Bachman v. Swan Harbour Associates

• Decision Date: 18 October 2002
• Docket Number: Docket No. 228841.
• Citation: 252 Mich. App. 400,653 N.W.2d 415
• Parties: Ronald BACHMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SWAN HARBOUR ASSOCIATES, Swan Harbour Apartments, II, Huntington Management, and Dawn R. Combs, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

653 N.W.2d 415

252 Mich. App. 400

Ronald BACHMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SWAN HARBOUR ASSOCIATES, Swan Harbour Apartments, II, Huntington Management, and Dawn R. Combs, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 228841.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 10, 2002, at Detroit.

Decided August 9, 2002, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication October 18, 2002.

O'Reilly, Rancilio, Nitz, Andrews, Turnbull & Scott, P.C. (by John E.F. Gerlach), Sterling Heights, for the plaintiff.

Cardelli, Hebert & Lanfear P.C. (by Deborah A. Hebert), Royal Oak, for the defendants.

Before: WHITBECK, C.J., and FITZGERALD and MARKEY, JJ.

MARKEY, J.

In this appeal involving the interpretation and application of the housing accommodations provisions of the Michigan Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA),¹ M.C.L. § 37.1101 et seq., defendants Swan Harbour Associates, Swan Harbour Apartments, II, Huntington Management, and Dawn R. Combs appeal by right the trial court's order of judgment entered in accordance with the jury's award of over $3.8 million to plaintiff Ronald Bachman. In this case, we must decide, among other issues, the scope of the legal duty imposed on apartment owners to accommodate tenants with disabilities after leasing an apartment to them. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant Swan Harbour Associates owns and operates Swan Harbour Apartments in Northville Township, a complex of eighteen buildings with over 260 apartments. Defendant Huntington Management manages the apartments, and defendant Dawn Combs was the residential manager who handled daily operations at Swan Harbour Apartments from October 1996 through December 1998. Plaintiff was born with a disease that required amputation of both his legs at the age of four. For most of plaintiff's adult life, he has moved around by walking on his hands rather than by using prostheses. In February 1988, plaintiff and his daughter moved into a non-barrier-free apartment at Swan Harbour Apartments.² In 1995, after plaintiff injured his back in an accident, he began to rely on a motorized scooter for mobility rather than walking on his hands. At that time, plaintiff also obtained a handicapped-equipped van with an extending ramp to accommodate his scooter.

It appears from the record that plaintiff resided at Swan Harbour Apartments from 1988 until 1995 without any major incidents or complaints. Shortly after plaintiff moved into his apartment in 1988, Swan Harbour installed ramps from the parking lot to the sidewalk and over the steps leading into plaintiff's apartment building so that plaintiff could gain access to his apartment. When plaintiff obtained his handicapped-equipped van in 1995, he leased an additional parking space from a fellow tenant in order to accommodate the side ramp on his van. In 1996, when the tenant reclaimed her parking spot, plaintiff submitted a written request to Swan Harbour for an additional parking space to accommodate his van. There is no dispute between the parties that the additional parking space was provided within a reasonable time at no extra fee to plaintiff.

In 1997, Swan Harbour began a sidewalk replacement project that placed several cutaways into the curbs to provide individuals with disabilities points of access from the parking lot onto the sidewalk. Upon completion of the project, access to the apartment building in which plaintiff lived was attainable by three cutaways, one close to plaintiff's assigned parking spaces and two less conveniently located for his use. According to plaintiff, although he experienced some access problems before the new sidewalks and cutaways were installed, gaining access to his apartment became much more difficult after the installation of the sidewalks because no handicapped signs and blue paint existed to inform people of the cutaways and plaintiff's parking spaces. Plaintiff testified that tenants and visitors began parking either too close to his parking spaces or in front of the curb cutaway so that his access was blocked to the cutaway closest to his parking spaces.

In June or July 1997, plaintiff made oral requests to employees at Swan Harbour Apartments that signs and blue paint be displayed at both the cutaway area and his parking spaces to remedy his access problems. According to plaintiff, the apartment management refused his oral requests,³ and defendant Dawn Combs told plaintiff, "I don't know who you people think you are but you are not going to get any special treatment here."⁴ The apartment management advised plaintiff to put his requests in writing. In July and August of 1997, plaintiff failed to pay his rent, so Swan Harbour filed a complaint for a judgment of possession for nonpayment of rent. Plaintiff made only a partial payment of the rent just before the hearing, so a judgment for possession was subsequently entered. Plaintiff was allowed ten days to pay any overdue rent, and plaintiff timely satisfied the balance of the judgment.

In October 1997, plaintiff wrote a letter to Swan Harbour informing its management of the parking problems and that his health conditions⁵ required him to have uninterrupted access to his apartment. In the letter, plaintiff requested that his carports be marked handicapped and that a sign be posted at the cutaway nearest his carports instructing people not to block that area. It appears that the letter contained no specific request for blue paint. Plaintiff also requested that his patio be made accessible so that he would be able to leave on his scooter out the patio door in case of a fire or other emergency. After submitting his letter, plaintiff filed a complaint on or about October 31, 1997, with Northville Township regarding the placement of the signs.⁶ Although plaintiff claims that the township ordinance officer who inspected the site determined that a handicapped sign was required by law, testimony presented at trial conflicted with this determination. At trial, because the township ordinance officer who inspected the site was then deceased, the chief building official from Northville Township testified. He stated that neither handicapped signs nor blue paint were required at private covered parking spaces like plaintiff's or at a curb cutaway.

In any event, on November 20, 1997, defendants installed the signs at plaintiff's carports and at the cutaway as plaintiff requested. At trial, plaintiff testified that "[n]inety-nine point nine percent" of his parking problems were resolved once the signs were installed. Regarding the blue paint issue, it appears from the record that although plaintiff orally requested blue paint, he may have never specifically requested this in writing. One of the owners of defendant Huntington Management testified that she is responsible for authorizing blue paint requests and that she did not become aware of plaintiff's blue paint request until about six months to a year before the trial commenced in April 2000. In October 1999, defendants painted plaintiff's parking spaces with blue paint.

With respect to plaintiff's October 1997 written request for a rear patio ramp, it appears that defendants responded within about a month and built a wooden ramp at a cost of about $100⁷ to accommodate plaintiff. However, plaintiff considered the ramp to be inadequate. Moreover, the ramp initially did not work because it was too wide to fit through the patio door. Although there is some dispute regarding when defendants knew that the ramp did not work because of its width, the ramp was not fixed until more than a year after it was first delivered to plaintiff. The ramp was designed so that plaintiff was required to bend over while seated on his scooter, locate a string, and pull a portion of the ramp into the apartment through a patio door. The ramp also was adequate for emergency use only and was not designed so that plaintiff could regularly use his patio.

In July 1998, plaintiff filed this lawsuit, claiming that defendants deprived him of his civil right to housing by refusing to accommodate his disability and by discriminating and retaliating against him for having sought accommodations. Specifically, plaintiff's complaint alleged, among other things, that defendants (1) failed or refused to accommodate his parking needs when they delayed the installation of handicapped parking signs in his parking area and when they refused to paint his parking area blue, (2) failed or refused to provide a rear patio ramp to accommodate plaintiff's need to have an alternative exit from the apartment in the event of fire or other hazard, (3) failed to remove snow and ice from the sidewalk within a reasonable amount of time thereby requiring plaintiff to remove the snow and ice with his hands and arms so that he could return to his apartment,⁸ (4) actively discriminated against plaintiff by making a reference to "you people,"⁹ and (5) retaliated against plaintiff for requesting the above accommodations by obtaining a judgment against him for nonpayment of rent,¹⁰ by assessing a $50 furniture moving fee,¹¹ and by failing to give him adequate notice of a government inspection of plaintiff's apartment.¹²

Plaintiff also sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from further retaliation and discrimination and to order defendants to promptly remove any snow and ice from plaintiff's sidewalk area. The court entered the temporary restraining order, and after an evidentiary hearing, the court opined that plaintiff was entitled to reasonable accommodations under the PWDCRA. The court was convinced that discrimination and retaliation had occurred and that defendants had failed to provide reasonable accommodations as requested with respect to the removal of snow and ice and the rear patio ramp leading from plaintiff's apartment. The court subsequently entered a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to refrain from attempting to constructively evict p...