B.F. v. Reprod. Med. Assocs. of N.Y., LLP
| Decision Date | 14 December 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 127,No. 126,126,127 |
| Citation | 92 N.E.3d 766,69 N.Y.S.3d 543,30 N.Y.3d 608 |
| Parties | B.F., et al., Respondents, v. REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE ASSOCIATES OF NEW YORK, LLP, et al., Appellants. Marie Dennehy, et al., Respondents, v. Alan B. Copperman, M.D., et al., Appellants. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
30 N.Y.3d 608
92 N.E.3d 766
69 N.Y.S.3d 543
B.F., et al., Respondents,
v.
REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE ASSOCIATES OF NEW YORK, LLP, et al., Appellants.
Marie Dennehy, et al., Respondents,
v.
Alan B. Copperman, M.D., et al., Appellants.
No. 126
No. 127
Court of Appeals of New York.
Decided December 14, 2017
Mauro Lilling Naparty LLP, Woodbury (Caryn L. Lilling and Katherine Herr Solomon of counsel), and Peter C. Kopff, LLC, for Reproductive Medicine Associates of New York, LLP, appellant in the first above-entitled action, and for Reproductive Medicine Associates of New York, LLP, and another, appellants in the second above-entitled action.
Ledy-Gurren Bass D'Avanzo & Siff, LLP, New York City (Nancy Ledy-Gurren of counsel), and Aaronson Rappaport Feinstein & Deutsch, LLP, New York City (Elliott J. Zucker of counsel), for Alan B. Copperman, M.D., appellant in the first and second above-entitled actions.
Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, New York City (Wendy R. Fleishman, Rachel J. Geman and Kelly K. McNabb of counsel), for respondents in the first above-entitled action.
Duffy & Duffy, PLLC, Uniondale (James LiCalzi of counsel), and Pollack Pollack Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York City (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for respondents in the second above-entitled action.
OPINION OF THE COURT
DiFIORE, Chief Judge:
In Becker v. Schwartz, this Court recognized a new cause of action permitting parents to recover the extraordinary expenses incurred to care for a disabled infant who, but for a physician's negligent failure to detect or advise on the risks of impairment, would not have been born ( 46 N.Y.2d 401, 410, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 [1978] ). The issue in these related appeals is whether the statute of limitations for such an extraordinary expenses claim runs from the date of the alleged negligence or the date of birth. We hold that it is the latter.
I.
The salient allegations in both cases, which we must assume to be true in light of their procedural posture, are the same. Two couples—the Dennehys and the Farbers—sought in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment from defendant Dr. Alan Copperman at defendant Reproductive Medicine Associates of New York, LLP (RMA). The couple discussed the possibility of using an egg donor. Copperman informed each couple that RMA screened donor candidates for all known genetic conditions for which testing is available, but did not state which conditions were included in the screening. The couple then matched with an anonymous egg donor and, after consenting to the IVF procedure, the plaintiff mother was implanted with fertilized embryos using the donor eggs. Pregnancy was confirmed and the couple was discharged to their obstetrician/gynecologist. Each plaintiff mother later gave birth without complications—the Dennehys had a single infant and the Farbers had twins. Following birth, Copperman learned that the egg donor had tested positive for the fragile X trait, a chromosomal abnormality that can result in intellectual disability and other deficits. He informed the couples within one year of the births, and testing later confirmed that the Dennehys' infant and one of the Farbers' twins had the full fragile X mutation.
The parents commenced separate lawsuits against Copperman and RMA.1 As
relevant here, the complaints allege, in essence, that defendants failed to timely screen the egg donor for the fragile X mutation or to notify plaintiffs that they did not screen for this trait. The parents contend these negligent acts
or omissions caused them to consent to the IVF procedure and go forward with pregnancy, resulting in the parents incurring extraordinary expenses to care for and treat a child with a disability. Defendants moved to dismiss both complaints under CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (a)(7), contending, among other things, that the extraordinary expenses claim is time-barred by CPLR 214–a, which provides that a 2 ½-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims runs from "the act, omission or failure complained of or last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure" ( CPLR 214–a ). Defendants argued that the limitations period runs from the date of the alleged malpractice, which they identified as the date the embryo was implanted in the mother. Plaintiffs opposed the motions to dismiss, contending that the limitations period started on the date of birth. It is undisputed that if the statute of limitations runs from the date of malpractice, even assuming the continuous treatment toll extended the date to plaintiffs' discharge to their obstetrician/gynecologist, the cause of action would be time-barred.
In each case, Supreme Court, among other things, denied the motion to dismiss with respect to the extraordinary expenses claim. The court held that the statute of limitations began to run upon the infant's birth, which rendered both actions timely. The Appellate Division affirmed, insofar as relevant here ( 136 A.D.3d 73, 22 N.Y.S.3d 190 [1st Dept.2015] ; 134 A.D.3d 543, 20 N.Y.S.3d 885 [1st Dept.2015] ), and thereafter granted defendants leave to appeal, certifying the question whether the orders were properly made.2 We now affirm.
II.
In negligence cases, the statute of limitations generally begins to run when a cause of action accrues (see Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175, 501 N.Y.S.2d 313, 492 N.E.2d 386 [1986] ). Absent legislative action to the contrary, courts have authority to determine when a common-law cause of action accrues (see Fleishman v. Lilly & Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 891–892, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853, 467 N.E.2d 517 [1984] ; see e.g. Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 84 N.Y.2d 535, 541–542, 620 N.Y.S.2d 318, 644 N.E.2d 1009 [1994] ).
In 1978, this Court recognized a new, narrow cause of action permitting parents to recover the extraordinary care and treatment
expenses "accruing as a consequence of the birth" of a child with a disability ( Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 ). This claim, "founded essentially upon a theory of negligence or medical malpractice," requires "a duty flowing from defendants to [plaintiffs] and that the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the birth of their infants" ( 46 N.Y.2d at 412, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 ). The claim is restricted to those instances in which the plaintiffs can demonstrate "that but for the defendants' breach of their duty to advise plaintiffs, the latter would not have
been required to assume these [extraordinary financial] obligations" ( 46 N.Y.2d at 412–413, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 ). In other words, parents bringing this type of action may seek to recover only" ‘the increased financial obligation arising from the extraordinary medical treatment rendered the child during minority’ " ( Foote v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 16 N.Y.3d 211, 215, 919 N.Y.S.2d 472, 944 N.E.2d 1111 [2011], quoting Bani–Esraili v. Lerman, 69 N.Y.2d 807, 808, 513 N.Y.S.2d 382, 505 N.E.2d 947 [1987] ). No recovery is allowed for any consequent psychic or emotional damages ( 46 N.Y.2d at 413, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 ), nor may parents recover the ordinary costs of raising a healthy child born by reason of so-called wrongful conception (see O'Toole v. Greenberg, 64 N.Y.2d 427, 432, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143, 477 N.E.2d 445 [1985] ). The extraordinary expenses claim belongs to the parents alone—the child cannot bring a claim for "wrongful life" (see Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 411, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 ). This is because, as a matter of public policy, an infant born in an impaired state suffers no legally cognizable injury in being born compared to not having been born at all ( id. ).
The question now before this Court is when this "extraordinary expenses" cause of action accrues—and consequently, when the statute of limitations begins to run.3 Defendants argue that the date of malpractice controls while plaintiffs contend that the cause of action accrues upon the date of birth.4 The parties agree that the cause of action is governed by the
2 ½-year statute of limitations applicable to medical malpractice actions. Due to its unique features, we conclude that the cause of action accrues upon, and hence the limitations period runs from, the birth of the child.
A claim accrues "when all of the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred so that the party would be entitled to obtain relief" ( Aetna, 67...
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