Azar v. Azar

• Decision Date: 04 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 8257,8257
• Citation: 146 N.W.2d 148
• Parties: James J. AZAR, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Betty AZAR, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Page 148

146 N.W.2d 148

James J. AZAR, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Betty AZAR, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 8257.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Nov. 4, 1966.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Extreme cruelty as a ground for divorce is an infliction of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering. Section 14--05--05, N.D.C.C.

2. Whether one party to a divorce action has inflicted grievous mental suffering upon the other is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances in the case.

3. Upon a trial de novo on appeal, the findings of fact of the tral judge are entitled to appreciable weight.

4. When a divorce is granted, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction with regard to the custody, care, education, and welfare of the minor children of the marriage. Section 14--05--22, N.D.C.C.

5. In the matter of awarding custody of the children of the parties to an action for divorce, the trial court is vested with a large discretion, and its discretion will ordinarily not be interfered with except for an abuse thereof.

6. In a divorce proceeding the court shall make such equitable distribution of the real and personal property of the parties as may seem just and proper. Section 14--05--24, N.D.C.C.

Zuger, Zuger & Bucklin, Bismarck, for plaintiff and respondent.

Higgins & Christensen, Bismarck, for defendant and appellant.

TEIGEN, Chief Justice (on reassignment).

This is an appeal from the judgment in a divorce action triable de novo in this Court.

In this case the plaintiff-husband and the defendant-wife each brought an action for divorce on the same day. The husband's complaint was served first, and it was stipulated that the complaint of the wife was to stand as a counterclaim to the husband's complaint. Each party alleged extreme cruelty as a ground for divorce, and each party denied the allegation of cruelty contained in the other's complaint.

This is the second action for divorce by these parties. The first action was brought by the wife as plaintiff. The husband counterclaimed. Each asked for a divorce and custody of the children, alleging extreme cruelty on the part of the other. The first case was tried piecemeal over a period of some 15 months. Judgment was entered August 12, 1959, granting a divorce to the husband, and awarding custody of their two children to an aunt. The wife appealed from the judgment. This Court, on November 27, 1961, held that both parties had established extreme cruelty on the part of the other, and the fact that one party might have been more culpable than the other did not alter the rule that divorce must not be granted where recrimination is established. We reversed judgment granting a divorce, and remanded to the district court with directions to enter a judgment denying a divorce and to hold additional hearings for the purpose of reviewing the questions of custody and allowances in the light of the evidence in the case and the circumstances of the parties at the time of remittitur. Azar v. Azar, N.D., 112 N.W.2d 1. The parties had been separated for four years prior to and during the litigation in that case. However, in the first part of December 1961, the parties reconciled and resumed living together as husband and wife. This continued until June 2, 1964, when the present actions were commenced.

In the present action, after a long trial, the trial court awarded judgment of divorce in favor of the plaintiff-husband on the ground of extreme cruelty. It dismissed the defendant-wife's counterclaim for divorce on the merits with prejudice, and awarded custody of the two minor children to the plaintiff-husband with certain visitation rights granted to the defendant-wife, and provided that she have the temporary custody of the children for a period not to exceed two weeks during the three-month summer vacation period each year, on certain conditions, during which time the plaintiff-husband would pay her $100 per week support money. The defendant-wife was awarded her personal belongings, and was directed to remove them and herself from the home occupied by the parties. The remainder of the property, both real and personal, was awarded to the plaintiff-husband. The judgment further provided that the plaintiff-husband should pay to the defendant-wife the sum of $3,000 for her equitable share in all of the community property, and awarded certain attorney fees and costs in favor of the defendant-wife.

Since the rendition of our first decision (Azar v. Azar, supra,) Section 14--05--15, N.D.C.C., defining recrimination, was repealed by the legislature, and Section 14--05--10, N.D.C.C., which provided that recrimination is a complete defense in an action for divorce, was amended to eliminate therefrom the defense of recrimination. Chapter 127, Session Laws of 1963. It became effective July 1, 1963. This action was commenced on June 2, 1964. The statutory defense of recrimination was no longer available.

We have reviewed all of the evidence submitted in this case pertaining to the conduct of each of the parties toward the other subsequent to July 1, 1963. We find each of the parties has testified to acts and conduct of the other that ordinarily can be said to constitute extreme cruelty and a ground for divorce. This cruelty was both physical and mental, and appears grievous in character. In view of the position taken by each of these parties it is apparent the legitimate objects of marriage have been destroyed. We conclude the interests of the parties, their children, and the public will be best served by granting a divorce to either or both of the parties.

The trial court found that the defendant-wife's attitude and conduct toward the plaintiff-husband were much more serious and substantial than that of the plaintiff. For this reason the trial court granted a divorce to the plaintiff-husband and denied divorce to the defendant-wife.

Whether the acts of one party have inflicted grievous mental or physical suffering upon the other is a question of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances of the case. Facts may justify inferences of suffering, but whether they caused grievous mental or physical suffering is another question. Extreme cruelty as a ground for divorce is an infliction of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering. Section 14--05--05, N.D.C.C. Swanson v. Swanson, 75 N.D. 332, 28 N.W.2d 73.

We have before us a record of sharply conflicting testimony. There are charges and denials, countercharges and denials, with scarcely any corroboration. The questions in issue are of fact in the first instance, with credibility the determining factor. We believe neither party is without fault, but it is difficult from the cold record to say that one was more to blame than the other. Many of the same problems existed after the reconciliation that existed prior to the first trial as reported in the former decision of this Court. The actions of both parties demonstrate emotional instability. Both parties had further psychiatric evaluations and some treatment. The evidence further illustrates the accuracy of the psychiatric evaluations made and reported in the first case. Clearly, the expert opinion has been proved correct. It was as follows:

We believe it is fair to say that, if they remain together, no amount of treatment will enable them to enjoy a relatively peaceful married life, and it is also believed that if they are separated they will continue their contacts and continue their conflict.

Though the case is triable anew in this Court, it is impossible to determine the amount of credence to which the testimony of each witness is entitled on the many disputed questions of fact. We have held that in cases of this kind, although being triable de novo here, that in the presence of a conflict in the testimony we are disposed to give serious consideration to the decision of the trial court (Gray v. Gray, 31 N.D. 618, 154 N.W. 530), and in determining whether or not the evidence establishes that the acts of a party inflicted grievous mental suffering upon the other, the findings of the trial court are entitled to appreciable weight. Swanson v. Swanson, supra; Raszler v. Raszler, N.D., 64 N.W.2d 358; Slade v. Slade, N.D., 122 N.W.2d 160. This Court, in Mahnken v. Mahnken, 9 N.D. 188, p. 191, 82 N.W. 870, p. 872, in regard to whether grievous mental suffering has been inflicted, stated:

But it is very evident that courts here tread upon delicate, and perhaps uncertain, grounds. The differences in mental characteristics are as varied as the differences in facial expression. The effect upon two minds of the same act or language may be entirely different, and the effect upon one may be incomprehensible to the other. It is clear, then, that no standard can be erected, no measurements given, and no criterion established by which to gauge mental suffering.

We find that in no other litigation is the personal presence of the parties in court more important, or the weight and value of the circumstances more vital, than in a divorce proceeding. The trial court in divorce cases where the evidence is conflicting necessarily exercises its judicial discretion to a large extent, and it should not be disturbed on appeal unless such discretion has been clearly abused. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 194(5). For these reasons we accept the trial court's findings on the question of divorce.

The next question pertains to the custody of the children of the marriage. When a divorce is granted, the trial court has continuing jurisdiction with reference to the custody, care, education and welfare of the minor children of the marriage. Section 14--05--22, N.D.C.C.; Bryant v. Bryant, N.D., 102 N.W.2d 800; Eisenbarth v. Eisenbarth, N.D., 91 N.W.2d 186; Olson v. Olson, 77 N.D. 444, 43 N.W.2d 689. In the matter of awarding custody of children in a divorce action, a large discretion is vested in the trial court and its decision will ordinarily be interfered with only where...