Ayres v. City of Chicago

Decision Date08 April 1909
PartiesAYRES et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Lockwood Honore, Judge.

Bill by Joseph D. Ayres and others against the City of Chicago. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

William H. Arthur and Colson & Johnson, for appellants.

Edward J. Brundage, Corp. Counsel, Emil C. Wetten, Clarence N. Boord, and Edwin H. Cassels, for appellee.

VICKERS, J.

This is a bill, filed by Joseph D. Ayres and 21 other persons, on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated who might desire to join in the bill and pay their proportion of the costs of the litigation, to enjoin the city of Chicago from the enforcement of an ordinance of said city known as the ‘Wheel Tax Ordinance,’ on the ground that said ordinance is unconstitutional and void. By their bill complainants represent that they own, use, and operate automobiles in the city of Chicago, and that each of complainants is the owner of one or more of such automobiles, ranging in value from $500 to $7,500 each, and that each and all of such automobiles have seats for two or more persons, and that none of such automobiles are used within the limits of said city of Chicago, or elsewhere, for public hire. It is charged in the bill that complainants have registered their respective automobiles with the Secretary of State, and received from him a certificate in compliance with the motor vehicle law, which went into effect July 1, 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 510). The bill recites the passage, by the city council of the city of Chicago, of an ordinance designated as the ‘Wheel Tax Ordinance,’ by virtue of an amendment to paragraph 96 of section 1, art. 5, City and Village Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, c. 24), and alleges that the wheel tax ordinance is invalid because it is in conflict with section 13 of the motor vehicle law, in so far as said ordinance relates to or affects the use and operation of motor vehicles or automobiles upon the public ways of the state. The complainants also charge that the wheel tax ordinance is invalid because it is in violation of the uniformity and equality provisions of the Constitution of this state, in that it requires all persons who own automobiles, or motor vehicles, with seats for two or more persons to pay a license tax, while persons using or operating automobiles with a seat for one person only, motorcycles, tricycles, and bicycles are not required, under and by virtue of the provisions of said ordinance, to pay any license or tax as a condition to the operation or use of vehicles of the last-mentioned classes, whereby it is alleged said ordinance unjustly and illegally discriminates against complainants and all others similarly situated. It is charged in the bill that a large number of such automobiles with a seat for one person only, motorcycles, tricycles, and bicycles have been, and are now, operated on the streets of Chicago, and that many of said automobiles last mentioned are more powerful, heavier, of greater value, and do as much, or more, damage to the pavements of such streets than many of the automobiles with seats for two or more persons. The city of Chicago demurred to said bill, which demurrer was sustained by the circuit court of Cook county, and, complainants electing to abide their bill, the same was dismissed for the want of equity, and a decree rendered against complainants below for costs. This appeal is prosecuted by complainants below to reverse that decree.

The validity and constitutionality of a municipal ordinance being involved, and the court below having certified that in its opinion the public interests, as well as the statute, required that an appeal be allowed to this court, complainants were granted an appeal direct to the Supreme Court, in accordance with section 118 of the new practice act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, c. 110).

Appellants' first contention is that the wheel tax ordinance is invalid in its application to automobiles not used for hire, for the reason that the ordinance is inconsistent with section 13 of the motor vehicle law. Before coming to a consideration of section 13 of the motor vehicle law, it will enable us to obtain a clearer view of section 13 of said law to briefly notice the preceding sections of the act. The title to the act is, ‘An act defining motor vehicles and providing for the registration of the same and uniform rules regulating the use and speed thereof and repealing an act entitled ‘An act to regulate the speed of automobiles and other horseless conveyances upon the public streets, roads and highways of the state of Illinois,’ approved May 13, 1903, in force July 1, 1903, and to repeal all other acts or parts of acts inconsistent therewith.' Section 1 of said act defines motor vehicles, as used in the act, to be ‘automobiles, locomobiles, and all other vehicles propelled otherwise than by muscular power, except motor bicycles, traction engines and road rollers, the cars of electric and steam railways and other motor vehicles running only upon rails or tracks,’ but nothing in the act applies to bicycles or tricycles or other vehicles which are propelled exclusively by muscular pedal power. Section 2 of the act provides that the owner of every motor vehicle which shall be driven in this state, except as otherwise provided in the act, shall, within 10 days after he becomes the owner of such vehicle, file in the office of the Secretary of State a declaration of his name and address, with a brief description of the vehicle to be registered, including the name of the maker, factory, number, style of vehicle, and motor power, on a blank to be prepared and furnished by such Secretary of State for that purpose, and shall pay a fee of $2 for each motor vehicle owned by the person making such declaration. This section provides, also, that the Secretary of State shall on such registration, and without further fee, issue to the owner of such motor vehicle a circular metal seal having stamped thereon the words, ‘Registered Motor Vehicle, No. $05R, Ill.-Motor Vehicle Law,’ on which shall be stamped the number assigned to the vehicle; and the Secretaryof State is required to enter the name of the owner, the number of the vehicle, and a brief description of such vehicle in a book to be kept for such purpose in the office of the Secretary of State. Section 3 requires the owner of the vehicle to have the official number of his vehicle conspicuously displayed upon the front and back of the vehicle at all times when the same is being used upon the public ways of this state. Section 4 relates to the character of lamps and the manner of displaying the same upon such vehicles. Section 5 applies to manufacturers and dealers in motor vehicles, and section 6 prohibits the use of fictitious numbers. Section 7 provides for the re-registration when a motor vehicle is transferred or sold from one person to another other than a dealer. Section 8 exempts nonresident owners of such vehicles, under certain conditions, from the provisions of this act. Section 9 relates to brakes and signal devices required upon such vehicles. Section 10 covers the subject of speed at which such vehicles may be operated in this state. Section 11 prohibits racing such vehicles upon the highways of this state. Section 12 makes it the duty of the owner or driver of such vehicle to bring such vehicle to a stop, when it appears that any horse driven or ridden by any person is about to become frightened, and to cause such vehicle to remain stationary until such horse has passed. Section 13 is as follows: ‘No owner of a motor vehicle who shall have obtained a certificate from the Secretary of State as hereinbefore provided shall be required to obtain any other license or permit to use or operate the same, nor shall such owner be required to display upon his motor vehicle any other number than the number of the registration seal issued by the Secretary of State, or excluded or prohibited from, or limited in the free use of his said motor vehicle or vehicles, nor limited as to speed upon any public street, avenue, road, turnpike, driveway, parkway, or any other public place, at any time when the same is or may hereafter be opened to the use of persons having or using other vehicles, nor be required to comply with other provisions or conditions as to the use of said motor vehicles except as in this act provided: Provided, however, that nothing in this section contained shall be construed to apply to, or include, any speedway created, provided for, or maintained by the local authorities of any city, village, town or other municipal corporation within the state: And provided, further, that the local authorities having jurisdiction over the public parks and boulevards connecting or pertaining to the same shall not by the terms of this act be prohibited from adopting and enforcing such reasonable ordinances, rules or regulations concerning the speed at which motor vehicles may be operated within or upon any such parks, parkways or boulevards, provided the rate of speed of motor vehicles fixed by such ordinances, rules or regulations shall not be lower than the rate fixed for other vehicles and provided such authorities shall, by signs conspicuously placed, indicate the rate of speed permitted by such ordinances, rules or regulations: And provided, further, that motor vehicles may be excluded from any cemetery or grounds used for the burial of the dead, by the authorities having jurisdiction over the same. Except as in this section provided, no city, town or village, or other municipality, shall have...

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