Ayoub v. Ford Motor Co.

Decision Date27 October 1980
Docket NumberDocket No. 44996
Citation300 N.W.2d 508,101 Mich.App. 740
PartiesAdel F. AYOUB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. 101 Mich.App. 740, 300 N.W.2d 508
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

[101 MICHAPP 742] Robert W. Howes, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Carl G. Meyers, Detroit, Hayim I. Gross, Birmingham, for defendant-appellee.

Before HOLBROOK, P. J., and V. J. BRENNAN and EVERETT, * JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On April 9, 1979, the Michigan Worker's Compensation Appeal Board in a 3-2 decision affirmed the August 12, 1976, decision of the referee denying plaintiff workers' compensation benefits on the grounds that plaintiff had refused favored work. Plaintiff appeals this order by leave.

On August 17, 1973, while working for defendant as a grinder, plaintiff sustained a crushing injury to his right hand. The index and middle fingers of his right hand were severely injured, necessitating the amputation of his thumb on August 27, 1973, followed by plastic surgery for his middle finger. 1 Defendant voluntarily paid benefits from August 27, 1973, until November 25, 1974, the specific loss period. Plaintiff returned to work in late December, 1973, and was restricted to one-handed jobs by order of defendant's physician. Accordingly, he was assigned to favored work which consisted of filling baskets with parts and conveying them to various plant locations by pushing one of three buttons and monitoring the flow of the parts. After an hour or so on the job, a foreman and three other workers told plaintiff that each basket had to contain parts of only one [101 MICHAPP 743] type, not mixed parts. Thus, plaintiff was required to manually sort the parts, some of which weighed 40 to 75 pounds each. Although this aspect of the job required two hands and caused plaintiff much pain, plaintiff performed the job for about a week without asking to be given a different job. 2 No one disputes that plaintiff was unable to perform this task. On January 7, 1974, plaintiff obtained a medical leave for pleurisy, unrelated to the accident, and received John Hancock benefits for one week. Upon leaving the job, plaintiff re-enrolled at the University of Michigan to complete his senior year. He worked at a pizza parlor in Ann Arbor, both full and part time. After completing his bachelor's program, plaintiff began work on a master's degree in business at the University of Detroit. Since August, 1975, plaintiff has worked as a caseworker with the Department of Social Services.

Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. The first is whether plaintiff's leaving defendant's employ constituted a refusal of favored employment. An employer need not extend benefits beyond the statutory disability schedule to a worker who has refused employment within his capabilities, which is known as "favored" employment. Pigue v. General Motors Corp., 317 Mich. 311, 26 N.W.2d 900 [101 MICHAPP 744] (1947); Lynch v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 329 Mich. 168, 172, 45 N.W.2d 20 (1950). An employer must prove, however, that it made an actual rather than speculative offer of favored employment before it can claim that the injured worker voluntarily refused it. Kolenko v. United States Rubber Products, Inc., 285 Mich. 159, 280 N.W. 148 (1938); Sims v. R.D. Brooks, Inc., 389 Mich. 91, 204 N.W.2d 139 (1973); Hope v. Welch Grape Juice Co., 46 Mich.App. 128, 129, 207 N.W.2d 476 (1973).

Defendant contends, and the referee and WCAB majority concur, that plaintiff left defendant's employ because of his desire to complete his education. This position is supported by the fact that plaintiff registered for his senior year of classes the week prior to the last day he worked for defendant. The assumption is that plaintiff's posture was one of bad faith since he would have not remained with defendant even if he could have had a job which he was capable of performing. As support, they note that plaintiff did not ask for a different job after his first assignment turned out to require both hands. Rather, in leaving defendant's employ, plaintiff stated that he was doing so because of pleurisy rather than an inability to perform the job.

Plaintiff counters that the issue of good faith was legally irrelevant since he was never actually offered favored employment.

Although we find this a close factual question, we are persuaded that defendant's position is the correct one. When plaintiff returned to work following his injury, plaintiff's foreman assigned him to favored work. That job merely required the pushing of three buttons to transport various parts throughout the plant. As such, it was a task performable by injured employees with a one-[101 MICHAPP 745] handed medical restriction. In fact, there was testimony that this assignment was routinely given to employees with one-handed restrictions, since, when like stock was run, the employee was only required to push three buttons. However, 11/2 hours after plaintiff began his favored work, another foreman assigned him to sort the mixed stock, a task clearly requiring two hands and contrary to the medical restrictions issued to plaintiff. Despite the fact that the sorting of parts weighing from 40 to 75 pounds each caused plaintiff much pain, he performed the job for about one week without asking to be given a different assignment.

Our reading of the cases leads us to conclude that a realistic and definite offer of favored employment must be present before the worker's conduct is called into question. The requirement can be somewhat formalistic. See Sims v. R.D. Brooks, Inc., supra. The offer of favored employment to a disabled worker is simply a means of permitting an employer to offset its loss.

In Kolenko v. U.S. Rubber, Inc., supra, 285 Mich. 159, 162, 280 N.W. 148, the Supreme Court placed the burden on the employer to show that it offered favored work and noted that the employee...

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6 cases
  • Hartsell v. Richmond Lumber Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 9 de setembro de 1986
    ...work is work offered by an employer to a disabled employee which accommodates the employee's limitations. Ayoub v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Mich.App. 740, 300 N.W.2d 508 (1980), lv. den. 411 Mich. 871 (1981). The rationale behind the favored work doctrine was stated in Stallworth v. Chrysler Cor......
  • Bower v. Whitehall Leather Co.
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 1 de novembro de 1980
    ...& Machine Co., 378 Mich. 418, 145 N.W.2d 40 (1966), failure to notify the employer of medical restrictions, Ayoub v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Mich.App. 740, 300 N.W.2d 508 (1980), or discharge because of gambling, Todd, or drunkenness, Garrett v. Chrysler Corp., 337 Mich. 192, 59 N.W.2d 259 (195......
  • Hamlin v. Michigan Seat Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 28 de janeiro de 1982
    ...and definite offer of employment was made and that the employee was capable of performing the work offered. Ayoub v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Mich.App. 740, 745, 300 N.W.2d 508 (1980); Kolenko, supra; Sims, supra, 389 Mich. 94, 204 N.W.2d 139. Once having met these criteria, a refusal by an empl......
  • Stallworth v. Chrysler Corp.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 12 de novembro de 1985
    ...to describe work offered by the employer to a disabled employee which accommodates the employee's limitations. Ayoub v. Ford Motor Co., 101 Mich.App. 740, 300 N.W.2d 508 (1980), lv. den. 411 Mich. 871 (1981). So it was in Evans, supra, which involved only a single employer. See also Bower v......
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