Averill v. Dreher-Holloway

• Decision Date: 24 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-148,DREHER-HOLLOWAY,90-148
• Citation: 134 N.H. 469,593 A.2d 1149
• Parties: Richard AVERILL v., et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1149

593 A.2d 1149

134 N.H. 469

Richard AVERILL v. DREHER-HOLLOWAY, et al.

No. 90-148.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

July 24, 1991.

Burns, Bryant, Hinchey, Cox & Schulte P.A., Dover (Paul R. Cox orally and on the brief, and Milan G.W. Slahor, on the brief), for plaintiff.

Devine, Millimet & Branch P.A., Manchester (Donald E. Gardner orally and on the brief, and Mark D. Wiseman on the brief), for defendants.

BROCK, Chief Justice.

The defendants, Dreher-Holloway and N.H. Auto Dealers Association (collectively Dreher-Holloway), appeal from an order of the Superior Court (Perkins, J.) providing that the plaintiff, Richard Averill, is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for his depression-related disability. On appeal, the defendants argue that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the plaintiff's stress as a result of his employment caused or contributed to his depressive illness, and (2) applying the wrong legal causation standard for emotional injury resulting from workplace stress. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's ruling.

The plaintiff was employed by the defendant, Dreher-Holloway, a car dealership, for the period from 1972 to 1985. Beginning in 1974, he held the dual positions of service advisor and assistant service manager. His duties included handling customer complaints, supervising other employees, and balancing the needs of the customers against the requirements of the mechanics and the demands of the management. In his position, the plaintiff was required to meet numerous deadlines and was exposed to irate and dissatisfied customers, who verbally and, on one occasion, physically abused him. In addition to his regular duties, the plaintiff was on-call to receive customer complaints at all hours of the day and night.

Prior to his employment with Dreher-Holloway, the plaintiff had a history of personal problems and physical ailments, including two divorces, an automobile accident resulting in chronic back pain, and another accident resulting in ruptured vertebral discs. In 1974, the plaintiff was treated for asthmatic bronchitis and allergies. In 1976, he was diagnosed as having polymyositis, an arthritis condition with symptoms including fatigue, achiness, muscle weakness and depression. Over the next several years, he suffered from hypertension, urinary frequency, temporal throbbing headaches, facial swelling, obesity, high blood cholesterol and sugar counts, nose bleeds, dermatitis, and bilateral breast enlargement as a side effect from the Prednisone treatment for his polymyositis. In 1980, he underwent surgery to correct the problem of breast enlargement. He was then diagnosed as suffering from depression in 1982. Later that year, he was diagnosed as suffering from Peyronie's disease, a disease causing sexual dysfunction. In 1984, he was diagnosed as suffering from sleep apnea, a condition which interferes with normal sleep patterns. He underwent a tracheostomy in order to correct the condition, and the operation left him with an opening in his throat. In 1985, he again underwent surgery in order to close up the opening, but it was determined that the tracheostomy could not be closed due to the severity of his condition. That spring, the plaintiff and his third wife separated and some time thereafter divorced. In October of the same year the plaintiff was hospitalized and diagnosed as suffering from major depressive illness.

The plaintiff first brought his claim for workers' compensation benefits before the New Hampshire Department of Labor. The hearings officer found that the plaintiff's depressive illness was not compensable. The plaintiff then appealed to the superior court for a trial de novo pursuant to RSA 281-A:43, I(b) (Supp.1990). The trial court rendered a judgment for the plaintiff, finding that work-related stress was legally and medically a causal factor in his major depressive illness. The court also found that the plaintiff did not have a prior weakness indicating a pre-disposition to depression. Finally, the court reasoned that even if his previous episode with depression could be considered a prior weakness, the plaintiff had established that work-related stress was greater than that encountered in normal nonemployment life and was a substantial contributing factor to his illness.

First, we consider the defendants' argument that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. The defendants' argument is three-fold, that: (1) the plaintiff's prior episode with depression constituted a prior weakness; (2) the court misapplied the substantial contributing factor test because it did not compare the plaintiff's work stress to his own nonemployment life; and (3) the court misapplied the substantial contributing factor test in not requiring the plaintiff to prove that work-related stress was the major cause of his depression.

In a workers' compensation action, the "plaintiff must establish both legal and medical causation." Wheeler v. School Admin. Unit 21, 130 N.H. 666, 671, 550 A.2d 980, 983 (1988). Where no prior weakness is found, " 'any exertion connected ... as a matter of medical fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test of causation....' " Id. (quoting, New Hampshire Supply Co. v. Steinberg, 119 N.H. 223, 231, 400 A.2d 1163, 1168 (1979) (emphasis in original)). "To establish medical causation, plaintiff must show that the work-related 'stress ... probably caused or contributed' to plaintiff's injury." Wheeler v. School Admin. Unit 21 supra (quoting New Hampshire Supply Co. v. Steinberg, supra at 231, 400 A.2d at 1168-69).

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