Baca v. City of Parkville

• Decision Date: 10 May 2022
• Docket Number: 5:19-cv-06057-RK
• Parties: THERESA BACA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PARKVILLE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

THERESA BACA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PARKVILLE, Defendant.

No. 5:19-cv-06057-RK

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri

May 10, 2022

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 96.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 99 101.) After careful consideration and for the reasons below Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED, and this case is remanded to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

I. Background and Procedural Posture

Initially filed in the Circuit Court of Platte County, Missouri, this civil lawsuit was removed to federal court on April 30, 2019, based on federal question jurisdiction, in part established by Plaintiff's claims against Defendant City of Parkville^[1] under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Plaintiff was pulled over by an officer with the Parkville Police Department for a traffic violation. During the traffic stop, police discovered Plaintiff had an active arrest warrant out of a nearby local jurisdiction. The officers physically struggled to take Plaintiff into custody and Plaintiff was ultimately arrested, charged, and prosecuted for resisting arrest. As a result, Plaintiff spent two days in the Platte County Detention Center and she ultimately pleaded guilty to a lesser charge. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 57, 59, 131.) Specifically, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to littering and was assessed a $400 fine. (Doc. 96-1.)^[2] Plaintiff now seeks relief under § 1983 against Defendant pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Initially, Plaintiff asserted claims of excessive force and wrongful arrest/prosecution under § 1983 and reasonable accommodation and unlawful arrest claims under the ADA. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to Plaintiff's ADA claims as well as Plaintiff's Monell claim under § 1983 for excessive force and wrongful arrest. (See generally Doc. 94.) At the same time, however, the Court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Monell claim under § 1983 for wrongful prosecution, rejecting Defendant's sole argument on summary judgment that the city prosecutor was not a final decisionmaker to support Monell liability. (Id. at 15-16.)

Trial in this matter is scheduled to be held July 11, 2022. (Doc. 100.) With the exception of deadlines associated with the trial date (including those tied to the initial and final pretrial conference), all other deadlines have expired, and no further extensions have been sought by either party. Defendant now argues the Court should dismiss the sole remaining claim under § 1983 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)) or to grant judgment on the pleadings (Rule 12(c)) in favor of Defendant. (Doc. 96.) Plaintiff argues Defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (c) should not be considered because it is untimely under the scheduling order and Defendant is not otherwise entitled to relief. (Doc. 99.)

II. Discussion

It is axiomatic that “[a]ny party or the court may, at any time, raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” GMA Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Allen v. United States, 590 F.3d 541, 544 (8th Cir. 2009) (even considering a lack-of-jurisdiction challenge raised for the first time on appeal); Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. ICM Controls Corp., No. 11-569 (JNE/TNL), 2014 WL 5106739, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. Oct. 10, 2014) (rejecting as without merit motion to strike as untimely opposing party's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time) (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (other citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Court first considers Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

Where, as here, a defendant attacks the sufficiency of the complaint on its face to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the Court accepts as true all facts alleged in the complaint and determines whether those facts support federal subject matter jurisdiction. Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2016). When faced with a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenge, “the non-moving party receives the same protections it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6), ” and the complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief.” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 725 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Here, Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a civil remedy when a “person . . . under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]”

“In order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction, the pleading must, on its face, state a cognizable claim for relief. In a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must be able to point to a specific, articulable constitutional right that is transgressed.” Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1978); see McKenzie v. City of White Hall, 112 F.3d 313, 316 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing “Jurisdiction is based on the complaint's allegations. If the [plaintiffs]' complaint stated a claim on its face, it alleged a valid § 1983 action and successfully invoked the district court's jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted).

As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[d]ismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)) (other citation omitted); accord N.W. S.D. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1986) (“A non-frivolous claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute is sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction.”); Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005) (“If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate.”) (citation omitted); cf. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 431 (2002) (although there remained an “open question” whether the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) provides a basis for § 1983 claim, the Supreme Court otherwise had subject matter jurisdiction “because [plaintiff]'s federal claim is not so ‘completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy'”) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that the city prosecutor “knew that Plaintiff's conduct was an involuntary reaction” and therefore “could not have constituted resisting arrest” and “[d]espite knowing that Plaintiff had not resisted arrest, Defendant[] prosecuted Plaintiff for resisting arrest, ” invoking the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. 1-1 at 14-15.) As a result of this unconstitutional prosecution, Plaintiff alleges, she was “forced to make the choice of either going to trial on the resisting arrest charge [that was “never dropped”] or pleading guilty to a lesser charge, ” and ultimately “opted to plead guilty to the lesser charge [of littering].” (Id. at ¶¶ 58-59.) Defendant argues the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because (1) wrongful prosecution is not a cognizable claim under § 1983, and (2) Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is otherwise barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

A. Whether Plaintiff's wrongful prosecution claim is cognizable under § 1983

First, Defendant argues Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts to support subject matter jurisdiction since Plaintiff's claim for “wrongful prosecution” is not cognizable under § 1983. In support of this argument, Defendant primarily relies on an Eighth Circuit case, Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001). In Kurtz, the Eighth Circuit held:

Section 1983 only provides a remedy for violations of rights expressly secured by federal statutes or the Constitution. The Constitution does not mention malicious prosecution nor do plaintiffs cite a basis for a federal action for malicious prosecution. Moreover, this court has uniformly held that malicious prosecution by itself is not punishable under § 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury. Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 1990). Thus, plaintiffs' allegation of malicious prosecution cannot sustain a civil rights claim under § 1983. Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th Cir. 1993).

Id. at 758.

Despite Defendant's suggestion to the contrary, a close reading of Kurtz reveals the Eighth Circuit did not foreclose completely a § 1983 claim based upon malicious or wrongful (i.e., unconstitutional) prosecution. See Robinson v. Norling, 25 F.4th 1061, 1063 (8th Cir. 2022) (affirming dismissal of malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983 where ...