Baaske v. City of Rolling Meadows

• Decision Date: 26 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01 C 8306.,01 C 8306.
• Parties: John A. BAASKE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ROLLING MEADOWS and Chief Philip Burns, City of Rolling Meadows Fire Department, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

191 F.Supp.2d 1009

John A. BAASKE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ROLLING MEADOWS and Chief Philip Burns, City of Rolling Meadows Fire Department, Defendants.

No. 01 C 8306.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

March 26, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Phillip S. Wood, Wood & Johnson, P.C., Aurora, for Plaintiff/Counter-defendants.

Richard T. Ryan, Mark F. Smolens, Richard L. Jones, Ryan, Smolens & Jones, Chicago, for Defendant/Counter-claimant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALESIA, District Judge.

Before the court are: (1) a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)"), filed by defendant City of Rolling Meadows ("the City"); (2) the City's request for attorney's fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 ("Rule 11") and 42 U.S.C. § 12205; (3) a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), filed by defendant Philip Burns ("Burns"), the Fire Chief of Rolling Meadows; and (4) Burns's request for attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 11 and 42 U.S.C. § 12205. For the following reasons, the court (1) grants the City's motion to dismiss, (2) denies the City's request for attorney's fees, (3) denies Burns's motion to dismiss as moot, and (4) denies Burns's request for attorney's fees.

I. BACKGROUND

In August and September 2000, the City renovated one of its firehouses. Plaintiff John Baaske ("Baaske") has filed this lawsuit, alleging that the firehouse renovation did not conform with the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.. Baaske claims that he brings this action as "an individual who has reasonable grounds to believe that a class of disabled individuals has been and will be denied access to a public building and public accommodations and public events and activities." (Compl. ¶ 6.) He purports to bring this case on behalf of a class of individuals with disabilities. However, Baaske's complaint does not allege that he is disabled.

Baaske brings this case against both the City and Burns. Each defendant has filed a motion to dismiss this case. The City raises two arguments in support of its motion to dismiss: (1) Title III of the ADA does not apply to local governments and other public entities and (2) Baaske does not have standing to bring a claim under Title II of the ADA. Burns moves to dismiss Baaske's claims against him on the grounds that those claims are redundant, as claims filed against a municipal officer in his official capacity. Additionally, both defendants ask the court to award them attorneys' fees. First, the court will address the City's motion to dismiss. Second, the court will consider Burns's motion to dismiss. Third, the court will discuss the defendants' claims for attorneys' fees.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard for Deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

In ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Szumny v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 246 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir.2001). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is not to decide the merits of the challenged claims but to test the sufficiency of the complaint. Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 n. 1 (7th Cir.1996). A court will grant a motion to dismiss only if it is impossible for the plaintiff to prevail under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations. Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir.2000).

B. The City's Motion to Dismiss

Before evaluating the merits of the City's motion to dismiss, the court must determine which title of the ADA gives rise to Baaske's claims. The ADA is separated into three titles, each of which prohibits disability discrimination in a different context: Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-17, applies to discrimination in employment; Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65, applies to discrimination in public services; and Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 applies to discrimination in public accommodations. Baaske makes no allegation regarding discrimination in employment and alleges that the City's renovation violates 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182, 12183 and 12188. (Compl.¶ 5.) Therefore, the court's analysis will focus upon Title II and Title III. The City raises two arguments in support of its motion to dismiss: (1) Title III of the ADA does not apply to local governments and other public entities and (2) Baaske does not have standing to bring a claim under Title II of the ADA.

1. Baaske's Title III Claims

The City argues that the court should dismiss Baaske's Title III claims against the City because Title III does not apply to municipalities and other public entities. Baaske does not oppose the City's argument.

Title III prohibits owners and operators of public accommodations from discriminating against persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). A "public accommodation," under Title III is a private entity whose operations affect commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). A private entity is any entity other than a public entity, as defined by Title II. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6). Title II's definition of public entity includes both state and local governments as well as their departments and agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 12131. With this statutory language in mind, the court must determine whether Baaske may bring a Title III claim against the City. Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has directly resolved this issue; therefore, this case appears to be one of first impression in this circuit. However, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have ruled on the issue and the court will look to the reasonings of those decisions for guidance in this case.

In Bloom v. Bexar County, the Fifth Circuit held that the ADA does not apply to public entities, including local governments. 130 F.3d 722, 726 (5th Cir.1997). The Fifth Circuit emphasized the statutory language of the ADA and concluded that because Title III applies only to public accommodations, which are private entities, the public entity defendant could not be held liable under Title III. Id. at 726. The Eighth and Sixth Circuits have reached the same conclusion. See DeBord v. Bd. of Educ., 126 F.3d 1102, 1106 (8th Cir.1997) ("Title III of the ADA applies to private entities providing public accommodations, however, not to public entities.... Entities subject to Title III include private schools, but not public ones."); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1036 (6th Cir.1995) ("Public accommodations are operated by private entities, not public entities.... Public school grounds and public parks are of course operated by public entities, and thus cannot constitute public accommodations under Title III.") (emphasis in original).

The court agrees with the reasoning of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits and concludes that Title III of the ADA does not apply to public entities. Therefore, Baaske cannot bring a claim against the City under Title III and his claims in this case that rely upon Title III must be dismissed. See Block v. Rockford Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 01 C 50133, 2001 WL 1195757, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Oct.20, 2001) (applying the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' decisions in concluding that Title III does not apply to public entities). Having concluded that Baaske cannot succeed on claims brought under Title III, the court must now determine whether Baaske can state a claim under Title II of the ADA.

2. Baaske's Standing to Raise Title II Claims

The City argues that Baaske does not have standing to bring this case. Baaske argues that he has standing to bring this case on behalf of the disabled because (1) he is a person "who has reasonable grounds for believing that [a disabled] person is about to be subjected to discrimination" and therefore has standing under 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Second Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. at 3.) and (2) the letter that he received from the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice grants him standing in this case. The court will address each of the City's arguments in turn and then turn to Baaske's arguments.

The standing inquiry focuses upon whether a particular litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute and involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 739 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). In this case, the court will explore both whether Baaske has constitutional standing to bring this case as well as whether any prudential limitations prevent him from asserting his claims. First, the court will determine whether Baaske satisfies the constitutional standing requirements. Second, the court will decide two issues that will determine whether prudential limitations prevent Baaske from having standing in this case: (1) whether Baaske's claims fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the ADA and (2) whether Baaske satisfies the requirements for third party standing.

a. Constitutional Standing

For a plaintiff to satisfy the standing requirements of Article III of the Constitution, he must allege: (1) a personal injury, (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and (3) which is likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Johnson v. Allsteel, Inc., 259 F.3d 885, 887 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). The personal injury must be an actual or imminent injury that is concrete and particularized. Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir.2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). This means that mere indignation does not suffice to establish standing. United States v. 5 S 351 Tuthill Rd., 233 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000).

In ...