Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc.

• Decision Date: 29 March 1966
• Docket Number: No. 66 C 165.,66 C 165.
• Citation: 287 F. Supp. 718
• Parties: AUTOWEST, INC., Plaintiff, v. PEUGEOT, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

287 F. Supp. 718

AUTOWEST, INC., Plaintiff, v. PEUGEOT, INC., Defendant.

No. 66 C 165.

United States District Court E. D. New York.

March 29, 1966.

Stanley Geller, New York City (Butler, Jablow & Geller, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Alexis C. Coudert, New York City (William Rand, Jr., Stanley R. Raskin, and Coudert Brothers, New York City, of counsel), for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

DOOLING, District Judge.

Plaintiff's motion is to enjoin defendant from terminating the importer-distributor relation between the parties or substituting a new Western States distributor for plaintiff (15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225, New York General Business Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 20, §§ 195-197, Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 3d Cir.1962, 302 F.2d 63, 66-67, Cf. Wagner v. World Wide Automobiles, W.D.N. Y.1961, 201 F.Supp. 22, 24, Staten Island Motors, Inc. v. American Motor Sales Corp., D.N.J.1959, 169 F.Supp. 378, 381); defendant moves to enjoin plaintiff from threatening to sue the Western States dealers if they stop dealing with plaintiff and give their business to defendant's substitutional distributor. Both motions are denied.

The facts have been separately found.

It may be that "equity jurisdiction" exists to arrest defendant's unilateral ending of whatever importer-distributor relation existed on February 15, 1966, when defendant acted. Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., supra, says that. All New York Auto Corp. v. Renault, Inc., N.Y.Co.1959, 19 Misc.2d 790, 190 N.Y.S. 2d 410, aff'd., 1st Dept.1960, 10 A.D.2d 910, 202 N.Y.S.2d 200 notes that the absence of a truly adequate remedy at law is not implicit in the ending of a dealership, and Deltown Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1963, 219 F.Supp. 887 indicates that even the presence of an express statutory base for the prayer for injunction does not dispense with the need to show a fair prospect of ultimate success on the merits. It may be, too, that there are supposable circumstances in which a preliminary injunction must be granted—as where private right and a strong statutory public policy coincide in demanding maintenance of a status quo of dealing. Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 3rd Cir.1962, 307 F.2d 725; Cf. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 2d Cir.1962, 298 F.2d 867, 870, 871-872. And there are cases where an express (or genuinely implicit) covenant not to deal with any one else is ready at hand to give a contract base for a negative injunction that is relatively certain to preserve or restore the old distributor-dealer relationship. Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 1898, 157 N.Y. 60, 66, 51 N.E. 408, 43 L.R.A. 854; Liedermann v. Voco, Inc., Kings Co. 1947, Sup., 73 N.Y.S.2d 462; Cf. Butterick Pub. Co. v. Frederick Loeser & Co., Inc., 1921, 232 N.Y. 86, 133 N.E. 361.

In the present case, however, the claim to preliminary injunctive relief rests only on the existence of the importer-distributor relation and the controverted promise of its continuance supported by the statutory restrictions on discontinuance and the fact that termination for the duration of a lawsuit is, necessarily, irreversible and, therefore, permanent. There is here no promise on defendant's part not to deal with others (Cf. Garvin v. American Motor Sales Corp., 3rd Cir.1963, 318 F. 2d 518, 520); the business expectation of the parties and the probabilities of fact are not, for present purposes, relevant; a legal fear may have dictated foregoing the right to be an exclusive distributor; the surrender of it is nonetheless real for that fact.

Whatever else may be thought, it cannot be easily supposed that importer-distributor contracts form a class especially eligible for specific performance as, legal history seems to indicate, are land contracts and contracts for unique chattels—or the services of uniquely talented people. Rather the right to the equitable specific relief of injunction, it would seem, must be here made out from some aggregate of circumstances that demonstrates that specific relief is manifestly more appropriate than damages. That cannot here be done. The galling harness of an injunction cannot create teamwork. At best an experiment, a preliminary injunction could well be wholly damaging here, jeopardizing any claim for damages that plaintiff might otherwise have without giving it any assurance that the experiment would not simply lengthen its losses. Too much would depend on efforts of continuing cooperation that are difficult to expect of parties locked in litigation and impossible to command. Cf. Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co. Inc., 6th Cir.1946, 155 F.2d 361, 366; Engemoen v. Rea, 8th Cir.1928, 26 F.2d 576, 578-579. A negative injunction will not serve where it...