Al-Ayoubi v. City of Hackensack
| Decision Date | 28 December 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-02592 (SDW) (MCA) |
| Parties | POLICE OFFICER JOSEPH AL-AYOUBI, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HACKENSACK, CHIEF OF POLICE CHARLES KEN ZISA, in both his professional and personal capacity, CAPTAIN THOMAS SALCEDO, in both his professional and personal capacity, and CAPTAIN DANILO GARCIA, in both his professional and personal capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Before the Court are the individual motions of defendants Chief of Police Charles Ken Zisa ("Zisa" or "Chief Zisa"), Captain Thomas Salcedo ("Salcedo"), and Captain Danilo Garcia ("Garcia") (collectively, "Individual Defendants" or "Defendants") to dismiss claims in plaintiff Police Officer Joseph Al-Ayoubi's complaint ("Plaintiff" or "Al-Ayoubi") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The City of Hackensack ("City"), another defendant, also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment ("City's Motion").
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 and 1343(a)(3), and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
This Court, having considered the parties' submissions, decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.
For the reasons stated below, this Court GRANTS Zisa's motion to dismiss ("Zisa's Motion"); GRANTS Salcedo's motion to dismiss ("Salcedo's Motion"); GRANTS Garcia's motion to dismiss ("Garcia's Motion"); and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the City's Motion.
Plaintiff is a police officer with the Hackensack New Jersey Police Department. (Am. Compl. ¶ 7.)
In 2009, while Salcedo was conducting an Internal Affairs Unit investigation into Lieutenant Vincent Riotta ("Riotta"), Riotta provided Salcedo with several recorded conversations on compact discs. (Def. Salcedo's Br., Ex. B at 1.) Riotta, Sergeant Scott Sybel ("Sybel"), and Plaintiff's conversations were considered to implicate them in possible steroid use. (Id. at 1-2.) On June 4, 2009, Salcedo provided the transcribed conversations to Chief Zisa via an Interoffice Communication. (Id.) In this communication, Salcedo relayed his belief that "reasonable suspicion" existed to compel urine samples from Riotta, Sybel, and Plaintiff. (Id. at 3.)1
On June 19, 2009, while on vacation, Plaintiff was ordered to undergo a urine test. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) He was informed that the test was based on reasonable suspicion of drug use. (Id.) Salcedo and Garcia allegedly "carried out" the urine test. (Id.)when the test results returned, Salcedo announced to Plaintiff in front of Garcia and others within the department that the "urine came back dirty" and that Plaintiff had "tested positive for steroids." (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff asserts that these public statements and written criminal complaints were defamatory and were meant to ruin his personal and professional life. (Id. ¶ 15.) On July 15, 2009, Plaintiff was criminally charged. (Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) Thereafter, Plaintiff was suspended from the force. (Id.) on September 24, 2009, the criminal charges against Plaintiff were dismissed with prejudice. (Id. ¶ 17.)
on May 20, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendants, for various civil rights violations, including conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence/palpably unreasonable conduct, malicious abuse of process, false arrest and false imprisonment, and defamation (libel and slander). (See generally Compl.) On June 23, 2010, Zisa and the City of Hackensack filed a motion to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On August 12, 2010, this Court granted the motion in part, denied in part, and stipulated in part. An order to that effect was filed on August 16, 2010.
On August 24, 2010, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint ("Amended Complaint"), adding a cause of action based on a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2, and adding Salcedo and Garcia as defendants. The Amended Complaint contains the following claims: 1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) violation of constitutional right of due process; 3) violation of New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA"), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2; 4) conspiracy to violate state and federal civil rights; 5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 6) gross negligence/palpablyunreasonable conduct; 7) malicious abuse of process, false arrest and false imprisonment; 8) defamation—libel and slander. On May 13, 2011, Zisa's Motion was filed to dismiss Count I (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983), Count II (violation of constitutional right of due process),2 and Count III (violation of NJCRA). On May 27, 2011, Salcedo's Motion was filed to dismiss the Amended Complaint, but specifically Count I (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983), Count III (violation of NJCRA), and Count IV (conspiracy to violate state and federal civil rights).3 On June 3, 2011, Garcia's Motion was filed to dismiss all claims (Counts I through IX)4 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On June 23, 2011, the City filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment.
The adequacy of pleadings is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint allege "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This Rule Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted) ("Rule 8(a)(2)still requires a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion, of an entitlement to relief."); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).
In considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must "'accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.'" Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). However, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As the Supreme Court has explained:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'"
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57, 570). Determining whether allegations in a complaint are plausible is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. If the "well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibilityof misconduct," the court must grant a motion to dismiss for failure to show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id.
To the extent that defendants' motions are to be considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), our courts have noted that "a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(c) is identical to one filed under Rule 12(b)(6), except Rule 12(c) allows for the motion to be filed after the filing of an answer, while Rule 12(b)(6) allows for the motion to be made in lieu of an answer." Wellness Pub. v. Barefoot, No. 02-3773, 2008 WL 108889, at * 6 (D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2008); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B). In either instance, a court is to use the same standard in evaluating the motions. Reinbold v. U.S. Post Office, 250 Fed. Appx. 465, 466 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Turbe v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiff asserts that Zisa compelled Plaintiff's urine specimen to conduct a drug test illegally and without reasonable suspicion. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15; see Pl.'s Opp'n to Zisa's Br. 2.) Plaintiff claims that due to the illegal procurement of his specimen, his "personal and professional reputation has been damaged beyond repair." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 34.) As discussed below, Zisa's Motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims is based primarily on the argument that qualified immunity should apply to Zisa in these circumstances.5
Defendant Zisa argues that he is shielded from liability arising from the urine test based on the doctrine of "qualified immunity." "Qualified immunity is 'an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). It applies to the "discretionary functions" of government officials whose actions do not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional...
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