AYALA v. WASHINGTON

• Decision Date: 25 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 92-CV-1553,92-CV-1553
• Parties: Kevin AYALA, Appellant, v. Evie L. WASHINGTON, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

679 A.2d 1057

Kevin AYALA, Appellant, v. Evie L. WASHINGTON, Appellee.

No. 92-CV-1553.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued February 28, 1995.

Decided July 25, 1996.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ARTHUR L. BURNETT, SR., J.

THIS PAGE CONTAINED HEADNOTES AND HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.

Paul H. Zukerberg, Washington, DC, for appellant.

Robert J. Jones, Washington, DC, for appellee.

Before TERRY and RUIZ, Associate Judges, and MACK, Senior Judge.

RUIZ, Associate Judge.

This case requires us to decide the meaning of the First Amendment's injunction against laws "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press" in the context of an action for defamation. A jury found that appellant Kevin Ayala, an airline pilot, had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his former lover, appellee Evie Washington, falsely told Ayala's employer and the Federal Aviation Administration that he had used marijuana during his off-duty hours. The jury also found that Ayala had shown by clear and convincing evidence that Washington either knew her accusation was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. The jury awarded Ayala nominal compensatory and punitive damages. Nevertheless, the trial court entered judgment for Washington, finding Ayala's showing insufficient under the First Amendment to sustain any judgment against Washington because the accusation made against him was on a "matter of public concern." Although we agree that Washington's communication to the FAA was on a "matter of public concern," we hold that Ayala's showing met the standard required by the First Amendment for the award of compensatory and punitive damages. Thus, the trial court erred in setting aside the award of nominal compensatory damages and in refusing to permit Ayala to present evidence relevant to fixing the amount of punitive damages. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the question of punitive damages.

I.

When the parties met, Ayala was a commercial airline pilot and Washington worked in an administrative position for the Central Intelligence Agency. As a result of their mutual interest in aviation, they became partners in the ownership of a small plane and eventually also romantically involved. Neither relationship, however, provided lasting rewards to the parties. Sometime after their personal relationship ended, but during the troubled course of their proprietary relationship, Washington wrote to the FAA and to Ayala's employer alleging that Ayala had engaged in several acts of misconduct, including the use of marijuana while off duty.

In a letter dated April 24, 1990, addressed to Ayala's employer, Washington asserted that she "knew [Ayala] used marijuana." She also wrote,

I would hate to see all USAIR pilots or any commercial pilots get a bad reputation because of one person. I know most of the general public still suspect that drugs were the real reason for USAIR carrier crashing off the end of the runway in New York. I'm trying to keep my friends and family from accidentally creating more bad publicity and suspicion of your pilots by talking to the wrong people about [Ayala's] behavior.

Another letter, dated May 16, 1990, was sent to the FAA. In it, Washington acknowledged receiving a letter from the FAA, which apparently discounted accusations she had made earlier against Ayala. She wrote, in part,

I respect and take FAA [regulations] serious[ly]. I thought that all FAA officials were serious about the FAA [regulations], and I did not realize, until now, that FAA officials play favoritism with certain individuals.I'm sorry that I thought that anyone who knowingly and deliberately violates the FAA [regulations], uses marijuana, and ha[s] had other FAA violations, would be the bad guy. But you all are making him into a saint, but I forgot he's an airline pilot and a man. I'm just a nonessential woman and lowly government employee. So [Ayala] is congratulated for violations and probably is being helped to cover up his violations, and I'm condem[n]ed and called crazy.

A third letter, dated October 9, 1990, was addressed to the chairman of the board of Ayala's employer. In it, Washington reiterated her earlier allegations of drug use and other violations of FAA regulations. Near the close of the letter, Washington said,

I know it is too much to ask for you to get [Ayala] to become responsible and mature enough to correct the grave injustice and stress that he has caused me. But I plead and pray that you will take the necessary action to save the lives of unsuspecting passengers that board[] the [aircraft] that [Ayala] is in charge of.

Ayala was never disciplined as a result of Washington's accusations, which the FAA and his employer determined to be unfounded.

Ayala commenced this defamation action requesting compensatory and punitive damages; Washington counterclaimed for abuse of process. In its pretrial order, the court directed Ayala not to mention his claim for punitive damages during his opening statement and forbade him from introducing evidence of Washington's net worth and his attorney fees unless and until the jury found in his favor regarding liability.

At trial, a dispute arose regarding Ayala's burden of proof. Debate focused on whether Washington's statements were on a "matter of public concern." The trial judge thought that they were, and that a higher standard of clear and convincing evidence, rather than a preponderance of evidence, was required. Because the trial judge was uncertain, however, he solicited jury findings under both standards and devised a special interrogatory form that he believed would create a complete appellate record. Neither party objected to the form. As completed by the jury, the form reads as follows:

1. Do you, the jury, find that Kevin Ayala, has established his cause of action for defamation by clear and convincing evidence?

Yes __________ No X

2. Do you, the jury, find that Kevin Ayala, has established his cause of action for defamation by a preponderance of the evidence?

Yes X No __________

3. If you answered either or both of the questions above, "Yes" proceed to the next question. What sum of money do you award to the Plaintiff, Kevin Ayala, as compensatory damages in this case?

$1.00

4. If you answered Questions 1 and/or 2 "Yes" in addition to compensatory damages, including nominal compensatory damages, you may also award punitive damages, if you find punitive damages to be justified. What sum of money do you award to the Plaintiff, Kevin Ayala, as punitive damages, if any, in this case?

$1.00

5. On Evie L. Washington's Counterclaim for Abuse of Process, how do you the jury find?

For Evie L. Washington, Counterclaim Plaintiff ___

For Kevin L. Ayala, Counterclaim Defendant X

6. If you find for Evie L. Washington, Counterclaim Plaintiff, what sum of money do you find will reasonably compensate her for her damages?

$ __________

In its instructions, the trial court defined the term, "cause of action for defamation," referred to in the first two interrogatories, as proof of a false, defamatory statement andpublication of the statement by the defendant with actual malice.¹

With respect to punitive damages, the trial court instructed the jury that it could only award such damages upon a finding

that [Washington] acted with knowledge of the falsity of the communication or with [r]eckless disregard as to whether the statements were true or false. The party seeking punitive damages must establish the grounds for punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.

After judgment was entered for Ayala on the jury's verdict, Washington moved for judgment as a matter of law. Ayala sought a trial on his claim for punitive damages, including an opportunity to present evidence concerning his expenditures on attorney fees and costs. The trial court granted Washington's motion, ruling that because the defamatory material involved a matter of public concern, Ayala was required to prove all elements of his case by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court denied Ayala's motion on the same ground and on the alternative ground that "in view of the nominal compensatory damages award, there was little or no evidence to justify a punitive damages award, even as to the $1.00 award."

II.

We review the trial court's action by determining, first, what the jury found and, second, whether such findings satisfy the legal requirements for award of compensatory and punitive damages in a defamation action. Turning, first, to what the jury found, we look at what it was asked to decide. The first two interrogatories concerning establishment of Ayala's "cause of action for defamation" were compound — the jury had to find three facts: falsity, publication, and constitutional malice. The first interrogatory asked whether these facts had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the second interrogatory inquired whether they had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. If the jury failed to find any one fact to have been established with the requisite certainty, under the instructions the jury was required to give a negative answer to that interrogatory. An affirmative answer would mean that the jury found all three facts to have been established with the requisite certainty. Interrogatory number four asked only one question, whether punitive damages were justified. The jury had been instructed that, for punitive damages to be justified, the jury had to find that Ayala had established constitutional malice by clear and convincing evidence.

In determining what the jury found, we will, if possible, reconcile the jury's responses, consistent with the instructions given. McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that court is constitutionally required to accept verdict if there is any view of case under which...