Avila-Jaimes v. United States
| Decision Date | 28 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | A-14-CR-300(1)-SS,CAUSE NO. A-18-CV-437-SS |
| Parties | OSCAR ARMANDO AVILA-JAIMES v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
BE IT REMEMBERED on this day, the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause, and specifically Movant Oscar Avila-Jaimes's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 978). Having considered the motion, the governing law, and the file as a whole, the Court now enters the following opinion and order denying Avila-Jaimes's motion.
An indictment returned October 7, 2014, charged Avila-Jaimes and twenty-one codefendants with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and seven counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1). (ECF No. 1). Avila-Jaimes was represented by retained counsel throughout his criminal proceedings.
On March 4, 2015, pursuant to a plea agreement and at the conclusion of a Rule 11 hearing, Avila-James pleaded guilty to both counts of a sealed superseding information, charging one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and one count of engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. (ECF No. 479). In return for his guilty pleas, the Government agreed to cap Avila-Jaimes's sentence at a total of twenty years' imprisonment and to cap the amount of cocaine attributable to his participation in the conspiracy at 50 kilograms. (ECF No. 872 at 94). The written plea agreement included a waiver of Avila-Jaimes's right to appeal and to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, other than to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct, and it included a factual basis for his guilty plea. (ECF No. 466).1
A Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") was prepared. The PSR increased Avila-Jaimes's offense level by four points because he was an organizer or leader of criminal activity involving five or more participants and he directed at least two conspirators to collect bulk currency. (ECF No. 681).2 The PSR decreased his offense level by three points for acceptance of responsibility. (Id.). The PSR calculated a total offense level of 38 and a criminal history score of I, arriving at a guideline range of imprisonment between 235 to 293 months imprisonment. (Id.). Defense counsel filed objections to the PSR, including an objection to the amount of cocaine (50 kilograms) found attributable to Avila-Jaimes's participation in the conspiracy and an objection to the finding of his leadership role in the conspiracy. (ECF No. 681; ECF No. 872 at 98-101).
On June 8, 2015, Avila-Jaimes's counsel filed a motion to withdraw. (ECF No. 647). The motion was denied on June 9, 2015. (ECF No. 660). On June 11, 2015, at the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing and after overruling Avila-Jaimes's objections to the PSR, the Court sentencedAvila-Jaimes to concurrent terms of 240 months' imprisonment on the drug charge and 120 months' imprisonment on the money-laundering charge, ordered the sentences to be followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered Avila-Jaimes to forfeit the $82,312 in drug proceeds seized from his residence. (ECF No. 745).
Avila-Jaimes appealed his conviction and sentence. (ECF No. 744). He asserted his guilty plea and waiver of an appeal were unknowing and involuntary because he required an interpreter and he was not familiar with federal criminal procedure. (ECF No. 962 at 4). He argued the Court erred by failing to grant his "motion" to withdraw his guilty plea, and alleged he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 962 at 7-8). Avila-Jaimes also asserted the Court erred by enhancing his offense level by four points for his position as a leader or organizer of the conspiracy. (ECF No. 962 at 8). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to address the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (ECF No. 962 at 8). The Fifth Circuit concluded Avila-Jaimes's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, rejected his claim of trial court error on the merits, and affirmed his conviction and sentence. (ECF No. 962).
Avila-Jaimes, through counsel, filed a timely motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 978). He asserts he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because counsel did not "adequately apprise [him] as to the effects of his guilty plea." (ECF No. 978 at 4). He further contends his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because it is disproportionate to both his crime and his codefendants' sentences. (ECF No. 978 at 4-5). Avila-Jaimes asks the Court to vacate his guilty plea and sentence, and to grant an evidentiary hearing to determine if he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and on the issue of the "[p]roper []application of [the] Guidelines." (ECF No. 978 at 13).
Generally, there are four grounds upon which a defendant may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255: (1) the imposition of a sentence in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States; (2) a lack of jurisdiction of the district court that imposed the sentence; (3) the imposition of a sentence in excess of the maximum authorized by law; and (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255; United States v. Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996). Section 2255 is an extraordinary measure; it cannot be used for errors that are not constitutional or jurisdictional if those errors could have been raised on direct appeal. United States v. Stumpf, 900 F.2d 842, 845 (5th Cir. 1990). Notably, misapplications of the Sentencing Guidelines are neither constitutional nor jurisdictional and, therefore, are not cognizable in a § 2255 action. See United States v. Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 1994).
In his § 2255 motion, Avila-Jaimes asserts he was denied the effective assistance of counsel "during the plea negotiation process, at the plea proceeding, and then at sentencing . . ." (ECF No. 980 at 25). Avila-Jaimes contends counsel did not ensure he fully understood his waiver of his constitutional rights and did not "adequately apprise [Avila-Jaimes] as to the effects of his guilty plea." (ECF No. 978 at 4). Avila-Jaimes alleges he "did not understand what was going on, had not been fully informed as to what rights he was waiving, clearly had not had the requisite opportunity to review and comprehend the plea terms, and did not understand what or even why he was pleading guilty." (ECF No. 980 at 6). Although Avila-Jaimes waived his right to collaterallyattack his conviction and sentence in his plea agreement, this waiver excepted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF No. 466). Additionally, even if a defendant waives his right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, he can avoid those waivers based on ineffective assistance of counsel if he establishes "the claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself." United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002); Blancas v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 2d 507, 528 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel, including the effective assistance of counsel when entering a guilty plea. Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964 (2017). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the context of a guilty plea is subject to the same standard as any other ineffective assistance claim, i.e., the Strickland standard. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). To successfully state a Strickland claim, a movant must demonstrate his counsel's performance was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The burden of proof is on the movant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Chavez, 193 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 1999).
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, a movant must establish his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable competence. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1993). "To show that his attorney's performance was deficient, [Avila-Jaimes] must show that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted).
In the context of a guilty plea, Strickland's "prejudice" analysis "focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process." Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Accordingly, to satisfy the prejudice test the movant must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id. A movant may also establish prejudice arising from counsel's alleged deficiencies by showing he "would have [had] a reasonable chance of obtaining a more favorable result" absent counsel's errors, i.e., an acquittal or a lesser sentence at trial. United States v. Batamula, 823 F.3d 237, 240 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 236 (2016).
Avila-Jaimes must affirmatively plead the actual prejudice resulting from his counsel's deficiencies. Hill, 474 U.S. at 60. The probability of prejudice may not be based upon conjecture or speculation. United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989). R...
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