative agency. It provides:

'Section Six. Parking Meter Spaces, Zones and Fees. All parking meter spaces shall be at least twenty (20) feet, more or less, in length and clearly marked. In accordance with public convenience and necessity, there shall be three (3) zones. The Parking Meter Commission shall determine the zone applicable to each street or part thereof upon which meters are to be installed. The fee shall be five (5) cents in a thirty (30) minute zone. The fee shall not be more than one (1) cent for each twelve (12) minutes or five (5) cents for each hour in one (1) hour zones. The fee in a two (2) hour zone shall not be more than five (5) cents for each hour nor more than ten (10) cents for two (2) hours; provided, however, the Commission may set a five (5) cent fee for the full period of the two (2) hour zone. The Commission shall determine the hours during which parking meters shall be operative which, unless otherwise provided by ordinance, shall be between the hours of eight (8) a. m. and seven (7) p. m., except Sundays.'

By the terms of Section Six of the ordinance the Parking Meter Commission is delegated the power to determine the minimum charge and to establish the specific charge not in excess of the established maximum charge for the one and two hour zones. Additionally, the commission is authorized to determine whether the particular zone area is to be designated (1) a thirty minute zone, or (2) a one hour zone, or (3) a two hour zone 'in accordance with public convenience and necessity.' Failure of a person using the parking space to pay the fee thusly established by the administrative board is a misdemeanor under the terms of the ordinance. While Section Five of the ordinance contains guideposts for establishing the location of parking meters it does not contain any criterion for determining either the amount of the parking fee or the time limit to be applied, and it is of no aid in considering the validity of Section Six.

It is our view that the trial court was correct in holding that Section Six of Ordinance 48484 unlawfully delegated legislative power to the Parking Meter Commission. The regulation on traffic, including the establishment of the parking zones, with their time limitations, and the fixing of the fees thereof are legislative functions which cannot lawfully be delegated. Cf., Cavanaugh v. Gerk, 313 Mo. 375, 280 S.W. 51; Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S.W. 565, 568. It is axiomatic that a legislative body cannot delegate its authority, but alone must exercise its legislative functions. True, it may empower certain officers, boards and commissions to carry out in detail the legislative purposes and promulgate rules by which to put in force legislative regulations. It may provide a regulation in general terms, may define certain areas within which certain regulations may be imposed, and it may empower a board to ascertain the facts as to whether the location affected comes within the general regulation or within the designated or described area or zone. See, State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn, Mo.Sup., 326 S.W.2d 314, 320. Much more than that was attempted here. The ordinance fails to establish a single criterion or standard to guide the commission in fixing the fee to be charged within the maximum mentioned. This is an attempted delegation of a legislative power without adequate standards and is unlawful. Further, 'in accordance with public convenience and necessity' is insufficient as

Page 359

a criterion or standard for determining whether the particular meter zone shall be a thirty minute, one hour or two hour zone. Cf., Fairmont Inv. Co. v. Woermann, 357 Mo. 625, 210 S.W.2d 26; State ex rel. Continental Oil Co. v. Waddill, Mo.Sup., 318 S.W.2d 281, 285-286; State ex rel. Triangle Fuel Co. v. Caulfield, 355 Mo. 330, 196 S.W.2d 296.

In Kalbfell v. City of St. Louis, 357 Mo. 986, 211 S.W.2d 911, we recognized that there are exceptions to the general rule that an ordinance vesting such a broad discretion in public officials or boards without furnishing definite conditions, regulations, tests or standards is void, such exceptions generally arising where the situation requires the placing of some discretion in the officers or board or the discretion relates to the administration of a proper police regulation. We acknowledged the tendency is to extend the discretion reposed in officials to meet the growing complexities of life, the multiplication of such regulations and the increased difficulty experienced in administering the laws. See, State ex rel. Priest v. Gunn, supra. But the establishment of the meter fee does not come within either the spirit or letter of those exceptions. As a practical matter it would be simple for the legislative body either to establish the exact parking fee or to establish legally sufficient standards and criterion for the Parking Meter Commission to follow in establishing the parking fee. This is also true with regard to the establishment of the various time zones.

Ordinance 48897, approved June 19, 1958, repealed Section Six of Ordinance 48484 and enacted a new Section Six in lieu thereof, which new section reads:

'Section Six. Parking Meter Spaces, Zones and Fees.--All parking meter spaces shall be at least twenty (20) feet, more or less, in length and clearly marked. In accordance with public convenience and necessity, the Commission shall establish fees for the use of designated parking spaces in accordance with the following...