Ayala v. Speckard
| Citation | 89 F.3d 91 |
| Decision Date | 15 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 1304,D,1304 |
| Parties | , 25 Media L. Rep. 1202 Steven AYALA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Hubert SPECKARD, Superintendent of Groveland Correctional Facility, Respondent-Appellee. ocket 95-2463. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Karl E. Pflanz, Office of the Appellate Defender, New York City (E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Joseph M. Nursey, Diane E. Courselle, on the brief), for petitioner-appellant.
Jennifer A. Daskevich, Assistant District Attorney, New York City (Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Joseph N. Ferdenzi, Nancy D. Killian, Assistant District Attorneys, on the brief), for respondent-appellee.
Before: CARDAMONE, ALTIMARI and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner-appellant Steven Ayala ("Ayala") was arrested as a result of an undercover "buy and bust" operation by state police officers in the Bronx, New York. At trial, the state prosecutor sought to have the courtroom closed during the police officer's testimony so as not to jeopardize the safety and efficacy of the officer's future undercover operations. The state court judge granted the closure and allowed the officer to testify absent the scrutiny of the public. Ayala unsuccessfully appealed his conviction through the state system, asserting that the courtroom closure violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Thereafter, Ayala sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Keenan, J.). The district court found Ayala's contentions unavailing and denied the writ. Ayala now argues, inter alia, that the district court erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus because the State failed to advance an interest that was likely to be prejudiced by the undercover officer's open testimony. Because we agree that there was no "substantial probability" that an overriding state interest would have been prejudiced by the public testimony of the undercover officer, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for issuance of the writ.
In his first two years of undercover work, Detective Willie Dotson ("Dotson") made approximately two hundred purchases of illicit drugs. During that period of time, Dotson and a team of officers engaged in what are known as "buy and busts"--Dotson, undercover, would purchase drugs with pre-marked bills, identify the individual from whom he had bought the drugs to his team members, and those officers in his team would then arrest the offending individual.
One such "buy and bust" arrest took place on September 22, 1990, moments after Ayala allegedly sold Dotson ten dollars worth of crack cocaine. Ayala was tried before a jury some ten months later in the New York Supreme Court of Bronx County (Marcus, J.), and was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, see N.Y. Penal Law § 220.16 (McKinney Supp.1996), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, see N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06 (McKinney Supp.1996). As a second time felony offender, Ayala was sentenced to six-and-a-half to thirteen years in prison.
The principal witness against Ayala at trial was Dotson. Prior to Dotson's testimony, the State moved to close the courtroom to protect the officer's identity and well-being. Accordingly, the trial judge held a hearing to determine the propriety of closing the courtroom. In the hearing, after stating that he was an undercover officer with the 41st Precinct, Dotson testified as follows:
There have been occasions where I would just say that people are injured or killed if they're recognized and if they know that you are a police officer, it has happened on occasion.
On cross-examination, Dotson further testified:
Based upon Dotson's testimony, and over the objections of Ayala's attorney, the trial judge excluded all spectators from the courtroom during Dotson's testimony.
On direct appeal, Ayala argued that the New York Supreme Court had violated his constitutional right to a public trial and that the State had failed to proffer a sufficient "overriding interest" to justify the courtroom closure. The Appellate Division rejected Ayala's Sixth Amendment challenge, stating that:
[t]he People provided ample justification for the closure of the courtroom during the undercover officer's testimony. The undercover officer testified that he had been working in the specific area where the crime took place for the past month; that he expected to go back there within a day after his trial testimony; that he had purchased drugs in the same building where this crime occurred just one week earlier; that he purchased drugs from the immediate area of this building about 20 times in the past year; that he "[d]efinitely" expected to go back to that area to buy drugs; that he had previously been approached by ex-defendants on the street who had attempted to warn others that he was a police officer; and that he feared for his life and safety as well as the lives and safety of his fellow officers should he be recognized.
People v. Ayala, 202 A.D.2d 262, 608 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (1st Dep't 1994). Thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals denied Ayala leave to seek review of the Appellate Division's decision. See People v. Ayala, 83 N.Y.2d 908, 614 N.Y.S.2d 390, 637 N.E.2d 281 (1994).
On October 31, 1994, Ayala brought the present habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In his petition, Ayala contended that the State had violated his Sixth Amendment rights by failing to meet all four prongs of the Waller test: 1) the State did not advance an overriding interest that was likely to be prejudiced by Dotson's open testimony; 2) the closure was broader than necessary to protect the State's interest; 3) the court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to closing the courtroom; and 4) the court failed to make adequate findings in support of the closure. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2216-17, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). The State conceded that habeas review was appropriate as to the The district court rejected the State's exhaustion argument but found Ayala's constitutional claim to be without merit. By opinion dated June 21, 1995, the district court held that: 1) the State had amply demonstrated likely prejudice of its overriding interest in protecting an undercover officer's anonymity and safety; 2) because Ayala had not requested that any family members be present during Dotson's testimony, the temporary courtroom closure for Dotson's testimony was no broader than necessary; 3) the trial court was under no obligation to sua sponte consider alternatives to complete closure of the courtroom and therefore did not err in considering no other alternatives; and 4) the state court justified its closure with sufficient specificity on the record. Accordingly, the district court rejected Ayala's petition. Moreover, the district court denied Ayala's motion for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. On October 31, 1995, this Court granted Ayala's motion for a certificate of probable cause and allowed the present appeal to go forward.
first prong of the Waller test, but argued that because Ayala had not specifically disputed the other three prongs in state court that he could not do so now in his habeas petition.
On appeal, Ayala contends, as he has below, that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by the closure of the courtroom during his state trial.
As an initial matter, we address the State's proposition that Ayala may not appeal three of the four prongs of the Waller test for failure to exhaust state remedies.
In the interest of comity and in keeping with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994), federal courts will not consider a constitutional challenge that has not first been "fairly presented" to the state courts. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971), Daye v. Attorney General, 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir.1982) (en banc). It is clear, however, that Ayala's Sixth Amendment challenge was "fairly presented" on direct appeal through the New York system. Not only did Ayala expressly invoke the Sixth Amendment in his arguments before the Appellate Division, see Daye, 696 F.2d at 192 (...
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