Aziyz v. Cameca

• Decision Date: 06 August 2021
• Docket Number: 20-cv-896-wmc
• Citation: Aziyz v. Cameca, 20-cv-896-wmc (W.D. Wis. Aug 06, 2021)
• Parties: NAJIY-ULLAH ‘AZIYZ, Plaintiff, v. CAMECA, a Wisconsin Profit Corporation; STEVEN TURNBULL, individually and in His capacity as a manager; ANNIE STROUD, individually and in her capacity As a manager; and FABRICE LeDUIGOU, individually and in His capacity as a manager, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

NAJIY-ULLAH ‘AZIYZ, Plaintiff, v. CAMECA, a Wisconsin Profit Corporation; STEVEN TURNBULL, individually and in His capacity as a manager; ANNIE STROUD, individually and in her capacity As a manager; and FABRICE LeDUIGOU, individually and in His capacity as a manager, Defendants.

No. 20-cv-896-wmc

United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin

August 6, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. CONLEY District Judge

In this civil action for damages, pro se plaintiff Najiy-Ullah ‘Aziyz, who is black, claims that defendant Cameca, Inc., violated federal antidiscrimination laws, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3)(A) and various state laws by failing to make him a “good faith” offer of employment after discovering that he had an old felony conviction. All defendants have moved for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), contending primarily that none of plaintiff's claims is actionable because, as ‘Azyiz admits in his complaint, Cameca offered him a job and ‘Azyiz rejected it.^[1] (Dkt. #20.) Because the admissions in the amended complaint disprove plaintiff's allegations of unlawful discrimination or violation of his rights under the FCRA, the court will dismiss his federal claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, which will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

ALLEGATIONS OF FACT^[2]

Plaintiff Najiy-Ullah ‘Aziyz, who is black, is a resident of the State of New York. At all relevant times, he was 52 years old. Defendant Cameca is a Wisconsin corporation that supplies scientific instruments. At the relevant times defendant Steven Turnbull was Cameca's Vice President of Human Resources; defendant Annie Stroud was its Human Resource Manager; and defendant Fabrice LeDuigou was its Service Manager.

On July 14, 2020, LeDuigou interviewed ‘Aziyz for a Field Service Engineer job with Cameca. On July 20, Cameca offered ‘Aziyz the position, which would report directly to LeDuigou. That same day, ‘Aziyz accepted the job offer and forwarded a signed copy to defendant Stroud. The parties agreed that ‘Aziyz's first day at Cameca would be Monday, August 10, 2020, and on or about July 27, LeDuigou emailed ‘Aziyz, stating that he was looking forward to him joining the team and informing him that Cameca would be providing him with a cellphone.

Cameca has a policy of considering applicants with a criminal history for employment. It also has a policy of conducting a “7-10 years background check” of its applicants. As part of its hiring process, Cameca hired a third-party vendor, HireRight, to conduct a background check on ‘Aziyz. HireRight finalized its report on July 28 2020. That same day, defendant Stroud sent ‘Aziyz a “welcome aboard” email. Over the next few days, Stroud communicated with ‘Aziyz about tax forms, his upcoming orientation, and mailing his computer and company phone to his home.

On or about August 6, 2020, however, Stroud called ‘Aziyz and told him that, in performing her own background investigation, she discovered that ‘Azyiz had a felony conviction. Stroud told ‘Azyiz that she had shared this information with LeDuigou, who became “upset” that ‘Azyiz had not disclosed this information during the interview process. Stroud told ‘Azyiz that she would have to report the conviction to Cameca's corporate office and rescind the job offer.

So far as it appears, however, Stroud did not have final say over new hires at Cameca. The next day, she called ‘Azyiz and told him that: (1) she was wrong for sharing the information about his conviction with LeDuigou; and (2) Cameca actually wished to proceed with ‘Azyiz's orientation on August 10. Stroud also attempted to set up a conference call with LeDuigou and ‘Azyiz to talk, but the parties were unable to find a time that worked. That same day, defendant Turnbull also called ‘Azyiz, apologized for how things had been handled, and explained how the company had discovered ‘Azyiz's felony conviction. According to Turnbull, after receiving HireRight's background check, Stroud noticed that ‘Azyiz's age and graduation date did not coincide with his work history, so she followed up with LeDuigou to see what he had learned during ‘Azyiz's interview. Turnbull told ‘Azyiz that it was LeDuigou (not Stroud) who then conducted the internet search that led to the discovery of the conviction. Turnbull further admitted during this conversation that Stroud, LeDuigou, and he “acted discriminatory towards Plaintiff based on race and age.” (Am. Cmpt. (dkt. #12) ¶98.) Finally, later that same day, Turnbull emailed ‘Azyiz and said he was looking forward to him starting with Cameca.

The next day, August 8, ‘Azyiz emailed Turnbull and asked (1) how he could “ensure that I will not be targeted by [LeDuigou]” and (2) whether there were any other managers or departments for whom he could work. Turnbull responded the following day, assuring ‘Azyiz that Cameca maintained a fair working environment and LeDuigou had been reminded of and confirmed that he would comply with Cameca's anti-discrimination policies. Turnbull also emphasized that Cameca's “good faith and commitment to the Code of Ethics is evidenced by our decision to move forward to hire you after being informed of your past criminal convictions.” (Id. ¶104.)

On August 10, ‘Azyiz's planned start date, Turnbull again emailed him to ask whether he had received the previous email and intended to report to work that day. ‘Azyiz responded that he did not intend to join Cameca because it had not assured him that he would not be a target of retaliation or that the job offer was in good faith. Cameca then allegedly filled the Field Service Engineer job with someone who was “sufficiently younger” than ‘Azyiz.

‘Azyiz's amended complaint in this case now alleges the following federal claims against Cameca: (1) Disparate Impact Race Discrimination; (2) Disparate Treatment Age Discrimination; and (3) Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. In addition, he purports to allege six more causes of action under Wisconsin common law, invoking the court's supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.^[3] ‘Azyiz further alleges economic, as well as emotional, damages in the form of depression, humiliation, embarrassment, and anger.

OPINION

Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety, arguing that the complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal, plaintiff's pleading must contain allegations that “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

When reviewing whether a complaint adequately states a claim, the court accepts as true all material allegations of the complaint and construes the complaint in favor of the plaintiff. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). However, legal conclusions and conclusory allegations are not entitled to this presumption of truth. McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009). A complaint generally “does not need detailed factual allegations, ” but it “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Even more important here, while a pro se complaint must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), even a pro se plaintiff can plead himself out of court if he pleads facts that preclude relief. See Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2007); McCready v. Ebay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2006).

A plaintiff “pleads himself out of court when it would be necessary to contradict the complaint in order to prevail on the merits.” Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Kolupa v. Roseel, 438 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2006)). Even where the plaintiff voluntarily provides unnecessary facts in the complaint, the defendant may use those facts to demonstrate that he is not entitled to relief. McCready, 453 F.3d at 888; Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 153-54 (7th Cir. 1995). Defendants argue that plaintiff's admission that Cameca offered him a job, after apologizing for its awkward handling of his conviction record, did just that: pleaded his way out of court by showing that he was neither subject to an adverse action nor sustained damages, which are necessary elements of all of his federal claims. Taking each claim in turn, the court agrees for the reasons that follow.

I. Disparate Impact Under Title VII

Title VII prohibits both job-related actions that are motivated by intentional discrimination against employees based on protected employee statuses such as race or sex, as well employment practices that have a disproportionately adverse impact on employees with protected characteristics, even if the impact is unintended. Ernst v. City of Chicago 837 F.3d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff in this case asserts the second type of discrimination -- disparate impact. A plaintiff alleging a disparate impact is “responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988). In addition, in a failure-to-hire case, he must support his claims of racial disparity by including some “basic allegations” showing the racial makeup of the employer's workforce as compared to the...