A.B. v. Hous. Auth. of South Bend

• Decision Date: 08 September 2011
• Docket Number: 3:11 CV 163 PPS
• Parties: A.B., a child by his next friend, Linda Kehoe, Plaintiff, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH BEND, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

A.B., a child by his next friend, Linda Kehoe, Plaintiff, v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH BEND, Defendant.

3:11 CV 163 PPS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ENTERED: September 8, 2011

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff A.B., a minor, brought this action through his next friend, Linda Kehoe, against the Housing Authority of South Bend ("HASB") alleging that A.B. and his mother were wrongfully evicted from public housing owned by HASB. A.B. asserts claims under the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Indiana state law. Before the Court is HASB's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. [DE 15.] For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED, though I will grant A.B. leave to replead.

BACKGROUND

I start with the facts alleged in the Complaint, which at this point I must accept as true. A.B. is a minor who lived with his mother, Autumn Oliver, in public housing owned by HASB. HASB is a public housing authority that administers the public housing program for low-income residents in South Bend, Indiana. On February 28, 2011, Oliver was arrested by South Bend police near her residence and was charged with possession of cocaine and resisting lawenforcement officers. Less than a month later, HASB sent Oliver a "Notice to Terminate Lease." The Notice stated that HASB was terminating Oliver's rental lease because of her February arrest, and she was given 30 days to vacate the property. The Notice informed Oliver that she did not qualify for a pre-termination hearing because of the nature of her arrest. The Notice was signed by four of the seven HASB commissioners. On April 13, 2011, Oliver pled guilty to possession of cocaine and resisting law enforcement.

Then on April 19, 2011 - after receiving the Notice but before Oliver and A.B. were forced to vacate - A.B. filed this action through his grandmother and next friend, Linda Kehoe. The Complaint asserts that, while HASB regarded or treated Oliver as a drug abuser, she does not use drugs and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program. Based on this, the Complaint alleges that the eviction violates the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana Code § 34-17-1-1. A.B., as a person associated with his mother, seeks monetary damages, a declaratory judgment, and preliminary and permanent injunctions, among other relief.

Oliver and A.B. continued to reside in their HASB administered housing after the deadline to vacate the premises ran, which was April 22, 2011. So, on April 28, 2011, HASB filed a complaint in St. Joseph, Indiana Superior Court Small Claims Division against Oliver seeking enforcement of the eviction and immediate possession of the rental unit. The state court scheduled an immediate possession hearing for June 24, 2011. In response to HASB's state court complaint, A.B. sought an order from this Court enjoining HASB from pursing the eviction in state court. After holding a hearing on the matter, I denied the motion. Days later, the statecourt granted HASB immediate possession of Oliver and A.B.'s rental unit.

While the motion for a preliminary injunction was pending, HASB filed this motion to dismiss. In this motion, HASB argues that this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over A.B.'s claims, and, in any event, the Complaint fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

DISCUSSION

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

First, HASB argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because A.B.'s claims in this Court arise out of the Indiana state court's final judgment granting HASB immediate possession of Oliver's rental unit. As a result, HASB believes that jurisdiction is foreclosed by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

I disagree. True enough, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes individuals from seeking review of state court judgments in federal district court. Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 1996). But the Seventh Circuit has described it as an "extremely limited" doctrine, applying to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). So the doctrine only applies where "the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended" Id. at 591 (emphasis in original). That's not the case here - A.B. brought the federal action before the state court proceedings even began. So the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive this court ofjurisdiction.¹

II. Failure to State a Claim

Next, HASB argues that A.B.'s Complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). As an initial matter, A.B. argues that this motion should be converted into a motion for summary judgment because HASB incorporated documents that are outside the pleadings from its motion for preliminary injunction into its motion to dismiss. Indeed, with a few exceptions, I may only consider the allegations raised in the complaint on a motion to dismiss. LaPorte Savings Bank v. Schmidt, 2011 WL 2516536, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 23, 2011). So when a defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion presents matters outside the pleadings, I may either exclude the matters outside the pleadings or convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

Here, I have not relied on any of the evidence that HASB attached to its motion for preliminary injunction in deciding this motion. And A.B. specifically does not argue that the exhibits HASB attached to its motion to dismiss are impermissible. Indeed, while I am taking judicial notice of two documents that HASB attached to its motion to dismiss - Oliver's guilty plea and the Indiana state court's order granting HASB immediate possession - I may take judicial notice of public records without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summaryjudgment.² Gen. Electric Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Sledge v. Bellwood School Dist. 88, 2010 WL 1579920, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2010) (taking judicial notice of state court orders and filings); Stewart v. Anderson, 2000 WL 1741885, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2000) (taking judicial notice of guilty plea). As a result, I do not need to convert this into a motion for summary judgment.

Turning to the merits. The minimum requirements for pleading a claim for relief are contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. That rule requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. But to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombley, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). And although at this stage I must accept all allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the complainant's favor, I don't need to accept threadbare legal conclusions supported by mere conclusory statements. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. So, under Iqbal, I must first identify allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth by, for example, disregarding legal conclusions. Id. at 1951. Then I must look at the remaining allegations to determine whether they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. Determining whether acomplaint states a plausible claim for relief requires me to draw on my judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 1950.

A. FHA, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act

First, A.B. asserts that HASB violated the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act because it evicted Oliver on the basis of her disability and failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. All three of these statutes prohibit a public entity from: intentionally discriminating on the basis of an individual's disability, or disparate treatment; failing to provide reasonable accommodations to a disabled individual; and enacting a rule that has a discriminatory effect on the disabled, or disparate impact. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (FHA); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Rehabilitation Act); Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 784 (7th Cir. 2009); Wisconsin Comm. Servics. Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737, 746-54 (7th Cir. 2006). Because, for the purpose of this motion, the standards for these claims under the three statutes are essentially the same, I analyze the statutes together. See Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, 810-11 (7th Cir. 2005); Dadian v. Village of Wilmette, 269 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2001).

HASB first argues that A.B. failed to allege that Oliver is disabled - an element of disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, and disparate impact claims. An individual is disabled under the ADA, FHA, and the Rehabilitation Act where she has: 1) a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, 2) a record of such an impairment, or 3)is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)³; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1); 29 U.S.C. § 705(9). HASB argues that A.B. fails to properly allege that Oliver is disabled because, while the complaint asserts that Oliver is no longer a drug user, it does not state she's a drug addict.

I disagree. As an initial matter, HASB does not argue that drug addiction is not a disability under the statutes; so for...