Avena, In re, No. S046608
Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Writing for the Court | LUCAS; Petitioner appealed and also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This court determined he stated a prima facie case for relief in his habeas corpus petition and issued an order to show cause. Finding issues of material fact in disput |
Citation | 12 Cal.4th 694,49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413 |
Parties | , 909 P.2d 1017, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 848, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1257 In re Carlos Jaime AVENA on Habeas Corpus. Crim. |
Docket Number | No. S046608,No. 25640 |
Decision Date | 05 February 1996 |
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[12 Cal.4th 703] [909 P.2d 1021] Eleanor M. Kraft, Palo Alto, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Nudell & Allen, Karen J. Nudell, Talcott, Lightfoot, Vandevelde, Woehrle & Sadowsky, Michael J. Lightfoot and John P. Martin, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.
John K. Van de Kamp and Daniel E. Lungren, Attorneys General, Richard B. Iglehart and George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Edward T. Fogel, Jr., and Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorneys General, Gary R. Hahn, Mark Alan Hart, Donald E. DeNicola, Mark E. Turchin, Susan Lee Frierson, Robert S. Henry and Frederick Grab, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
LUCAS, Chief Justice.
Carlos Jaime Avena was convicted in 1980 in Los Angeles County Superior Court of the first degree murders of Manuel Solis and Miguel Vasquez. (Pen.Code, § 187; all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.) Multiple-murder and robbery-murder special-circumstance allegations were also sustained. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3) & (17).) In addition, petitioner was convicted of robbery, attempted robbery, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, and two counts of [12 Cal.4th 704] assault with intent to commit murder. (§§ 211, 664/211, 245, subd. (a), & former § 217.) The jury set the penalty at death under the 1978 death penalty law. (§ 190.1 et seq.)
Petitioner appealed and also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This court determined he stated a prima facie case for relief in his habeas corpus petition and issued an order to show cause. Finding issues of material fact in dispute as to only one of his allegations, we appointed Judge Kathleen Parker, judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, to hold a hearing and file her report with us. We later vacated Judge Parker's appointment due to her failing health and thereafter appointed John Ouderkirk, judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, to act as our referee. Judge Ouderkirk has now filed his report. Both petitioner and respondent except to various portions of the referee's findings. After due consideration, we conclude that the referee's findings are supported by the evidence and thus reject those claims. After considering those findings, we conclude the order to show cause should be discharged and the writ denied.
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FACTS
A. The Crimes
On September 12, 1980, petitioner and brothers Victor and Arturo Padua were driving in a white 1971 Mazda. Petitioner sat in the back seat and had a .22-caliber rifle with him. All three had consumed some beer that evening. While waiting for a stoplight, a brown Ford Galaxy pulled alongside them. When Arturo Padua yelled an insult at the brown car, one of its occupants threw a beer bottle at them, striking the Mazda on the window where petitioner was seated. Petitioner retaliated by shooting at the Ford, which then sped off.
Petitioner and the Paduas gave chase. The Ford stopped suddenly, causing petitioner's Mazda to collide with the rear of the Ford. The Ford again drove away; the Mazda, however, was rendered inoperable. Petitioner and the Paduas pushed it to the side of the road and decided to secure alternative transportation. It was then they saw a pink Chevrolet Camaro, driven by victims Manuel Solis and Miguel Vasquez. Petitioner and the Padua brothers approached the Camaro and stood on either side of the car. Petitioner was carrying his rifle and Arturo was carrying a piece of wood. Although the exact sequence of events is unclear, petitioner apparently demanded the driver give him his money and the keys to the Camaro. Petitioner then shot into the car wounding the occupants. Petitioner also apparently grabbed one of the victims, pulled him out of the car, and shot him four times in the [12 Cal.4th 705] chest. The other victim exited the passenger side of the Camaro whereupon Arturo struck him in the head with the piece of wood. When one of the victims made a vain attempt to flee, petitioner told Arturo to move out of his line of sight, and then he shot the victim twice. Some people on the street, including the victim's brother, Daniel Solis, witnessing this crime, engaged in some sort of confrontation that included throwing a bottle. The witnesses fled when petitioner began shooting at them. Petitioner and the Paduas then left in the pink Camaro.
Once in the car, petitioner said he was out of ammunition and needed to go home and reload. After reloading, the trio drove the Camaro to a church parking lot, where they set the car on fire, apparently to eliminate their fingerprints. They then walked to 22nd Street and Normandie, near the Santa Monica Freeway. The Paduas went to buy more beer and then returned to petitioner. By this time, it was approximately 11 p.m., and the trio was once again on foot.
Victor Padua, apparently having had enough excitement for one night, hid in some bushes near a freeway exit. When victim Ana Hernandez stopped her yellow Chevette at a stop light, petitioner and Arturo walked up to either side of the car and attempted to open her door. Petitioner shot into the car door; Arturo may have slammed a beer bottle on the windshield. Hernandez accelerated through the red light to escape; petitioner shot at the escaping Chevette, striking the rear of the vehicle.
Officers McCann and Derenia were coincidentally driving by the off ramp in an unmarked police car at this time and observed the yellow Chevette drive through the red light. They then saw petitioner standing in the off ramp with the rifle. Petitioner opened fire on the officers, shooting out the car windows. The officers returned fire, both emptying their revolvers before driving under the freeway, making a U-turn, and returning. Petitioner and Arturo fled on foot, managing to escape capture. A police search of the area revealed several .22-caliber casings on the ground and, eventually, Victor Padua, still hiding in the bushes.
Police initially did not connect Victor to the shootings, as he gave a false story. Finding evidence that Victor had been seen in the company of two other men that night, police questioned him again and this time he told police about petitioner and Arturo. They were arrested and identified by Officers McCann and Derenia. The witnesses of the Solis and Vasquez murders confirmed the shootings but were too far away to make positive identifications. Hernandez likewise said it was too dark to make a positive identification of her assailants.
[12 Cal.4th 706] Victor Padua testified against petitioner at his trial. In addition, petitioner gave a statement to police that was surreptitiously
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[909 P.2d 1023] recorded. This statement largely tracked Victor's account of the crimes, except that petitioner claimed the driver of the pink Camaro menaced him with a knife and that was why he shot him. The recording was played for the jury.Petitioner also admitted he used a .22-caliber rifle that was loaded by means of a tubular magazine with a capacity of 17 to 20 rounds. He said he bought the rifle on the street for $30. A police expert testified that the .22-caliber shell casings found at the murder scene and on the off ramp were, with one exception, fired from the same gun. The expert testified that only three types of rifles could have produced those shell casings. One type, the Marlin Glenfield, was described as a "very common, very popular ... very low priced [rifle]" that uses a tubular magazine with an 18 round capacity. (One shell casing exhibited characteristics that made it impossible to determine with certainty that it came from the same weapon.)
Petitioner's trial counsel, Marvin Part, waived his opening statement and rested without presenting any defense at the guilt phase of the trial. Part called only two minor witnesses at the penalty phase of the trial. Following argument, the jury set the penalty at death.
B. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Evidentiary Hearing, and the Referee's Report
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner claimed that his trial counsel Part was constitutionally ineffective for failing to: (1) "Adequately interview petitioner and his immediate family for probative information"; (2) "Arrange for proper investigation of the facts"; (3) "Interview witnesses"; (4) "Present any pretrial motions on behalf of [petitioner], including a motion to suppress ... [petitioner's] statement to police"; (5) "Investigate, raise and support the defense of diminished capacity"; (6) "Present his client before the jury in a respectable fashion," i.e., to ensure that petitioner did not appear before the jury in jail clothes; (7) "Present mitigating evidence at the penalty trial"; and (8) "Argue effectively on behalf of [petitioner] at [the] guilt or penalty phase of the trial."
Finding these allegations, considered together with the exhibits, established a prima facie showing of relief, we issued an order to show cause. (People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 475, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 886 P.2d 1252 (hereafter Duvall ); In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875, fn. 4, 87 Cal.Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1.) After receiving the People's return and petitioner's traverse, we concluded that most of the issues raised could be decided [12 Cal.4th 707] on the pleadings because there were no disputed factual matters outside the trial record. (Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 478-479, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 886 P.2d 1252.) As to petitioner's claim that Part should have investigated and presented the defense of diminished capacity, however, there were disputed issues of material fact. Accordingly, we referred the matter to a referee for an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at p. 478, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 886 P.2d 1252.)
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People v. Ledesma, No. S014394.
...could be no satisfactory explanation." (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859; see In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017.) If a defendant meets the burden of establishing that counsel's performance was deficient, he or ......
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Shukry v. Neotti, No. 2:09-cv-00669-JKS
...not a court's duty to second-guess trial counsel and great deference is given to trial counsel's tactical decisions. (In re Avena, (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 722.) Actual prejudice must be shown, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's error(s), the result wo......
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Jensen v. Hernandez, No. CIV S–09–0512 DAD P.
...not a court's duty to second-guess trial counsel and great deference is given to trial counsel's tactical decisions. (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 722 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017].) Actual prejudice must be shown, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the......
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People v. Dunkle, No. S014200.
...the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.'" (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017, quoting Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 656-657, 104 S.Ct. 2039, fns. omitted.) The high court gave ......
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People v. Ledesma, No. S014394.
...could be no satisfactory explanation." (People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859; see In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 721, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017.) If a defendant meets the burden of establishing that counsel's performance was deficient, he or ......
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Shukry v. Neotti, No. 2:09-cv-00669-JKS
...not a court's duty to second-guess trial counsel and great deference is given to trial counsel's tactical decisions. (In re Avena, (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 722.) Actual prejudice must be shown, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's error(s), the result wo......
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Jensen v. Hernandez, No. CIV S–09–0512 DAD P.
...not a court's duty to second-guess trial counsel and great deference is given to trial counsel's tactical decisions. (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 722 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017].) Actual prejudice must be shown, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the......
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People v. Dunkle, No. S014200.
...the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.'" (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 727, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 909 P.2d 1017, quoting Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 656-657, 104 S.Ct. 2039, fns. omitted.) The high court gave ......