B.T.B. v. V.T.B. (In re Interest of B.T.B.)
| Decision Date | 22 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 20180805,20180805 |
| Citation | 472 P.3d 827 |
| Parties | In the INTEREST OF B.T.B. and B.Z.B., children under 18 years of age. B.T.B. and B.Z.B, with J.P.B, Petitioner and Cross-Appellees, v. V.T.B., Respondent and Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Attorneys:2
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian ad Litem for B.T.B. and B.Z.B., petitioners and cross-appellees
LaMar J. Winward, St. George, for joinder J.P.B., petitioner and cross-appellee
J. Robert Latham, St. George, for V.T.B., respondent and cross-appellant
INTRODUCTION
¶1 The mother (Mother) of two children, B.T.B. and B.Z.B., asked the juvenile court to terminate the parental rights of the children's biological father (Father). To resolve the petition, the juvenile court followed the statutory framework the Legislature created to decide when the power of the State can be used to sever the legal bond between parent and child.
¶2 The Termination of Parental Rights Act (Act) first requires that a juvenile court find, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of several specifically listed grounds for termination is present. See UTAH CODE § 78A-6-506, -507. The juvenile court here found multiple grounds, including that Father had abandoned and neglected his children. The juvenile court then, in compliance with the statutory framework, concluded that terminating Father's parental rights was in B.T.B.’s and B.Z.B.’s best interest.
¶3 The juvenile court next addressed a relatively new addition to the statutory scheme: a legislative mandate that termination occur only when it is "strictly necessary" to terminate parental rights. See UTAH CODE § 78A-6-507(1). The juvenile court rejected Father's argument that termination can only be strictly necessary when it is prelude to an adoption. And it found that termination was strictly necessary because Father's inconsistent presence in the lives of the children "will continue to damage" them.
¶4 Father appealed that ruling to the court of appeals, arguing that the juvenile court had not properly interpreted the termination statute. In Interest of B.T.B. , 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 1, 436 P.3d 206. The court of appeals clarified the analysis the juvenile court should have employed and remanded to the juvenile court to re-examine the question under the clarified analysis. Id. ¶ 63.
¶5 The children's guardian ad litem (GAL) petitioned us to review the court of appeals’ decision, arguing that the court of appeals misinterpreted the statute. The GAL also contends that the court of appeals improperly overruled a line of its cases that stood for the proposition that once statutory grounds for termination are found, it follows "almost automatically" that termination is in a child's best interest. Father cross-petitioned, complaining that the court of appeals had misinterpreted the strictly necessary requirement. We granted both petitions.
¶6 We reject the GAL's argument that the court of appeals inappropriately clarified its case law. And we largely agree with the court of appeals’ statutory analysis. But we add our own observations about the statute and take the opportunity to clarify a couple of points in response to concerns the GAL and the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) (which we invited to file an amicus brief) have raised about how the court of appeals opinion might be interpreted. Ultimately, we affirm the court of appeals’ decision to remand to the juvenile court so it may re-examine the termination petition in light of the clarified standard.
¶7 Mother and Father are the parents of B.T.B. and B.Z.B. The couple married in 2010, separated in 2012, and divorced the following year. Since that time, Father has been repeatedly incarcerated. Between June 2012 and the 2017 termination petition, Father visited his children only a handful of times. Although Father's incarceration explains some of that absence, Father never wrote or otherwise attempted to contact his children from prison. Except for a single occasion when he attempted to give Mother $400 cash, Father has not paid child support.
¶8 In 2017, Mother petitioned the juvenile court to terminate Father's parental rights. The Office of Guardian ad Litem represented the children's interests in the termination proceedings.
¶9 After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court found that Mother had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned the children, had made only token efforts to support or communicate with the children, had neglected the children, and was an unfit parent. In addition, the court found that it was in the children's best interest for Father's parental rights to be terminated. The juvenile court took note of the requirement that the termination be "strictly necessary" and found that it was strictly necessary to terminate Father's parental rights because Father's "inconsistent parent time, and expectations of the [children] that accompany it, will continue to damage" the children. The court then terminated Father's parental rights in B.T.B. and B.Z.B.
¶10 Father appealed the termination order, arguing that the juvenile court misapplied the Act's strictly necessary requirement. In Interest of B.T.B. , 2018 UT App 157, ¶ 1, 436 P.3d 206. Specifically, Father argued that by adding that language, the Legislature introduced a third element into the termination inquiry, such that the juvenile court needed to find: (1) that termination was strictly necessary; (2) that grounds for termination existed; and (3) that termination was in the child's best interest. Id. ¶ 33. Father also contended that termination can only be strictly necessary when the juvenile court is considering an adoption or similar change in the child's permanent living situation. Id. ¶ 56.
¶11 The court of appeals rejected Father's contentions. Id. ¶¶ 33, 46, 50, 56. It opined that a court should consider whether termination is strictly necessary as part of its analysis into the child's best interest. Id. ¶ 50. And it concluded that termination would be strictly necessary when it was "absolutely essential to the child's best interest that a parent's rights be permanently severed." Id. ¶ 54.
¶12 After soliciting supplemental briefing on the subject, the court of appeals took the opportunity to disavow its case law to the extent it suggested that when statutory grounds for termination are present, it follows "almost automatically" that termination will be in a child's best interest (the almost automatically cases). Id . ¶ 44. The court of appeals reasoned that this case law muddled the important distinction between the statutory grounds for termination and the court's examination into what outcome would promote a child's best interest. See id. ¶ 23. The court of appeals opined that the almost automatically cases were irreconcilable with the legislative mandate that a court examine whether termination is "strictly necessary." Id. ¶¶ 32, 37.
¶13 The court of appeals demonstrated that its concern about the almost automatically cases was more than an academic frolic. It noted that in at least two instances, court of appeals panels had relied on the almost automatically line of reasoning to hold that a respondent —meaning the parent whose rights were to be terminated—had failed to show why termination was not in the best interest of the child once the court had determined that a ground for termination existed. Id. ¶¶ 24 –31 The B.T.B. court reasoned that this had effectively, and improperly, flipped the burden from the petitioner to the respondent. Id. ¶ 31.
¶14 The court of appeals then construed the balance of Father's arguments as a challenge to the juvenile court's best interest determination. Id. ¶ 59. The court of appeals reasoned that it had "clarified and reformulated" the analytical framework to comport with the statute and explained that the strictly necessary inquiry was part of the best interest analysis. Id. Because of this, "Father's arguments regarding ‘strictly necessary,’ " were really "a challenge to the juvenile court's conclusion that termination of his rights was in the Children's best interests." Id. And it remanded the case back to the juvenile court so that court could examine the question with the benefit of the clarified test. Id. ¶ 63.
¶15 The GAL, as well as Father, asked this court to review the court of appeals’ decision. We granted the cross-petitions for writ of certiorari on the following questions:
¶16 We invited amicus curiae briefs from DCFS and the Parental Defense Alliance of Utah.4
¶17 "On certiorari, we review for correctness the decision of the court of appeals ...." Pulham v. Kirsling , 2019 UT 18, ¶ 18, 443 P.3d 1217 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶18 Before we discuss the parties’...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- State v. Garcia-Lorenzo
-
State v. A. G. (In re A.G.)
...one of which merely noted, "the clear and convincing standard might be constitutionally mandated" at disposition. See B.T.B. v. V.T.B., 472 P.3d 827, 838 n.11 (Utah 2020) (emphasis added). The dissent also quotes a South Dakota Supreme Court decision, which misquoted a United States Supreme......
-
State ex rel. K.Y. v. State
... 523 P.3d 1159 STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF K.Y., S.Y., and M.Y., Persons Under Eighteen Years of Age. C.Y., ... ...
-
State v. Garcia-Lorenzo
...its own precedent, and we have done so on rare occasions. See, e.g., In re B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157, ¶¶ 39-44, 436 P.3d 206, aff'd, 2020 UT 60, 472 P.3d 827; State Legg, 2016 UT App 168, ¶¶ 26-42, 380 P.3d 360, aff'd, 2018 UT 12, 417 P.3d 592. But we do not do so lightly, and we recognize th......
-
SUPPLEMENTING SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING.
...Dep't of Corr. Sec'y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1278 (11th Cir. 2020) ("[O]ur first obligation--our oath--is to get the law right."); In re B.T.B., 472 P.3d 827, 835 (Utah 2020) ("When interpreting a statute, a court is not bound to rely only on information the parties provide. Stated differently, the......