B.J.M. v. B.S. (In re R.B.F.S.)

Decision Date03 May 2012
Docket NumberNo. 20080231–CA.,20080231–CA.
Citation278 P.3d 143,2012 UT App 132
PartiesIn the Matter of R.B.F.S., A.M.F.S., R.E.F.S., and O.J.F.S., minor children. B.J.M. and A.F.M., Petitioners and Appellees, v. B.S., Respondent and Appellant.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joshua F. King, Kaysville, for Appellant.

Randy S. Ludlow, David J. Hardy, and Larry S. Jenkins, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.

Before Judges McHUGH, DAVIS, and THORNE.

OPINION

McHUGH, Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 This case is before us on remand from the Utah Supreme Court with instructions to address any remaining issues. See In re Adoption of R.B.F.S. ( R.B.F.S. II), 2011 UT 46, ¶ 22, 258 P.3d 583. We decide those issues now and affirm the trial court's decision enforcing B.S.'s (Father) voluntary relinquishment of his parental rights.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The background to this case is provided in-depth in our prior opinion, In re R.B.F.S. ( R.B.F.S. I), 2009 UT App 223, 218 P.3d 908, and in the supreme court's opinion, R.B.F.S. II, 2011 UT 46, 258 P.3d 583. Accordingly, we do not restate the facts in detail here.

¶ 3 Father and A.F.M. (Mother) are the parents of four minor children (the Children). The parents divorced in August 2005. One month later, Father executed a relinquishment of his parental rights (the Relinquishment) in the presence of a notary public. As part of the Relinquishment, Father “waive[d] any and all rights [he] ha[d] in relation to the children.” He also consented to the adoption of the Children at some future time and to the permanent termination of his parental rights. On the same date, the parties entered into a stipulation (the Stipulation) to modify their divorce decree, which incorporated the Relinquishment by reference. As part of the Stipulation, Father consented to the adoption of the Children by Mother's future spouse, even though a spouse had not yet been identified. Nonetheless, Father agreed to continue paying child support and medical expenses until the future adoption by Mother's yet-to-be-identified husband was finalized.

¶ 4 In October 2005, Mother filed the Stipulation, incorporating the Relinquishment, with the trial court. Judge Sandra N. Peuler rejected it on two grounds: first, because “a relinquishment of parental rights” in the trial court is enforceable only in conjunction with an adoption petition, and, second, because no stepfather had resided with the Children for at least one year as required to finalize an adoption under Utah Code section 78B–6–135(7)(b). After Judge Peuler declined to enforce the Stipulation, it is undisputed that Father had substantial involvement with the Children and continued to exercise visitation until his rights were eventually terminated.

¶ 5 On April 30, 2007, Mother and her new husband (Stepfather) filed a petition to determine parental rights and a proposed order to terminate Father's parental rights based on the Relinquishment. Stepfather filed a separate adoption petition on the same day. Because Judge Peuler was not available at the time, Judge Robert K. Hilder signed the order terminating Father's parental rights based on the Relinquishment. Mother and Stepfather did not notify Father of these proceedings, and he therefore did not have an opportunity to be heard before Judge Hilder executed the order.

¶ 6 When Father subsequently learned that the trial court had enforced the Relinquishment, he wrote a letter to Judge Hilder objecting to the decision. Judge Hilder treated Father's letter as a motion to reconsider and notified Father, Mother, and Stepfather of his intent to entertain further argument on the matter. After extensive briefing and argument, Judge Hilder denied the motion to reconsider. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court's ruling on the ground that the petition to terminate Father's parental rights was not filed with a facially valid adoption petition as required by Utah Code section 78B–6–112, and we therefore remanded the case to the trial court. See R.B.F.S. I, 2009 UT App 223, ¶ 12, 218 P.3d 908;see alsoUtah Code Ann. § 78B–6–112 (2008) (permitting an adoption petition to be filed separately in the trial court, so long as the termination is “for the purpose of facilitating the adoption of the children”). In particular, we determined that the trial court would have subject matter jurisdiction to terminate Father's parental rights only if there was good cause to grant the adoption, despite the fact that Stepfather had not resided with the Children for a year. See R.B.F.S. I, 2009 UT App 223, ¶¶ 10–12, 218 P.3d 908 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B–6–135(7)(b) (allowing a stepparent to adopt before residing with the children for a year upon a showing of good cause)). Therefore, we remanded the matter to the trial court to resolve the factual issues related to that court's subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 7 Mother appealed and the supreme court reversed our decision, holding that the requirements of section 78B–6–135(7)(b) are not jurisdictional and, therefore, need not be satisfied before the termination of the biological father's parental rights. See R.B.F.S. II, 2011 UT 46, ¶ 22, 258 P.3d 583. As instructed by the supreme court, we now address the remaining issues that Father raised in his initial appeal. See id.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 8 First, Father contends that Judge Hilder's ruling terminating his parental rights improperly overruled the decision of Judge Peuler in violation of the law of the case doctrine. Our review of this issue is composed of two parts: Initially, we determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion in revisiting a matter previously decided by another judge. See In re E.H., 2006 UT 36, ¶ 32, 137 P.3d 809. We then review the substance of the second judge's decision, which in this case is an issue of law that we review for correctness. See id.

¶ 9 Second, Father claims that the trial court erroneously precluded him from testifying regarding the Children's best interests because he has inchoate rights that survived the relinquishment of his parental rights. Questions of standing are primarily questions of law that we review for correctness. See Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ¶ 14, 216 P.3d 944. However, we do not give advisory opinions; an issue must be ripe before we will consider it on appeal. See Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 93, 269 P.3d 141.

¶ 10 Third, Father contends that the trial court erred by looking solely to the plain language of Utah Code section 78B–6–126 in determining that the statute applied to both married fathers and unmarried fathers. Father also contends that the trial court erred in concluding that a “best interests of the child” analysis was not required under the Utah Adoption Act (the Adoption Act) before his parental rights could be terminated. SeeUtah Code Ann. §§ 78B–6–101 to –145 (2008) (current version at id. (2008); id. (Supp. 2011)).1 Issues of “statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review for correctness.” See In re Adoption of B.W.G., 2007 UT App 278, ¶ 4, 167 P.3d 1099.

¶ 11 Finally, Father contends that enforcement of the Relinquishment was barred by the doctrines of equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, waiver, and laches. These equitable claims present mixed questions of fact and law. See Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App 315, ¶ 11, 222 P.3d 69,aff'd,2012 UT 14, 274 P.3d 911. We review the trial court's factual findings under a clear error standard “but review its legal conclusions for correctness.” 2Id.

ANALYSIS
I. Law of the Case

¶ 12 Father contends that the law of the case doctrine prohibited Judge Hilder from terminating his parental rights because Judge Peuler had already ruled on the validity of the Relinquishment by declining to enforce the Stipulation. However, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the [l]aw of the case does not prohibit a district court judge from revisiting a previously decided issue during the course of a case, regardless of whether the judge has changed or remained the same throughout the proceedings.” See Mid–America Pipeline Co. v. Four–Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ¶ 11, 216 P.3d 352. This is true even when a second judge has taken over the case because “the two judges, while different persons, constitute a single judicial office.” PC Crane Serv., LLC v. McQueen Masonry, Inc., 2012 UT App 61, ¶ 43, 273 P.3d 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, ‘the doctrine allows a court to decline to revisit issues within the same case once the court has ruled on them.’ Mid–America Pipeline Co., 2009 UT 43, ¶ 11, 216 P.3d 352 (quoting IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 26, 196 P.3d 588). This rule

tracks with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that prior to final judgment, “any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims ... is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”

Id. ¶ 12 (omission in original) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)). Accordingly, Judge Hilder was free to revisit the validity of the Relinquishment and Stipulation even though both were previously decided by Judge Peuler.

II. Father's Right to Testify as to the Children's Best Interests

¶ 13 Father next argues that he retained inchoate rights in the Children that would allow him to testify as to their best interests at the adoption proceeding. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78B–6–137 (requiring that prior to the final decree of adoption the trial court must be “satisfied that the interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption”); Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a) (providing that a party may intervene as of right “when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately...

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