Bachowski v. Brennan
Citation | 405 F. Supp. 1227 |
Decision Date | 19 December 1975 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 73-0954. |
Parties | Walter BACHOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. Peter BRENNAN, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, and United Steelworkers of America, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Kenneth Y. Jablonski, Washington, Pa., for plaintiff.
James D. English, Pittsburgh, Pa., Beate Bloch, Associate Sol., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C., Stephen Ernst, Philadelphia, Pa., Robert Weinberg, Bredhoff, Cushman, Gottesman & Cohen, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Washington, D. C., for defendants.
In response to revelations regarding unsavory practices in the management of labor unions, Congress enacted the "Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959",1 commonly known as LMRDA or the Landrum-Griffin Act, to purify the process of collective bargaining by ensuring that unions were genuinely representative of the interests of their membership, and not exploited for the private advantage of corrupt labor tycoons. The original bill dealing with this subject was introduced on January 20, 1959, by Senator John F. Kennedy to "protect workers, employers, honest unions, and the general public from the unscrupulous or dictatorial tactics of the few rackateers."2 Even in this first draft of the legislation there was contained a provision practically identical with Section 402 as enacted (29 U.S.C.A. § 482) providing for enforcement of the statutory provisions to ensure honest democratic elections by means of a suit brought by the Secretary of Labor, and a new election under his supervision if violations are proved.3
The House passed a bill authorizing suit by individual union members rather than by the Secretary.4 In conference the Senate version was accepted.5
Section 402 of Title IV of the Act (73 Stat. 534, 29 U.S.C.A. § 482) provides:
Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court interpreting the Act established that the remedy of suit by the Secretary is exclusive with respect to claims of violation after an election has been held, and that individual union members have no standing to sue in their own right.7 They may intervene in a suit brought by the Secretary but may not expand the scope of the issues involved by introducing new questions.8 Apparently the Secretary himself may broaden the issues if his investigation unearths additional violations.9
With these principles in mind, this Court summarily dismissed plaintiff's instant suit to compel the Secretary to bring an action which the Secretary had decided, after complaint and investigation, not to bring.
This Court was convinced that it had no more business to order the Secretary to file suit than it had to order Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski to indict Richard Milhous Nixon for Watergate transgressions, or to direct President Ford whether he should or should not appoint a particular individual as a Justice of the Supreme Court to fill a vacancy on that tribunal.
The subsequent course of the litigation (in which this Court's decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals,10 and the Court of Appeals decision was reversed by the Supreme Court)11 disclosed that this simple-minded12 view was too simplistic.
The Court of Appeals relied chiefly on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),13 a legislative landmark enacted in 1946 after much endeavor on the part of the American Bar Association, to allay the spectre of "the rise of administrative absolutism" which haunted Dean Roscoe Pound during the later years of his life.14
Section 10(a) of the APA provided that "Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion . . . any person . . . adversely affected . . . by agency action . . . shall be entitled to judicial review thereof."15 Section 10(c) proclaimed that "every final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial review."16 The scope of such review is specified in Section 10(e).17
"Agency" is defined as "each authority . . . of the Government of the United States other than Congress, the courts, or the governments of the possessions, Territories, or the District of Columbia."18
No doubt the Secretary of Labor's decision not to bring suit to seek a new union election was an act done by authority of the United States government; and one that adversely affected the members who hoped for better results if a new election were held. But there remained the question whether the matter was "by law committed to agency discretion."19
Construing these words in accordance with notions of public policy, the Court of Appeals held that judicial review of the Secretary's decision not to bring suit 502 F.2d at 89-90.20
In pursuance of the mandate of the Court of Appeals this Court entered an order requiring the Secretary "to furnish a statement of reasons."21
In pursuance of this order, the Secretary filed a statement, which appears as an appendix to the Supreme Court opinion, at 421 U.S. 578-90, 95 S.Ct. 1851.
The Supreme Court on June 2, 1975, reversing the Court of Appeals said:
"We hold . . . that the Court of Appeals erred insofar as its opinion construes 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) to authorize a trial-type inquiry into the factual bases of the Secretary's conclusion that no violations occurred affecting the outcome of the election." 421 U.S. at 566, 95 S.Ct. at 1857.
The Supreme Court detected in LMRDA "a congressional purpose narrowly to limit the scope of judicial review of the Secretary's decision." 421 U.S. at 568, 95 S.Ct. at 1858.
The Court concluded that (1): "clearly the reviewing court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for the decision of the Secretary not to bring suit; (2) therefore to enable the reviewing court intelligently to review the Secretary's determination, the Secretary must provide the court and the complaining witness with copies of a statement of reasons supporting his determination." 421 U.S. at 571, 95 S.Ct. at 1860.
The Court went on to say that Hence it "should inform the court and the complaining union member of both the grounds of decision and the essential facts upon which the Secretary's inferences are based." 421 U.S. at...
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