B.A.L. v. Edna Gladney Home

• Decision Date: 11 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 2-84-111-CV,2-84-111-CV
• Citation: 677 S.W.2d 826
• Parties: B.A.L., Appellant, v. The EDNA GLADNEY HOME, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 826

677 S.W.2d 826

B.A.L., Appellant, v.The EDNA GLADNEY HOME, Appellee.

No. 2-84-111-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Fort Worth.

Oct. 11, 1984.

Michael W. Berg, Fort Worth, for appellant.

Wynn, Brown, Mack, Renfro & Thompson, and William M. Schur, Fort Worth, for appellee.

Before FENDER, C.J., and HUGHES and JORDAN, JJ.

OPINION

JORDAN, Justice.

In this termination of parental rights case, the appeal is by the mother of a child born out of wedlock at The Edna Gladney Home in Fort Worth on February 10, 1984.Suit was filed by the Home on February 13, 1984 to terminate the parental rights of B.A.L., mother of the child, and those rights were terminated by the trial court on February 22, 1984, after the mother had executed an affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights before two witnesses and a notary public on February 14, 1984.Motion for new trial was filed by appellant on March 9, 1984, amended on March 23, 1984, and heard by the trial court for two full days beginning April 16, 1984.On April 19, 1984, the court overruled the amended motion for new trial and appellant now complains by eleven points of error of the action of the trial court in terminating her parental rights and in overruling her amended motion for new trial.The hearing on the amended motion for new trial was to the court alone and no findings of fact or conclusions of law were either requested or filed.

The natural father of the child signed a waiver or disclaimer of any interest in or rights to the child, which waiver was filed with the court on February 21, 1984, before the mother's parental rights were terminated.He is not involved in this appeal.

We affirm.

B.A.L., a nineteen-year-old girl from New York, pregnant and unmarried, after first considering then rejecting plans for an abortion, was referred to The Edna Gladney Home by a referral organization known as Birth Right.She left her family home in New York without disclosing to her mother or two sisters, or anyone else in her family, the fact that she was pregnant and entered The Edna Gladney Home on November 8, 1983.She resided there, with her pre-natal care and all her living expenses paid for by the Home until her baby girl was born February 10, 1984.She was counselled and assisted by social workers at The Edna Gladney Home.Although B.A.L. testified at the hearing on the amended motion for new trial that the emphasis was on adoption while she resided at the Home and now claims on appeal that she was overreached and unduly influenced, there was considerable testimony that all her options were explained to her and she was given the clear choice of either keeping her baby or having it placed for adoption by the Home.The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, accepted the testimony that she had a clear choice.

None of B.A.L.'s immediate family knew of her condition until February 8, 1984, when her mother received a letter from her advising her of her situation.On February 9she talked to her sister Lucille and her mother, both of whom assured her of their support and her entire family's support.Another sister, Maria, was not advised of her pregnancy at that time.At all times after these several telephone conversations, appellant knew that she would have her family's support if she wanted to raise the baby and not have it placed for adoption.

After the birth of the baby on February 10, 1984, the mother, on February 14, executed the affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights, before two witnesses and a notary public, Elaine Brown, an employee of the Home.The relinquishment affidavit, which B.A.L. admitted she read and understood, stated, among other things, that she felt it was in the child's best interest that it be placed for adoption, and she could not meet the child's physical and emotional needs as a parent.The relinquishment affidavit also contained this language typed in bold, capitalized letters:

I REALIZE THAT I SHOULD NOT SIGN THIS AFFIDAVIT UNTIL I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD EACH WORD, SENTENCE, AND PARAGRAPH IN IT.I REALIZE THAT I SHOULD NOT SIGN THIS AFFIDAVIT OF RELINQUISHMENT IF THERE IS ANY THOUGHT IN MY MIND THAT I MIGHT SOME DAY SEEK TO ESTABLISH OR REESTABLISH ANY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILD.

She admitted at the hearing on the motion for new trial that she knew at the time she signed the affidavit that if she entertained any thoughts at all about keeping her baby and raising it she should not sign that affidavit, and that "once I signed, that was it".

She also testified at the hearing that when she signed the relinquishment affidavit, she believed it was best for her and for her baby to sign it and give the baby up for adoption, and before she signed the affidavit she never told her caseworker or anyone else at the Home that she was considering keeping the baby.

Appellant's primary attack on the judgment of the trial court, contained in her first four points of error, is that the trial court erred in overruling her amended motion for new trial because the evidence"raised fact questions" for the trier of fact with respect to The Edna Gladney Home's use of undue influence over her in "their methods of granting her aid,""in the way of bringing up expenses,""in taking advantage of her youth and emotional distress," and by overreaching appellant by requiring her to sign the relinquishment affidavit four days after the birth of her child.These contentions are not only rather vaguely stated but the arguments in the brief are cloudy and unclear.

Even if appellant is correct in her assertion that the evidence raised fact questions on the issue of undue influence and overreaching, those fact questions were decided against her by the trial judge sitting as the trier of facts.

Appellant seems to argue that because the Home aided and abetted her by furnishing medical care and financial support for living expenses and because she was young, alone, pregnant and emotionally distraught that there "is a possibility of undue influence," and that the Home "overreached" her by having her sign the relinquishment affidavit four days after the birth of the child.

In answering the argument of appellant as to undue influence and overreaching, we must decide from the evidence in the record of the hearing on the motion for new trial if there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court and its implied findings of fact in support thereof.In a trial to the court where no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed or requested, the judgment of the trial court implies all necessary findings of fact in support thereof.Burnett v. Motyka, 610 S.W.2d 735, 736(Tex.1980).

Where the implied findings of fact are supported by the evidence, it is the duty of the appellate court to uphold the judgment on any theory of law applicable to the case.Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 358(Tex.1977);Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791(Tex.App.--Fort Worth1982), rev'd on other grounds, 656 S.W.2d 902(Tex.1983).This is so regardless of whether the trial court articulates the correct legal reason for the judgment.Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, 84(1939);Rheiner v. Varner, 627 S.W.2d 459, 462(Tex.App.--Tyler 1981, no writ).

These implied findings may be challenged by "no evidence" and "insufficient evidence" points and when so challenged, the standard of review to be applied by this court is the same as that to be applied in the review of jury findings or a trial court's findings of fact.Appellant here does not challenge the trial court's judgment on either of these points; she simply says there was evidence to support findings of undue influence and overreaching.She says "if there is the slightest possibility of undue influence the court must order a new trial."This is just not the law.

The question of whether there is sufficient evidence in this case to support the judgment of the trial court must be based on whether that evidence is "clear and convincing".It has been held that a judgment to terminate involuntarily a person's parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence and not on the Family Code standard of preponderance of the evidence applicable to custody cases.Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1391-92, 71 L.Ed.2d 599(1982);Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497, (1984); In Interest of G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846(Tex.1980).

In support of her contention that she was unduly influenced by The Edna Gladney Home at the time she signed the relinquishment affidavit, B.A.L. cites Methodist Mission Home v. N....A....B...., 451 S.W.2d 539(Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1970, no writ), which affirmed a jury finding in the trial court that the execution of the relinquishment affidavit by the appellee in that case was unduly influenced by the placement agency.However, in Methodist Mission Home, the parent, according to the evidence, had been subjected to an intensive five-day period of campaigning designed to persuade her to give up her child.We do not have that situation in this case.Id. at 540.

The court in Methodist Mission Home, said that what constitutes "undue influence" depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case viewed in the light of applicable...