Avella v. City of N.Y.
Decision Date | 06 June 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 54.,54. |
Citation | 80 N.E.3d 982,58 N.Y.S.3d 236,29 N.Y.3d 425 |
Parties | In the Matter of Tony AVELLA et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents, and Queens Development Group, LLC, et al., Appellants. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York City (Caitlin J. Halligan of counsel), Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, New York City (Jonathan Frank of counsel), and Fox Rothschild LLP, New York City (Karen Binder of counsel), for appellants.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Richard P. Dearing and Michael Pastor of counsel), for City of New York and others, respondents.
John R. Low–Beer, Brooklyn and Law Office of Lorna Goodman, New York City (Lorna B. Goodman of counsel), for Tony Avella and others, respondents.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Anisha S. Dasgupta, Barbara D. Underwood and Andrew Rhys Davies of counsel), for Attorney General of the State of New York, amicus curiae.
Albert K. Butzel Law Office, New York City (Albert K. Butzel of counsel), and Jonathan L. Geballe, New York City, for Natural Resources Defense Council and others, amicus curiae.
Plaintiffs—a state senator, not-for-profit organizations, businesses, taxpayers, and users of Flushing Meadows Park, brought this hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the proposed development of parkland in Queens. The proposed development, "Willets West," involves the construction of a shopping mall and movie theater on Citi Field's parking lot, where Shea Stadium once stood.
Following New York's loss of both the Dodgers and Giants, Mayor Wagner, determined that New York City should have a National League Team, formed a Baseball Committee, led by William Shea, to work with Major League Baseball and others to obtain an expansion franchise for New York City. Major League Baseball approved the issuance of a franchise to the New York Metropolitan Baseball Club, conditioned upon the club's ability to secure the rights to use of a stadium that met League specifications (see Off of Mayor, Supp. Mem. in Support, Bill Jacket, L. 1961, ch. 729 at 41). In 1961, the state legislature enacted a law providing for the financing and use of a municipal baseball stadium within Flushing Meadows Park, later named Shea Stadium. As the State Department of Commerce noted in a memorandum supporting the bill, "[t]h[e] legislation [wa]s needed in order to get a second major league baseball team in New York City" (Bill Jacket, L. 1961, ch. 729 at 15). Shea Stadium was home to the New York Mets for nearly 50 years, before it was demolished in 2008 and replaced with a new stadium, Citi Field.
To the east of the parkland is an area known as Willets Point. As the Appellate Division noted, and as the parties agree, ( 131 A.D.3d 77, 78, 13 N.Y.S.3d 358 [1st Dept.2015] ). Prior proposals to remediate and develop Willets Point have foundered.
In response to the City's request for proposals, in 2011, defendant Queens Development Group, LLC (QDG),1 proposed a two-phase project for developing Willets Point. The current Willets Point Plan calls for construction, in several staged phases, of retail space, a hotel, an outdoor space, a public school, and affordable housing in the Willets Point neighborhood, and the construction of a large-scale retail complex on the parkland of Willets West. QDG included Willets West in the development proposal under the theory that "the creation of a retail and entertainment center at Willets West w[ould] spur a critical perception change of Willets Point, establishing a sense of place and making it a destination where people want to live, work, and visit."
The phases of the planned development project are as follows: Phase 1A, which was set to begin in 2015, included the construction of Willets West. That phase calls for a retail mall to be built on parkland—which is currently Citi Field's parking lot—and would include over 200 retail stores and restaurants, as well as a movie theater. Phase 1A would also include the installation of sewage systems, roads and ramps, and a hotel in Willets Point. Phase 1B, expected to begin in 2026, would include construction of 2,490 housing units (35% of which would be affordable), a public school, and open outdoor space. Under the agreement between QDG and the New York City Economic Development Corporation, QDG could avoid phase 1B by paying $35 million. The City approved QDG's proposal in May of 2012.
Thereafter, plaintiffs commenced the instant action against defendants including, among others, the City, various municipal officers and entities, and QDG, alleging that because the Willets West development was located within parkland, the public trust doctrine required legislative authorization, which had not been granted. Supreme Court denied the petition for declaratory and injunctive relief and dismissed the proceeding. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed and granted the petition "to the extent of declaring that construction of Willets West on City parkland without the authorization of the state legislature violates the public trust doctrine, and enjoining any further steps toward its construction" ( 131 A.D.3d at 87, 13 N.Y.S.3d 358 ). We granted defendant QDG and related entities leave to appeal ( 26 N.Y.3d 912, 2015 WL 7373386 [2015] ).2 We now affirm.
There is no dispute that the Willets West development is proposed to be constructed entirely on city parkland. The public trust doctrine is ancient and firmly established in our precedent. In Brooklyn Park Commrs. v. Armstrong we held that, when a municipality takes land "for the public use as a park, ... [it holds] it in trust for that purpose ... Receiving the title in trust for an especial public use, [the municipality] could not convey [the land] without the sanction of the legislature" ( 45 N.Y. 234, 243 [1871] ). Likewise, in Matter of Boston & Albany R.R. Co., we held that parklands held by a village were held ( 53 N.Y. 574, 576 [1873] ). Summarizing the long-standing history of the public trust doctrine in Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, we explained that "our courts have time and again reaffirmed the principle that parkland is impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative approval before it can be alienated or used for an extended period for non-park purposes" ( 95 N.Y.2d 623, 630, 727 N.Y.S.2d 2, 750 N.E.2d 1050 [2001] ).
Only the state legislature has the power to alienate parkland (or other lands held in the public trust) for purposes other than those for which they have been designated. The parties here agree with that proposition. Even though a municipality may own the land dedicated to public use, "the title of the municipal corporation to the public streets [is] held in trust for the public and the power to regulate those uses [is] vested solely in the legislature" ( Potter v. Collis, 156 N.Y. 16, 30, 50 N.E. 413 [1898] ).
The approval of the legislature in alienating parkland must be "plainly conferred" through the "direct and specific approval of the State Legislature" (Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 95 N.Y.2d at 632, 727 N.Y.S.2d 2, 750 N.E.2d 1050 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Capruso v. Village of Kings Point, 23 N.Y.3d 631, 639, 992 N.Y.S.2d 469, 16 N.E.3d 527 [2014] ; Williams v. Gallatin, 229 N.Y. 248, 253, 128 N.E. 121 [1920] ). Although we have often articulated that principle in the context of an initial alienation of lands held in the public trust (see e.g. Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, 95 N.Y.2d at 631, 727 N.Y.S.2d 2, 750 N.E.2d 1050 ), the principle also requires that a proposed use of parkland falls within the scope of legislative authorization once granted. For example, in Potter v. Collis, we held that, although the legislature's General Railroad Act of 1850 authorized municipalities to assent to the construction of railroads, that legislative authorization was not "sufficient to authorize a city street railroad," and the City's resolution granting a third party authorization to construct a railroad on public streets was therefore invalid under the public trust doctrine ( 156 N.Y. at 30, 50 N.E. 413 ). As we held in Matter of City of New York, which involved New York City's right to alienate piers and wharves held in the public trust, "[w]hen there is a fair, reasonable and substantial doubt concerning the existence of an alleged power in a municipality, the power should be denied" ( 228 N.Y. 140, 152, 126 N.E. 809 [1920] ). We reiterated that rule in Lake George Steamboat Co. v. Blais,
in which we said, " legislative sanction must be clear and certain to permit a municipality to lease public property for private purposes" ( 30 N.Y.2d 48, 52, 330 N.Y.S.2d 336, 281 N.E.2d 147 [1972] ).
Keeping in mind that the current proposed alienation must plainly fall within the scope of the legislative direction authorizing alienation of the parklands at issue, we now turn to an examination of the statute relied on by defendants for the legislative authorization of Willets West.
Defendants contend that the 1961 legislation concerning Shea Stadium, which the City constructed on parkland, constitutes legislative authorization for the Willets West development. That legislation, codified in section 18–118 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, is titled: "Renting of stadium in Flushing Meadow park; exemption from down payment requirements." Section 18–118(a) provides, as relevant here:
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