Autovest, L.L.C. v. Agosto
| Decision Date | 31 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Nos. A-1-CA-37459,A-1-CA-37969,A-1-CA-37483,s. A-1-CA-37459 |
| Citation | 497 P.3d 642 |
| Parties | AUTOVEST, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Debra M. AGOSTO and Debbie M. Agosto, Defendants-Appellees. Autovest, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Maria Estrada, Defendant-Appellant, and Frank Rivera, Jr., Defendant. Autovest, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Debra M. Agosto and Debbie M. Agosto, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Jenkins & Young, P.C., Jody D. Jenkins, Lubbock, TX, Simmonds & Narita LLP, Michael R. Simmonds, R. Travis Campbell, San Francisco, CA, for Autovest, L.L.C.
Hanratty Law Firm, Kevin J. Hanratty, Artesia, NM, for Appellee Debbie M. Agosto
Kenneth L. Beal, Las Cruces, NM, for Appellee Debra M. Agosto
Law Office of Jane B. Yohalem, Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellees Agosto
Kevin J. Hanratty, Artesia, NM, Kenneth L. Beal, Las Cruces, NM, Law Office of Jane B. Yohalem, Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant Maria Estrada
{1} In this opinion we address related appeals arising from two district court cases involving the same Plaintiff, Autovest LLC, and its pursuit of deficiency actions against borrowers who defaulted on automobile purchase contracts.1 A common issue arose in both cases: whether a partial payment revived the limitations period for a cause of action under Article 2 of New Mexico's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)— NMSA 1978, Section 55-2-725(1) (1961). The district courts reached conflicting decisions on the question. In Autovest I , the court concluded that Autovest's complaint was time-barred and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, whereas in Autovest II , the court concluded that a partial payment revived the limitations period and entered judgment in favor of Autovest. We hold that the partial payment revival statute, NMSA 1978, § 37-1-16 (1957), does not operate to toll the limitations period in Section 55-2-725. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of Autovest's complaint in Autovest I and reverse the judgment in favor of Autovest in Autovest II .
{2} Autovest additionally challenges the district court's attorney fee decisions in Autovest I . Because we conclude the district court erred in its disposition of both parties’ fee requests, we reverse and remand for further consideration of those matters.
{3} In June 2006, Defendants Debra and Debbie Agosto, mother and daughter (hereinafter, the Agostos), bought a used Saturn L200 from a dealer pursuant to a sales contract and purchase money security agreement. The Agostos financed approximately $14,000 to complete the purchase and agreed to repay this debt in monthly installments. The dealer assigned its interest in the agreement to Wells Fargo Auto Finance, Inc., which in turn assigned it to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo). The Agostos defaulted in 2008. Wells Fargo repossessed and sold the vehicle that winter, but a deficiency of approximately $9,000 remained. Wells Fargo assigned its interest in the agreement to Autovest in January 2011.
{4} Autovest referred the debt to a collection agency, which obtained a payment of $1,000 from Debra via check dated February 25, 2011. Autovest filed suit for the remaining deficiency on June 5, 2014. Debbie2 answered and asserted as an affirmative defense that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. She also counterclaimed, alleging that Autovest violated New Mexico's Unfair Practices Act (UPA), NMSA 1978, §§ 57-12-1 to -26 (1967, as amended through 2019), and committed tortious debt collection by "willfully ... filing time-barred complaints."
{5} Autovest moved for summary judgment on Debbie's counterclaims, arguing, among other things, that its lawsuit was not barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations because Debra's $1,000 payment revived the limitations period pursuant to Section 37-1-16, and the complaint was filed within four years of her payment. At the hearing on the motion, the district court granted Autovest's motion but also, sua sponte, dismissed Autovest's complaint. The district court reasoned that although Section 37-1-16 is applicable to a claim under Article 2 of the UCC, the statute requires both a partial payment and a writing to revive the limitations period. According to the court, Autovest had not provided evidence that Debra's payment was accompanied by an admission in writing or a new promise to pay.3
{6} Following the district court's ruling, the Agostos submitted billing statements and fee affidavits collectively seeking over $115,000 in attorney fees pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 39-2-2 (1981). The district court awarded attorney fees to the Agostos in the amount of $39,111.27. Autovest also sought attorney fees of over $143,000 for successfully defending against Debbie's UPA counterclaim. The district court declined to award a monetary judgment in favor of Autovest, saying that "an award of attorneys’ fees to Autovest, LLC is reflected in the [c]ourt's reduction of the attorneys’ fees sought by Debra Agosto and Debbie Agosto by two-thirds." Autovest appeals.
{7} In August 2007, Defendant Maria Estrada executed a motor vehicle retail installment contract in the amount of approximately $17,900 for the purchase of a 2006 Nissan Frontier truck. As in Autovest I , the dealer assigned the contract to Wells Fargo Auto Finance, Inc., which then assigned its interest to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Estrada defaulted in September 2008. Wells Fargo repossessed the truck and sold it in January 2009, but a deficiency of approximately $9,100 remained. Wells Fargo received a payment in the amount of $999.20 on February 6, 2009, shortly after the truck was sold at auction. This was the last payment on the account. As with the Agostos’ contract, Wells Fargo assigned its interest in the Estrada contract to Autovest in January 2011; Autovest filed suit for the remaining deficiency on January 18, 2013.
{8} Estrada moved for summary judgment, arguing that Autovest's complaint was time-barred because it was filed more than four years after the date of default. In response, Autovest argued that the February 6, 2009, payment revived the statute of limitations pursuant to Section 37-1-16 such that the complaint, filed within four years of that payment, was timely. The district court orally denied Estrada's motion at the hearing, finding that Section 37-1-16 applied but that disputed issues of material fact remained as to when and how the final payment was made. After a bench trial later that year, the district court found that Estrada or her agent had made a voluntary payment of $999.20 on February 6, 2009, and concluded that the payment had revived the statute of limitations pursuant to Section 37-1-16. The court entered judgment in favor of Autovest on its breach of contract claim, awarding $9,153.54 for the deficiency and $48,650.75 for attorney fees, plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Estrada appeals.
{9} We first address the common question raised in these appeals: whether Defendants’ partial payments revived the statute of limitations and started the clock anew from the date of the last payment. Where, as here, "facts relevant to a statute of limitations issue are not in dispute, the standard of review is whether the district court correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts." Haas Enters., Inc. v. Davis , 2003-NMCA-143, ¶ 9, 134 N.M. 675, 82 P.3d 42. "We review questions of law de novo." Id.
{10} It is undisputed in these cases that an action to recover a deficiency on a motor vehicle installment contract is governed by Article 2 of the UCC and subject to the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 55-2-725 :
Id. ; see First Nat'l Bank v. Chase , 1994-NMSC-127, ¶¶ 9, 11, 118 N.M. 783, 887 P.2d 1250 (). There is also no dispute that Autovest filed each lawsuit more than four years after the actions accrued—i.e., four years after each defendant first breached its installment contract by failing to make an installment payment. See § 55-2-725(2).
{11} Nevertheless, Autovest maintains that its complaints are timely because Defendants’ partial payments operated to start the running of the statute anew. Autovest points out that Section 55-2-725(4) incorporates New Mexico's "law on tolling of the statute of limitations" for Article 2 claims and argues that such "law on tolling" includes New Mexico's revival statute, Section 37-1-16.4 Section 37-1-16...
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Jaquez v. Paccar, Inc.
...for claims founded upon written contracts set forth in NMSA 1978 § 37-1-3. See Autovest, LLC v. Agosto, 2021-NMCA-053, ¶ 12, 497 P.3d 642, 647 (“an action for breach of a contract [must] be commenced within four years rather than the six-year period that is generally applicable” because § 5......