Babbitt v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co.

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: STONE
• Citation: Babbitt v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 285 Ill. 267, 120 N.E. 803 (Ill. 1918)
• Decision Date: 05 December 1918
• Docket Number: No. 12099.,12099.
• Parties: BABBITT et al. v. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RY. CO.

285 Ill. 267

120 N.E. 803

BABBITT et al.

v.GRAND TRUNK WESTERN RY. CO.

No. 12099.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 21, 1918.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 5, 1918.

Error to First Branch Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Municipal Court of Chicago; John R. Newcomer, Judge.

Action by E. M. Babbitt and others against the Grand Trunk Western Railway Company. From judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District, which affirmed, and defendant brings certiorari. Judgment of the Appellate Court affirmed.

Kretzinger, Kretzinger & Smith, of Chicago (L. L. Smith, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Stewart Reed Brown, of Chicago, for defendants in error.

STONE, J.

This is an action on a breach of contract for loss of goods in an interstate commerce transaction. Defendants in error sold a carload of beans to the A. J. Thompson Company, of Kansas City, Mo., for a specified price of $1,683.15, to be paid for on arrival of the shipment at Evansville, Ind. Plaintiff in error issued a bill of lading ‘to order of A. J. Thompson & Co., destination Evansville, Ind., notify Ragon Bros.’ The beans were on May 3, 1912, loaded and shipped from Millett, Mich., and arrived at destination May 6, 1912. This bill of lading, with sight draft attached, was deposited by defendants in error with the Exchange Bank of Haslett, Mich., and by it forwarded to Kansas City and presented to the A. J. Thompson Company for collection. The draft was not honored and for that reason returned to the defendants in error unpaid. When the beans arrived at destination they were by the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company, the delivering carrier, upon the written order of the A. J. Thompson Company, delivered to Ragon Bros. without the surrender of the bill of lading. Ragon Bros. paid the A. J. Thompson Company for the beans.

This action was brought in the municipal court of Chicago against the Grand Trunk Railway System and the receivers of the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company for the wrongful delivery of the beans. Upon leave of court the name of the defendant the Grand Trunk Railway System was changed to the Grand Trunk Western Railway Company and the cause of action dismissed as to the receivers of the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company. The affidavit of merits was amended, so as to apply to the Grand Trunk Company alone. Thereupon the case was tried by the court without a jury. The original bill of lading was introduced in evidence by the plaintiffs and due proof made of the value of the beans and their delivery to Ragon Bros. without the bill of lading, upon the specific order, in writing, from the A. J. Thompson Company, and also that plaintiffs had not been paid for the beans. The defendant introduced no evidence at the trial. At the close of all of the evidence for the plaintiffs the defendant moved the court to make a finding and enter judgment in its favor, which motion was by the court denied, and exceptions were preserved. No other motion or proposition of law was submitted to the trial court by either party. The court found for the plaintiffs and against the defendant in the sum of $1,683.15, overruled a motion for new trial, and entered judgment on this finding. From that judgment plaintiff in error appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District. The Appellate Court held that under the pleadings there was but one question raised on appeal, and that is whether plaintiffs made a prima facie case on the issues of fact raised by the pleadings. That court found that a prima facie case had been made, and affirmed the judgment of the municipal court. The case comes to this court on writ of certiorari.

The first question presented by the record is that of jurisdiction of this court. On the trial in the municipal court no question was raised as to the admission or exclusion of evidence, and no written propositions of law were submitted to the court to be held as law. The defendants in error contend that the question attempted to be raised here-i. e., that under the evidence the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover-is a question of fact, upon which, under the statute, the judgment of the Appellate Court is final. This court has frequently held that, when no question of law is presented for our consideration, the judgment of the Appellate Court will have to be affirmed. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Ottawa, 165 Ill. 207, 46 N. E. 213, and cases therein cited. While on the trial the plaintiff in error offered no evidence nor propositions of law, it did at the close of the plaintiffs' case enter a motion that the court find the issues for the defendant. The question now presented here by such motion is whether or not it preserves a question of law that may be reviewed here. This court has held that it cannot review the evidence for the purpose of determining whether it sustains the findings of the Appellate Court; but when the question is properly raised and preserved in the trial court whether there is evidence tending to prove plaintiff's cause of action, the ruling may be examined by this court as presenting a question of law. Rigdon v. More, 226 Ill. 382, 80 N. E. 901. Whether the evidence proves the issues may be a question of law. Cothran v. Ellis, 125 Ill. 496, 16 N. E. 646. When there is no controversy as to the facts, whether these facts sustain the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defense is a question of law. Launtz v. People, 113 Ill. 137, 55 Am. Rep. 405. ‘Whether or not the record contains any evidence tending to establish a fact is a question of law, and which we must decide.’ Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Scammon, 126 Ill. 355, 18 N. E. 562,9 Am. St. Rep. 607. Where there is no controversy as to the facts, and the only question is what judgment shall be entered on the facts in the record, such question is one of law, and may be raised and preserved for review here in one of three ways: By demurrerto the evidence, by propositions to be held as law, or by a motion to find for the party. Conway v. Garden City Paying Co. 190 Ill. 89, 60 N. E. 82;Smith v. Billings, 169 Ill. 294, 48 N. E. 683. Had the plaintiff in error presented no motion, proposition, or demurrer to the evidence, but contented itself with an appeal from the judgment of the trial court, the questions preserved in the record would have been of fact merely, of which this court could have taken no jurisdiction; but, a motion to find for the defendant having been entered and denied in the trial court, a question of law has been properly presented and preserved for review here.

Plaintiff in error contends, first, that upon delivery of the beans to the plaintiff in error for shipment under this bill of lading the title to the property passed from the defendants in error, the consignor, to and became vested in the consignee, and the carrier had a legal right to deliver the same on the consignee's order without demanding the bill of lading; second, that the provision of the bill of lading, ‘the surrender of this original bill of lading, properly indorsed, shall be required before the delivery of the property,’ is for the benefit of the carrier, only, and as between the carrier and consignor the carrier is not subject to liability for failure to require the production of the bill of lading before making delivery of the goods; and, third, that the evidence does not show that the defendants in error complied with the provisions of the bill of lading requiring notice of claim to be filed within four months, as set forth in paragraph 3 of section 3 of the bill of lading.

Plaintiff in error in support of its first contention cites Hutchinson on Carriers, § 181, Halliday v. Hamilton, 11 Wall. 560, 20 L. Ed. 214, and United States v. Andrews & Co., 207 U. S. 229, 28 Sup. Ct. 100, 52 L. Ed. 185. There is no doubt but that prior to the act of Congress of June 29, 1906, known as the Carmack Amendment to section 20 of the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, as amended by section 7 of the Hepburn Act (34 U. S. Stat. at Large, 595, c. 3591 [U. S. Comp. St. 1916, §§ 8604a, 8604aa]), the rule in such cases was:

‘That as a general rule the delivery of goods by a consignor to a commoncarrier for account of a consignee has effect as delivery to such consignee.’ United States v. Andrews & Co., supra.

The Carmack Amendment provides:

‘That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state shall issue a recipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage or injury to such property caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass,’ etc. U. S. Comp. St. 1916, § 8604a.

Prior to the passage of this amendment the law relating to the carrier's liability in interstate shipments of property was enforced according to the view of the forum where the case arose. The federal courts based their rules on the general common law, while a majority of the state courts determined the rights of the parties either according to public policy or the statutes of the state where the case was tried. Some states allowed carriers to exempt themselves from common-law liability, in whole or in part, by contract or regulation. Federal courts sitting in the various states followed the rule of the state in which they were sitting, with the result that liability was found by the federal court sitting in one state, while on the same state of facts such court sitting in another state found the carrier exempt. Neither uniformity of obligation nor of liability was possible. This diversity of legislative and judicial attitude toward the subject rendered uncertain, and, in fact, well-nigh impossible, the business of a...