Ayala v. Lee

• Decision Date: 18 December 2013
• Docket Number: Sept. Term, 2012.,No. 1288,1288
• Citation: 215 Md.App. 457,81 A.3d 584
• Parties: Rigoberto E. Domingos AYALA, et al. v. Robert Frederick LEE, et al.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

215 Md.App. 457

81 A.3d 584

Rigoberto E. Domingos AYALA, et al.

v.Robert Frederick LEE, et al.

No. 1288, Sept. Term, 2012.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 18, 2013.

Kevin J. McCarthy (McCarthy, Winkelman & Morrow, LLP, on the brief) Bowie, MD, for appellant.

Daniel J. Moore (Scott D. Goetsch, Joel D. Newport, Moore & Jackson, LLC, on the brief) Towson, MD, for appellee.

Panel: ZARNOCH, GRAEFF, JAMES P. SALMON (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

ZARNOCH, J.

This case presents two key issues for resolution: (1) Can a driver be found negligent if an accident occurs when his truck crashes into a parked vehicle but the apparently healthy driver has no memory of the accident? and (2) Is a plaintiff's status as an undocumented immigrant ¹ relevant and admissible evidence in this personal injury action?

Appellants Rigoberto E. Domingos Ayala and Jose R. Rodas Santacruz were working for Ebb Tide Tents and Party Rentals (“Ebb Tide”) when they were involved in a motor vehicle accident. The truck driven by appellee Robert F. Lee, holder of a commercial driver's license, on behalf of his employer Bay State Pool Supplies of Baltimore, Inc. (“Bay State”), collided with Ebb Tide's parked truck, resulting in severe injuries to Ayala and Santacruz. Ayala, Santacruz, and Imelda Carolina Chavez Ventura, Ayala's wife, sued Lee and Bay State for negligence. A six-day jury trial resulted in a jury verdict for Lee and Bay State, which appellants now ask us to reverse. We agree with appellants and therefore we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

Ayala and Santacruz were working for William Edward Comegys, Jr., then the owner of Ebb Tide, on September 27, 2010. Comegys was driving the three of them from the company headquarters to a job site in Annapolis and was traveling westbound on Route 50. It was raining, and the truck's windshield wipers stopped working at some point during the drive. After crossing the Bay Bridge, Comegys stopped the truck and pulled over to the right hand shoulder of Route 50. The vehicle was fully out of the travel lanes, with the two right wheels on the grass and the two left wheels on the paved part of the shoulder. The emergency flashers were also on. Comegys, Ayala, and Santacruz all exited the truck and went to work on the windshield wipers. They had just fixed the wipers and were standing in front of the vehicle when suddenly their truck was struck from behind by the truck owned by Bay State and operated by Lee. Comegys was killed as a result of the impact. Ayala and Santacruz survived, but suffered serious and permanent injuries to their lower extremities.

Ayala, Santacruz, and Ventura filed a complaint against Lee and Bay State in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on November 3, 2010.² Ayala and Santacruz each alleged counts of negligence against Lee and Bay State (Counts I and II) and counts of negligent entrustment and hiring against Bay State (Counts III and IV).³ Ayala and Ventura also claimed loss of consortium against Lee and Bay State (Count V). The damages sought included past and future medical expenses, loss of income, and loss of earning capacity.

It became obvious even before trial that Ayala and Santacruz's immigration status would be at issue. Ayala and Santacruz are originally from El Salvador. In 2006, they entered the United States through Texas without presenting themselves to federal immigration authorities. They eventually settled in Maryland. Each acquired a Social Security Number and used it to get a permanent resident card, seek employment, and pay taxes. However, each Social Security Number was acquired illegally. Ayala and Santacruz are therefore undocumented immigrants.⁴

Appellants moved to exclude evidence of their immigration status at trial in a written motion filed on April 26, 2012. The circuit court considered this and other motions in limine at a hearing on May 29, and ruled that immigration status was relevant and admissible evidence. Because Ayala and Santacruz asked for income-based damages, the circuit court reasoned that they had opened the door to inquiries about their immigration status. In the court's view, there was a valid question over whether or not a plaintiff could legally earn the income he was claiming in damages. The court also found that the fact that Ayala and Santacruz had misrepresented their immigration status on employment forms was relevant to their credibility. Accordingly, at the August 2012 trial, the jury heard extensive testimony from Ayala and Santacruz on their legal status and how they came to the United States. Indeed, the second question asked of Ayala during cross-examination was: “You do not have a Social Security Number issued to you by the United States Government?” Counsel for Bay State and Lee also asked almost every other witness questions related to appellants' immigration status.⁵

Ayala and Santacruz also testified about their injuries as a result of the accident and how those injuries had affected their ability to work. They called expert witnesses to corroborate their testimony, including the orthopedist who treated them, a rehabilitation specialist, and an economist. The Maryland State Troopers who had responded to the accident also testified. They described the work they did to reconstruct the accident scene, which showed that the front right corner of the Bay State truck hit the back left corner of the Ebb Tide truck. There was no damage to any other part of the Bay State truck. The officers also testified that the conditions that day included some rain but no obstructions to vision or any construction along that portion of Route 50.

Lee and Bay State relied on testimony from their own medical expert, who testified that Ayala and Santacruz's injuries were less severe than they claimed, and video evidence from an investigator who had recorded Ayala and Santacruz performing various day-to-day activities. They also presented, over objection, the de bene esse deposition of the woman who had been lawfully issued the Social Security Number Ayala was using. Absent from the trial, however, was Lee himself. Because Lee was hospitalized, his deposition was read to the jury and served as his testimony. Accordingly, the jury heard that Lee was driving about fifty miles per hour in the right travel lane of Route 50. He saw a vehicle in his left side mirror and thought “Buddy, you're getting too close. You're coming into my lane.” Lee's next memory was of crashing through the brush on the right side of the highway. He did not remember striking the Ebb Tide truck, nor did he remember seeing the truck. When asked how his vehicle moved to the right shoulder, Lee stated that “I must have just turned the wheel to the right, slightly.” When asked if he was guessing, Lee said “I don't remember turning the wheel, but I could have—but it could have been [a] reaction as I was looking, you know.”

Appellants moved for “judgment on the issue of liability” at the close of Lee and Bay State's case, which the circuit court denied. The case was submitted to the jury, which found that Lee and Bay State were not negligent. Ayala and Santacruz timely appealed.

Additional facts will be discussed below.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Appellants ask us to review five questions,⁶ which we have consolidated:

I. Did the circuit court err when it denied appellants' motion for judgment?

II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it denied appellants' motion in limine to exclude evidence of appellants' immigration status at trial?

III. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it permitted a de bene esse deposition of a witness who was legally issued the Social Security Number Ayala used?

IV. Did circuit court err when it refused to give appellants' requested jury instructions?

Because we conclude that the circuit court erred when it denied appellants' motion for judgment, we do not reach the third and fourth questions. We therefore reverse the denial of the motion for judgment and remand for trial on the issue of damages. Given that appellants' immigration status may again appear relevant at that stage, however, we also consider appellants' second question and address the propriety of evidence of immigration status.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Judgment

A. Background

Appellants argue that the facts of the accident “create a presumption of negligence” because Lee failed to maintain control of his vehicle. They assert that Lee violated two Maryland state laws when he crashed into the Ebb Tide vehicle: (1) Md.Code (1977, 2012 Repl.Vol.), Transportation Article (“Trans.”), § 21–309(b), which states that a “vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane”; and (2) Trans. § 21–312(b), which states that a “person may not drive a vehicle from any controlled access highway except at the entrances and exits established by public authority.” They contend that these violations are prima facie evidence of negligence. They therefore ask us to reverse the circuit court's denial of their motion for judgment. By contrast, appellees argue that Lee did not violate any state laws because restrictions on lane changes and access to and from a highway do not apply to travel to and from the shoulder of a highway. Appellees argue in the alternative that even if the laws apply, they create only an inference of negligence, not a presumption, making the court's denial of the motion for judgment and submission of the case to the jury appropriate.

B. Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews de novo the denial of a motion for judgment in a civil case, applying the same standard as the circuit court. See District of Columbia v. Singleton, 425 Md. 398, 406, 41 A.3d 717 (2012). The evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 407, 41 A.3d 717 (Citation omitted). If there was “any evidence, no matter how...