Avaras ex rel. A.A. v. Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 17 July 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 15 Civ. 2042 (NSR),15 Civ. 2042 (NSR) |
| Parties | CONNIE AVARAS, individually and as parent of A.A., Plaintiffs, v. CLARKSTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR THE CLARKSTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, and NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Connie Avaras, individually and as parent of A.A., brings this action pro se against the Clarkstown Central School District (the "District"), the Board of Education for the District1 (the "Board") (collectively the "District Defendants"), and the New York State Department of Education (the "Department") pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act ("IDEA" or "IDEIA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Predominantly, Ms. Avaras seeks judicial review of a decision made by a State Review Officer ("SRO") at the Department, who affirmed the decision of an Independent Hearing Officer ("IHO"), denying Ms. Avaras's request for tuition reimbursement and other expenses associatedwith a private school placement after finding that the District offered A.A. a free and appropriate public education for the 2012-2013 school year and that, although the District did not offer such an education for the 2013-2014 school year, her unilateral alternative placement for A.A. was also inadequate. Plaintiff also alleges the Defendants' treatment of A.A. and herself violated the ADA, RA, and Section 1983.
Before the Court are the District Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Department's motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 62 & 38.) For the reasons set forth below, the District Defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The SRO's decision is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED on a limited issue. Plaintiff's claims asserted against the District Defendants pursuant to the ADA, RA, and Section 1983 are DISMISSED. The Department's motion is GRANTED and all claims against it DISMISSED.
The parties have submitted briefs, statements of material facts pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, and the record and exhibits from the proceedings below,2 which reflect the following factual background.3
At the independent hearing held to determine the appropriateness of the education plan provided by the District to A.A., four witnesses testified on behalf of the District: Meredith Grant (school psychologist), Arnold Fucci (executive director of pupil services), Eileen Mahoney (special education teacher), and Amy Avecilla (school psychologist). Five witnesses testified on behalf of Plaintiff and A.A.: David Carlson (a chairperson for the committee on special education (CSE) convened to determine the appropriate educational program for A.A), Rhonda Graff (general education teacher), Suzanne Braniecki, Ph.D. (clinical psychologist), Erin Castle (co-founder and co-director of Hawk Meadow Montessori School), and Plaintiff.4 The Court summarizes the salient portions of the documentary and testimonial evidence below, referring to the IHO's summary and specific record citations as needed.
A.A. was born on July 17, 2002, and he was 12 years old at the time the hearing was conducted in 2014. (C.R. 49 ("IHO Opinion").) A.A. was a student at Woodglen Elementary School, a school within the District, until his parents placed him in an alternative program for his fifth grade year. (C.R. 50.) A.A.'s struggles with reading were first noticed by his mother and teacher in kindergarten. (C.R. 50.) At that time, he received an education support of 30 minutes per day of small group reading. (C.R. 50; C.R. 60 (Grant).)
The District began providing additional education supports to A.A. during his first grade year. By letter dated November 14, 2008, Woodglen's principal advised A.A.'s parents that the school was recommending "academic intervention services" (AIS) based on his performance onstate assessments. (C.R. 50; C.R. 5188 (D-67).) Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of that letter, ostensibly agreeing to A.A. receiving those additional literacy support services during the regular school day. (Id.) Ms. Grant, the school's psychologist, testified that A.A. received "building level reading support" at that time as part of a "Response to Intervention" (RTI). (C.R. 50.) She also indicated that it was during this year that Plaintiff shared with Ms. Grant the extent of A.A.'s challenges from his preschool years, including "emotionality," hyperactivity, and aggressive behavior directed at his brother. (C.R. 574 (Grant).) Ms. Mahoney, the special education teacher, became familiar with A.A. around this time and began using the "Wilson reading program" with him. (C.R. 100 (Mahoney).)
Ms. Grant testified that she had "extensive" discussions with Plaintiff regarding conducting a special education evaluation for A.A., but Plaintiff indicated she and A.A.'s father were not in agreement on how to address his academic issues. (C.R. 74; see also C.R. 575, 584 (Grant) ("Dad was against Special Ed.").)
During his second grade year, aside from his academic performance struggles which largely contrasted with his social skills (C.R. 117 (Graff) ("academically, the Student was really below, but socially he seemed to be almost above")), the District and Ms. Graff—A.A.'s regular education teacher at that time—noted that A.A. also struggled with completing homework on time. (C.R. 51-52.)5 On September 29, 2009, A.A. was referred to the RTI team, which implemented a plan to provide additional support for him during the second grade. (C.R. 51.)This included one visit by a District employee to the family home in order to assist with organizing A.A.'s learning environment. (C.R. 51.)
The minutes from the RTI meeting indicate that A.A. did not want to go to a special education "pull-out." (C.R. 51; C.R. 5212 (D-75) (the notes from the RTI implementation plan state Ms. Graff relayed this information).) Instead, Ms. Graff provided specialized reading instruction using the "Wilson program" to him in her general education classroom. (C.R. 51; see also C.R. 116 (Graff).)6 Ms. Grant testified that although Plaintiff expressed concerns about A.A.'s progress, Plaintiff and her husband were still not in agreement on how to remedy the situation. (C.R. 53.) In particular, the parents felt that Ms. Mahoney's special education classroom was not "socially appropriate" for A.A. (C.R. 53; C.R. 5215 (D-76).)7 Because A.A.'s father did not want to move forward with a special education referral, the District—in Ms. Grant's opinion—attempted to respect the family's wishes by moving forward through the support offered via the RTI process. (C.R. 53; C.R. 87 (Grant); see also C.R. 102 (Mahoney).)
Eventually the RTI team determined, however, that the supports were not enough. (C.R. 54.) After discussing the issue with A.A.'s parents at an RTI meeting, in early 2010 the parents provided, though not without hesitation, their consent to move A.A. into Ms. Mahoney's class for ELA. (C.R. 54; C.R. 120-21 (Graff) (testifying that Plaintiff agreed to A.A. attending Ms. Mahoney's class for English Language Arts (ELA) and Math as part of the RTI process);compare C.R. 118 (Graff) ( he began to attend the special education class in November or December 2009), with C.R. 5256 (D-90) (email chain from January 2010 where Ms. Mahoney is explaining to the other members of the RTI team the urgent need to transfer A.A. into her ELA class) and C.R. 4887 (P-GG) (email from Plaintiff dated February 2, 2010, acknowledging A.A.'s pending move to Ms. Mahoney's class).) Plaintiff testified at the hearing that A.A. found the environment in the special education class distracting and was very unhappy once he spent the majority of his educational time there. (C.R. 54; see also C.R. 3793 (Avaras) ( way of an example that A.A. could not concentrate because they put him next to a student that was "rocking" back and forth).)
Notably, Ms. Graff testified that after the RTI meeting A.A. spent only 37 minutes per day in her classroom—meaning he spent the vast majority of his time in the special education classroom. (C.R. 123 (Graff).)
A.A. was also referred to the CSE at that time for evaluation. (C.R. 54; C.R. 87 (Grant); C.R. 4886 (P-FF) (letter from Plaintiff dated March 22, 2010, providing consent for evaluation).) A CSE meeting to determine his eligibility for special education services was held on April 13, 2010, concurrent with the CSE's annual review where it would formulate A.A.'s IEP for his next year of education, including recommended supports and services. (C.R. 55.) At the meeting, the CSE considered a letter provided by A.A.'s pediatrician, Dr. Satran, diagnosing A.A. with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). (C.R. 55; C.R. 5015 (D-13) (diagnosis letter dated April 12, 2010).) Plaintiff participated in the meeting, which resulted in the classification of A.A. as "Other Health Impaired" (OHI), though she testified she was unaware there were other potential classifications. (C.R. 56.) Ms. Grant testified that "all felt that OHI was the most accurate" classification, rather than a learning disability, given the ADHD diagnosis. (C.R. 77.)
The IEP developed by the CSE recommended that for the remainder of the 2009-2010 school year and for the 2010-2011 school year (third grade) A.A. would be placed in a special math and ELA class with a ratio of fifteen students to one teacher (15:1) for a total of two hours and fifteen minutes per day and would receive direct consultant teacher services for two hours per week in science and social studies provided in the general education...
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