B.G. v. Raton Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 08 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1:14-CV-01047-RB/LF,1:14-CV-01047-RB/LF
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico
• Parties: B.G., a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, L.G. and J.A., a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, S.A., Plaintiffs, v. RATON BOARD OF EDUCATION, DAVID WILLDEN, in his individual and official capacities, PAUL MALANO, in his individual and official capacities, GILBERT SAN ROMAN, in this individual capacity, ALBERT ORTIZ, in his individual capacity, and JUSTIN MALANO, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

B.G., a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, L.G. and J.A., a minor,by and through his parent and next friend, S.A., Plaintiffs, v. RATON BOARD OF EDUCATION,DAVID WILLDEN, in his individual and official capacities,PAUL MALANO, in his individual and official capacities,GILBERT SAN ROMAN, in this individual capacity,ALBERT ORTIZ, in his individual capacity,and JUSTIN MALANO, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

No. 1:14-CV-01047-RB/LF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

September 8, 2016

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment filed on July 5, 2016 (Doc. 133). Jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

On June 8, 2016, the Court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88. (See Doc. 131.) Having dismissed Plaintiffs' federal claims, the Court declined to exercise pendant jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state claims and dismissed them without prejudice. (See id. at 25.) Plaintiffs now move the Court to amend its judgment, and in support thereof allege the Court erred in not automatically granting them the opportunity to present countervailing evidence after Defendants filed their supplemental reply, by relying on evidence viewed in a light most favorable to Defendants, and in misapprehending either Plaintiffs' position or the controlling law with respect to Plaintiffs' Title IX claims. (See Doc. 133, at 1-2.) Having considered the submissions of counsel and relevant law, the Court will DENY the motion.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Plaintiffs B.G., by and through his next friend L.G., and J.A., by and through his next friend S.A., (collectively "Plaintiffs") sued the Raton Board of Education (Board), former Superintendent David Willden, Assistant Superintendent Paul Malano, Coach Gilbert San Roman, Assistant Coach Albert Ortiz, and Spanish teacher and track coach Justin Malano. (Doc. 1; see also Doc. 33 (Am. Compl.).) Plaintiffs allege claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88, and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, §§ 41-4-5 and 41-4-6. (Am. Compl.) Defendants moved for summary judgment on J.A.'s claims and to dismiss the rest of the amended complaint. (Docs. 97, 96.) Plaintiffs responded with a request that the Court convert Defendants' motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 114 at 3.)

The Court provided formal notice that it would convert Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to a motion for summary judgment and gave Defendants 15 days to file a supplemental reply. (Doc. 127.) The Court did not automatically grant Plaintiffs the opportunity to respond to Defendants' supplemental brief, nor did it foreclose it. (See id.) Defendants filed their supplemental reply on June 1, 2016. (Doc. 128.)

Plaintiffs never sought an opportunity to respond after Defendants filed their supplemental reply, either by motion or during the June 3, 2016 telephonic pretrial conference. (See Doc. 130.) On June 8, 2016, the Court granted both Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff J.A. (Doc. 96) and Defendants' converted motion for summary judgment (Doc. 97) as to the first, second, and third causes of action in the Amended Complaint. (See Doc. 133.) The Courtdismissed Plaintiffs' fourth and fifth causes of action (the pendant state claims) without prejudice. (See id. at 125.)

The Court provided a summary of the pertinent facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs in its original Memorandum Opinion and Order and incorporates those facts herein. (See Doc. 131, at 2-11.) Plaintiffs submitted approximately 42 more pages of documents as exhibits with their current motion. (See Docs. 133, 134-1 through -8.) Out of an abundance of caution (see Section III(A) infra), the Court will supplement its original statement of the facts as necessary throughout the body of this opinion. The Court will view all facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs.

II. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Standard

A motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to "rule 59(e) is an 'inappropriate vehicle[] to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court when the motion merely advances new arguments, or supporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion.'" Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 58 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1218 (D.N.M. 2014) (quoting Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000)). "Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Id. (quoting Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012 (internal citation omitted)). "Thus, a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law." Id. (quoting Servants of Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012). "A district court has considerable discretion in ruling on a motion to reconsider under rule 59(e)." Id. (citing Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997)).

B. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it may influence the determination of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is genuine if a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for either party. Id. To apply this standard, courts "examine the record and all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Gross v. Hale-Halsell Co., 554 F.3d 870, 875 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation and internal citations omitted). In cases where the moving party will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the movant bears the initial responsibility of identifying "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If shown, the burden shifts to the non-movant. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991). "[T]he nonmovant must make a showing that, 'if reduced to admissible evidence,' would be sufficient to carry the nonmovant's burden of proof at trial." Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1526 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327).

III. Analysis

Plaintiffs allege three points of error with the Court's June 8, 2016 opinion: (1) "Plaintiffs were not provided a full and fair opportunity to meet Defendants' allegations with countervailing evidence and support"; (2) "The Court's determination that Defendants[] did not violate Plaintiffs' rights erroneously relies on facts viewed in the light most favorable to Defendants . . . and demonstrates a misapprehension of the facts"; and (3) "Under its Title IX analysis, the Court's reliance on the reasonableness of the Board's actions to address the harm it knew Plaintiffs sufferedis a misapprehension of controlling law or of Plaintiffs' position that alternative theories of Title IX liability apply." (Doc. 133 at 5-23.) The Court will address Plaintiffs' arguments in order.

A. The Court will consider Plaintiffs' new arguments and evidence.

"A court must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment if 'matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,' and 'all parties . . . [must be] given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.'" Sawyer v. USAA Ins. Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1132 (D.N.M. 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). "A party is considered to have adequate notice that a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) has been converted to a motion for summary judgment when that party is the one whose submission of documents outside of the pleadings triggered the conversion." Id. "Normally, notice and opportunity to present material must be given of such a conversion." Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). "If 'the non-moving party is the party introducing the additional material and the Court is nonetheless granting summary judgment to the moving party . . . notice is not necessary.'" Id. (quoting Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, No. CIV 07-0633, 2008 WL 5992270, at *20 n. 7 (D.N.M. Oct. 17, 2008) (rev'd on other grounds, 596 F.3d 708 (10th Cir. 2010); citing Burnham v. Humphrey Hosp. Reit Trust, Inc., 403 F.3d 709, 713-714 (10th Cir. 2005) ("noting that a plaintiff is not prejudiced when a defendant's motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment, when the plaintiff's 'opposition to the motion to dismiss first introduced affidavits containing facts beyond those in the complaint'")).

In Burnham, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff "introduced affidavits containing facts beyond those in the complaint" in her response. 403 F.3d at 714 (citation omitted). The defendants then attached affidavits to their reply brief only "to counter those of the plaintiff. Id. (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit held that because the plaintiff "had theopportunity to introduce evidence that was not contained in the complaint," she "was not prejudiced by converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment[,]" even though the court gave no notice of the conversion. Id. at 713-14 (citing Lamb v. Rizzo, 391 F.3d 1133, 1136 n.3 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted)).

The facts in Burnham are analogous to those here: Plaintiffs submitted matters outside of the pleadings with their response to Defendants' motion to dismiss and asked the Court to convert the motion to one for summary judgment. (See Doc. 114 at...