Avila v. Cate, Case No.: 1:10-cv-01208 JLT
| Decision Date | 06 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:10-cv-01208 JLT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | PERRY ROBERT AVILA, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW CATE, et al., Defendants. |
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND
(Doc. 1)
Perry Robert Avila ("Plaintiff") is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action against California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) Secretary Matthew Cate, California State Prison-Corcoran (CSP-C) Warden R. Lopez, and CSP-C Deputy Warden of Operations M. Junious (collectively, "Defendants") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July 6, 2010 (Id.) and it is now before the Court for screening.
Because Plaintiff is seeking redress from governmental employees in a civil action, the Court is required to screen his complaint in order to identify cognizable claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). The Court shall "dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I)-(iii).
"Pro se documents are to be liberally construed" and "'must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). "[They] can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Id.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plaint statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, . . . ; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). While a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In analyzing a pleading, the Court should set conclusory factual allegations aside, accept all non-conclusory factual allegations as true, and determine whether those non-conclusory factual allegations accepted as true state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 1949 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining plausibility, the Court is permitted "to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950.
Plaintiff alleges California prisons contain media rooms where prison employees show movies for the prison population. (Doc. 1 at 4.) He contends Title 15, Section 3220.4(b) of the California Code of Regulations (CCR) categorically prohibits the approval of films not rated G,PG, or PG-13 by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and prohibits showing any film found to glorify violence or sex or is inflammatory to the climate of the prison, regardless of rating. (Id. at 5.) He asserts these guidelines effectively ban R-, NC-17-, X-rated and unrated films. (Id.)
Plaintiff maintains the MPAA consists of a group of parents whose main function is to provide other parents with warnings about what movies they should and should not permit their children to see. (Doc. 1.) An "R" rating stands for "restricted," which means those under seventeen years of age must be accompanied by a parent or adult guardian in order to view the film. (Id.) In essence, Plaintiff alleges that the MPAA rating is not a proper basis for determining which movies may be shown.
Plaintiff admits that Sections 3220.4(d)(1)-(2) provides that other movies may be submitted to the Director for consideration for specified limited inmate viewing purposes. (Doc. 1 at 5) On August 3, 2008, Plaintiff initiated a CDC 602 Prisoner Grievance seeking to amend prison regulations to remove the prohibition of movies not rated G, PG, or PG-13, because it is "unreasonable and overbroad." (Doc. 1 at 5-6.) Also, he requested that all movies listed on the Library of Congress' National Film Registry be allowed to be shown. (Id.) He claims that denial of this request demonstrates that in practice, the process outlined in § 3220.4(d)(1)-(2) does not preserve the inmates' First Amendment rights because prison officials do not actually consider allowing R-rated movies, even those that do not glorify violence or sex or inflame the prison population, to be shown. (Id.) He alleges that "more process is due in respect to whether prisoners should be permitted to view films rated other than G, PG, PG-13." (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 18, 2008, Defendant Junious could have submitted Plaintiff's 602 request to view films on the National Film Registry and other films for "meaningful consideration" but elected not to do so and, instead, he "merely submitted Plaintiff's requests to the movie specialist for review." (Doc. 1.) According to Plaintiff, Section 3220.4(b)(1)-(2) only permits the Director of the CDCR "to conduct meaningful review and grant prisoner viewing of films outside the G, PG, and PG-13 ratings." (Id.)
Plaintiff contends that on March 2, 2009, Cate had an opportunity to grant Plaintiff's grievance and to exercise the discretion granted under Sections 3220.4(d)(1)-(2) to allow inmate viewing of the movies on the National Film Registry but he declined to do so. (Doc. 1) Instead, Cate acknowledged the requests, elected not to exercise the discretion, and denied the grievance in all respects. (Id.)
Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his rights to freedom of speech under the First Amendment and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 4.)
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57 (1978)). It does not provide any substantive rights, but rather "authorizes a cause of action based on the deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by other Acts of Congress." Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979).
A plaintiff stating a claim under § 1983 must allege facts showing he was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). For a defendant to be liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove there is an affirmative link between the alleged deprivation and the resulting injury. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). An affirmative link exists when a defendant "does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
1. Failure to Link
Title 42, § 1983 of the United States Code requires that there be an actual causal link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370-71; May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). In order to state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing each named defendant either exhibited some sort of "direct personal participation in the deprivation" or "set[] in motion a series of acts by others which the actor [knew] or reasonably should [have known] would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury." Johnson, 588 F. 2d at 743-44. The complaint must specifically allege how each named defendant is liable for the claimed deprivation.
In this case, Plaintiff names Cate, Lopez, and Junious as defendants (Doc. 1 at 1); however, Plaintiff fails to even mention Lopez within the body of the Complaint, let alone attribute specific constitutional violations to him. In addition, Plaintiff fails to plead facts linking Junious to his claim of First Amendment violations. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to state cognizable claims for First or Fourteenth Amendment violations against Lopez and has failed to state a cognizable claim for a First Amendment violation against Junious.
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const. amend. I. However, "[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). Thus, the constitutional rights...
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