Axtell v. LaPenna

Decision Date03 March 1971
Docket NumberNo. 87-70 Erie.,87-70 Erie.
Citation323 F. Supp. 1077
PartiesLawrence AXTELL, a minor, by his father and next friend, Frederick B. Axtell v. Robert J. LaPENNA, individually and as Superintendent of Schools, City of Erie, Pa., et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Roger M. Fischer, Erie, Pa., for plaintiff.

D. Sherwood Jones, Erie, Pa., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

KNOX, District Judge.

Introduction:

The Court in this non-jury Civil Rights case has heard the evidence, the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the briefs and other documents submitted by the parties enters the following Findings of Fact, Opinion and Conclusions of Law.

A. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The plaintiff, Lawrence Axtell, is a fourteen year old minor presently enrolled in the ninth grade of Memorial Junior High School, one of the five junior high schools within the jurisdiction of the School Board of Erie, Pennsylvania. This suit is brought on his behalf by his father, Lawrence Axtell, Sr.

2. Memorial Junior High School has an enrollment of 1,272 pupils and distributed to them in the fall of 1970 a "Student Handbook" requiring inter alia: "* * * Proper hair grooming and hair styling are to be maintained."

3. Memorial Junior High School annually distributes to students and their parents a mimeographed "Modified Grooming Code" providing inter alia:

"Boy's Grooming
I. Hair (Use good common sense)
a. Follow contour of head and be tapered on back and sides.
b. Cannot touch the collar in the back.
c. Must be kept above the eyebrow.
d. Must not go over the ears on the sides.
e. Must be kept neat and clean.
II. Sideburns
a. May grow to bottom of ear line.
b. Should be trimmed square and neat.
c. All boys should be clean shaven."

4. The "Student Handbook" was originated in 1966 by the Administration of the School alone, while the "Modified Grooming Code" is annually reviewed and updated by the Administration, the Parent Teachers Association and select students. The present version was promulgated in the fall of 1970.

This handbook and code were never approved as Rules and Regulations by the School Board as apparently required by Section 510 of the Pennsylvania School Code (24 Purdons Pa.Stat. § 5-510) but this defect was waived by plaintiffs.

5. Minor plaintiff's hair is neatly groomed but longer than that permitted by the Modified Grooming Code. After many conferences with Mr. and Mrs. Axtell and various members of the School Administration, Lawrence Axtell was finally sent home on November 13, 1970, by Assistant Principal, Joseph Gervase and ordered to get a haircut so as to bring himself within the scope of the Dress Code, and not return until he had done so.

6. Lawrence Axtell, with the consent and approval of his parents, declined to get a haircut and, on November 19, 1970, was officially suspended by means of a hand-delivered letter signed by Principal Albert Hook.

Plaintiff was never given a proper hearing before the School Board after charges as required by Section 1318 of the Pennsylvania School Code (24 P.S. § 13-1318) but this defect also was waived by plaintiffs.

7. There has been no evidence submitted that long hair on male students has at any time disrupted school activity or discipline, distracted students or teachers in classrooms, or interrupted the educational process at Memorial Junior High School.

8. The minor plaintiff's long hair has never been a disruptive or disturbing influence at Memorial Junior High School nor has it adversely affected such minor's academic performance, nor interfered with educational processes.

9. The minor plaintiff has been neat and clean in his person, including his long hair which he keeps neatly combed. The length of this minor's hair presents no danger to the health and safety either of himself or of other students.

10. As a result of this suspension, this action was instituted, under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3, 4). On December 10, 1970, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, which was later extended and the minor plaintiff returned to school. On December 28, 1970, a hearing on Motion for a Preliminary Injunction was held. It was stipulated that evidence taken at this hearing should also be applicable to the request for a permanent injunction.

11. No actual or punitive damages were sustained by the plaintiff.

12. Defendants are administrators and directors of the Erie School District as set forth in the caption.

B. OPINION

This is another of what has been described by the Court of Appeals of the First Circuit as a growing "thicket" of hair cases. (Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1970). The Federal Courts in this country are now being classified as "pro hair" and "anti-hair". The U. S. Supreme Court has thus far not reviewed the hair situation.

Inasmuch as the plaintiffs specifically waive any challenge to the Administrative procedure relating to the suspension and do not raise any question of vagueness or of freedom of speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Court will concentrate its discussion on the following issue: Is the regulation of hair length and hair styling by a school administration an infringement of the constitutional rights of liberty of an individual as afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?

While it is acknowledged that school authorities stand in the position of loco parentis over children while they are in attendance at school1 and that the Board of School Directors have full power to enact and enforce reasonable rules and regulations concerning the conduct of students while at school2, such statuory authority resides solely in the Board of School Directors and not in the administration of individual schools. However, plaintiffs make no challenge to the promulgation of reasonable rules by individual school administrators when tailored to the exigencies of their specific situations.

An examination of the "long-hair cases" to date makes clear that each such case must be decided on its own factual background and setting. Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, the plaintiffs properly contend that such regulations concerning personal behavior and appearance are appropriate in the area of conduct only where necessary to prevent "a deleterious effect on the student's ability to read and write and to communicate and interact with other human beings in a positive manner".3 The Supreme Court has cautioned school officials that they do not possess absolute authority over their students with the following language: "In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well as out of school are `persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental right which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to the State." Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1968). It is clear that the "in loco parentis" section of the Pennsylvania School Code (24 P.S. § 13-1317) was never intended to invest the schools with all the authority of parents over their minor children but only such control as is necessary to prevent infractions of discipline and interference with the educational process. See Guerrieri v. Tyson, 147 Pa. Super. 239, 24 A.2d 468 (1942).

In the absence of a clear showing that school regulations are necessary to prevent disruption of the educational process, recent case law recognizes that an individual's hair style and personal appearance are entitled to protection from action by the State, or its agents, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Westley v. Rossi, 305 F.Supp. 706 (D.Minn.1969); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Gere v. Stanley, 320 F.Supp. 852 (Pa.1970); Martin v. Davison, 322 F.Supp. 318 (Pa.1971).

The Supreme Court has long recognized the individual's right to control his own person:

"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pacific Rwy. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S.Ct. 1000, 1001, 35 L.Ed. 734 (1891).

Recent decisions have accorded the same high order of importance to the individual's special right to control his physical person "The Founding Fathers wrote an amendment for speech and assembly; even they did not deem it necessary to write an amendment for personal appearance.4 We conclude that within the commodious concept of liberty, embracing freedoms great and small, is the right to wear one's hair as he wishes." Richards v. Thurston, supra, 424 F.2d at 1285. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965).

"Determining that a personal liberty is involved answers only the first of two questions. The second is whether there is an outweighing state interest justifying the intrusion. The answer to this question must take into account the nature of the liberty asserted, the context in which it is asserted, and the extent to which the intrusion is confined to the legitimate public interest to be served. * * * Once the personal liberty is shown, the countervailing interest must either be self-evident or be affirmatively shown. We see no inherent reason why decency, decorum, or good conduct requires a boy to wear his hair short. Certainly eccentric hair styling is no longer a reliable signal of perverse behavior." Richards v. Thurston, supra, 424 F.2d at 1285-1286. "The right to wear one's hair at any length or in any manner is an ingredient of personal freedom protected by the United States Constitution." Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • Smith v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 22 Junio 1982
    ...school system, the doctrine has been followed in this country even though there is compulsory school attendance. E.g., Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F.Supp. 889 (E.D.Ill.1970); Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So.2d 49, 43 A.L.R.2d 465 (1954);......
  • Stull v. School Board of Western Beaver Jr.-Sr. HS
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 13 Abril 1972
    ...1970); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); See also the following district court cases to the same effect: Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971); Berryman v. Hein, 329 F.Supp. 616 (D.C.Idaho 1971); Parker v. Fry, 323 F.Supp. 728 (E.D.Ark. 1970); Martin v. Davison, 32......
  • D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 11 Agosto 1992
    ...control as is reasonably necessary to prevent infractions of discipline and interference with the educational process." Axtell v. Lapenna, 323 F.Supp. 1077 (W.D.Pa.1971). As the Commonwealth court concluded, section 13-1317 "invests authority in public school teachers; it does not impose a ......
  • Hunt v. Board of Fire Com'rs of Massapequa Fire Dist.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • 29 Noviembre 1971
    ...Kahl, 7 Cir., 419 F.2d 1034, cert. den. 398 U.S. 937, 90 S.Ct. 1836, 26 L.Ed.2d 268; Parker v. Fry, D.C., 323 F.Supp. 728; Axtell v. La Penna, D.C., 323 F.Supp. 1077; Lindquist v. City of Coral Gables, D.C., 323 F.Supp. 1161, supra; Dawson v. Hillsborough County, Florida School Board, D.C.,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT