Aylward v. Dragus

• Decision Date: 12 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-811,79-811
• Citation: 37 Ill.Dec. 698,82 Ill.App.3d 283,402 N.E.2d 700
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 37 Ill.Dec. 698 William J. AYLWARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard DRAGUS and Helen Dragus, Defendants, People of the State of Illinois ex rel. William J. Scott, the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, Appellant.

Page 700

402 N.E.2d 700

82 Ill.App.3d 283, 37 Ill.Dec. 698

William J. AYLWARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard DRAGUS and Helen Dragus, Defendants People of the State of Illinois ex rel. William J. Scott the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, Appellant.

No. 79-811.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

March 12, 1980.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen. of Ill., Chicago (Edward M. Kay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Mathew K. Szygowski, Bianco & Szygowski, chartered, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

McNAMARA, Justice:

The Attorney General sought the enforcement of a statutory lien in the full amount of $4,446.85, against the proceeds of a settlement recovered by plaintiff, William J. Aylward. The lien is recoverable under section 10(c) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 70, par. 80(c), for compensation paid to plaintiff. The trial court adjudicated the lien and reduced its amount to $2,200. The State appeals from the order reducing the amount of the lien. It contends that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to reduce a valid lien under the Act in question.

On November 8, 1975, defendant Richard Dragus shot plaintiff with a firearm. On December 10, 1975, plaintiff brought an action against Dragus in the circuit court of Cook County for damages resulting from gunshot wounds. On February 6, 1976, plaintiff applied to the State of Illinois for compensation as a victim of a violent crime under the Act. Plaintiff executed an agreement in which he agreed to subrogate the State for compensation received from any personal injury recovery. On August 31, 1977, the State awarded plaintiff $4,446.85 for hospital and medical expenses under the Act. Plaintiff did not use the funds to pay the hospital and medical expenses.

In March 1979, plaintiff's personal injury action against Dragus was settled for $20,000. Plaintiff presented a motion for reduction of the hospital lien and, on March 2, 1979, the trial court ordered the hospital lien of $4,011.85 to be adjudicated at $2,000. Plaintiff also sought a reduction of the State's lien of $4,446.85 and, on March 8, 1979, a hearing was held. Plaintiff asked the trial court to adjudicate the State's lien at 50% in consideration of his injuries, the compromise settlement, the hospital lien and his attorney's fees of $7,000. Over the State's objections, the trial court ordered the State's lien adjudicated in the amount of $2,200.

The State urges that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to reduce a lien under the Crime Victims Compensation Act. We agree.

The Act expressly provides that the State has a lien or charge for compensation awarded to applicants. This lien attaches to any judgment entered and to any money or property which is recovered by plaintiff against an assailant. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 70, par. 80(c).) Section 10(c) of the Act further provides that "On petition filed by the Attorney General on behalf of the State or by the applicant or other recipient of compensation, the circuit court, on written notice to all interested parties, shall adjudicate the rights of the parties and enforce the charge."

In construing identical statutory language in a case involving State liens under the Public Aid Code, Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 23, par. 819, our supreme court has held that specific statutory authority is required to permit a reduction of the State's lien. (In re Estate of Poole (1962), 26 Ill.2d 443, 187 N.E.2d 231.) In that case, the court stated at pp. 445-46, 187 N.E.2d at 232:

"We do not construe the authority to adjudicate the rights of the parties as giving a court the prerogative of refusing to enforce a valid lien but, to the contrary, we believe the legislature intended thereby to grant only the power to determine whether the statutory requirements for a lien had in fact been met, and if so, then to enforce the charge in that amount. Since there is no question here but that a valid lien did exist in the first instance, the lower court, bound as it was by the legislative direction in section 8-19 of the Public Assistance Code, correctly refused to go further and subordinate such lien so as to...