Avram v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 2:12-976 (KM),Civ. No. 2:11-6973 (KM) |
| Parties | LYNNE AVRAM, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants. MARGARET LARK, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
The Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Star program permits manufacturers of appliances, including refrigerators, to affix a label indicating that the appliance meets certain standards of energy efficiency. Such appliances, Plaintiffs allege, cost more to purchase, but supposedly save money in the long run by reducing electricity bills. Lynne Avram and Margaret Lark, putative class action plaintiffs in these consolidated actions, each bought refrigerator model RF26VAB, manufactured by Defendant Samsung Electronics America, Inc. ("Samsung"), from Defendant Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.("Lowe's"). At the time of purchase, the refrigerators bore the Energy Star label. Sometime thereafter, however, DOE determined that this refrigerator model did not meet the Energy Star program's requirements. Avram and Lark allege that they therefore have not received what they paid for. They assert causes of action for breach of express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, violation of the Maryland and New Jersey consumer fraud statutes, and unjust enrichment.
Now before the court are the motions of Samsung and Lowe's to dismiss each complaint. Defendants argue that the warranty claims are preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act and that the Complaints' allegations are otherwise insufficient as a matter of law.
Samsung and Lowe's motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, I will dismiss (1) Avram's claim of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability against Samsung; (2) the claims of violation of the state consumer fraud statutes; and (3) the unjust enrichment causes of action against Samsung. The rest of the claims survive.
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (the "ECPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6291, et seq., created an energy conservation program for major household appliances. . A few years later, the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978 granted the United States Department of Energy ("DOE") the authority to establish minimum energy efficiency standards for, inter alia, home refrigerator-freezers. (Avram Compl. ¶ 12; Lark Compl. ¶ 12). Later, the National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987 established minimum energy efficiency standards for refrigerator-freezers. (Avram Compl. ¶ 12; Lark Compl. ¶ 12).
42 U.S.C. § 6294a. DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") jointly administer the program. Id. In general, to earn the Energy Star label, refrigerators and freezers must be at least 20% more energy efficient than the minimum mandated by federal law. (Avram Compl. ¶ 13; Lark Compl. ¶ 13).
The Energy Star logo is an important marketing tool. It conveys a message that the purchaser can maximize his or her energy savings and help to protect the environment. (Avram Compl. ¶ 14; Lark Compl. ¶ 14). In essence, the consumer pays more to purchase an Energy Star-compliant appliance, but the appliance costs less to operate. (Avram Compl. ¶ 2; Lark Compl. ¶ 2).
Because Avram was concerned about the environment, when she shopped for a new refrigerator, she looked only at Energy Star models. (Avram Compl. ¶ 17). On June 26, 2009, Avram purchased her new refrigerator at a Lowe's retail store in Scottsdale, Arizona for $1,213.20 plus tax. (Id.). That purchase price included a substantial premium based on claims that the refrigerator was energy efficient and met the qualifications of Energy Star program. (Id.). Avram would not have purchased the refrigerator had she known it was not Energy Star-compliant. (Id.).
On November 1, 2009, Lark purchased the refrigerator at a Lowe's retail store in Maryland for about $2,100. (Lark Compl. ¶ 17; Lark Opp. at 2). That purchase price included a substantial premium based on claims that the refrigerator was energy efficient and met the qualifications of Energy Star program. (Lark Compl. ¶ 17).
On February 18, 2010, DOE alerted Samsung that its testing showed that the refrigerators did not meet the Energy Star efficiency requirements. (Avram Compl. ¶ 18; Lark Compl. ¶ 18). About three weeks later, on March 8, 2010, Samsung representatives met with DOE regarding the test results. (Avram Compl. ¶ 19; Lark Compl. ¶ 19). DOE permitted Samsung to submit its own test results. (Avram Compl. ¶¶ 19-20; Lark Compl. ¶¶ 19-20) In DOE's estimation, however, Samsung's testing failed to establish that the refrigerators met Energy Star standards. (Avram Compl. ¶ 20; Lark Compl. ¶ 20). On March 16, 2010, DOE sent Samsung a letter stating that the refrigerators had failed DOE tests for the Energy Star program and that Samsung had failed to rebut that conclusion. (Avram Compl. ¶ 21; Lark Compl. ¶ 21). DOE then referred the matter to EPA for appropriate action. (Avram Compl. ¶ 21; Lark Compl. ¶ 21). EPA and Samsung eventually entered into an informal, private agreement under which Samsung agreed to stop manufacturing or selling the refrigerators. (Avram Compl. ¶ 22).
As a result, Avram and Lark did not receive the benefit of the Energy Star bargain. They paid a price premium for what purported to be an Energy Star product but did not receive the energy savings they had paid for. (Avram Compl. ¶ 23; Lark Compl. ¶ 22).
On November 30, 2011, Avram filed a Complaint on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated individuals. That Complaint alleges that Defendants' manufacture and sale of a refrigerator that falsely claimed to be Energy Star-compliant give rise to the following causes of action: breach of express warranty, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, violations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("Magnuson-Moss") and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA"), and unjust enrichment.
On February 17, 2012, Lark filed a nearly identical class action complaint alleging the same causes of action, with one exception. Instead of a claim under the NJCFA, Lark's complaint alleges a violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("MCPA").
On June 20, 2012, then-Magistrate Judge Shipp granted Lark's motion to consolidate the two cases. Subject matter jurisdiction over these consolidated actions is predicated on three grounds. Over the federal law claim, the Court has federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Over the related state law claims, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367. Finally, because the Complaint alleges that there are over 100 class members, the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, and at least one class member is diverse from the defendants,2 the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Venue is proper because Samsung resides in the District of New Jersey, the Defendants do business throughout the District, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the Plaintiffs' claims took place in New Jersey. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Prior to the consolidation order and in lieu of filing an answer, Lowe's and Samsung each moved to dismiss each complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party, ordinarily the defendant, bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint must be taken as true, with all reasonable inferences drawn in plaintiff's favor. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) ().
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has elaborated on the standards that a court is to apply in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, particularly in light of the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factualallegations, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above a speculative level, demonstrating that it is "plausible on its face." See id. at 570; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). A claim has "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v....
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